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Abstract
Periods of expansion and contraction in economic activity, which can appear as crises, can 
be noticed throughout history. When a crisis is very deep, politicians are pressed to find the 
right set  of macroeconomic policies that will lead to a new period of growth and 
development. If the macroeconomic policies currently considered to be mainstream cannot 
make the level of economic activity and employment return to normal, they will eventually 
be replaced by another set  of macroeconomic policies that will then turn into the new 
mainstream. If Classical Liberalism was the mainstream until the 1930s, this was replaced 
by Keynesianism after the great slump; with the stagflation of the 1960-1970s, 
Keynesianism was then replaced by Neoliberalism. This process is determined by the fact 
that voting is also determined by macroeconomic performance. As political parties face the 
challenge of remaining in or gaining power, there is a process of party  convergence to a 
predetermined set of macroeconomic policies, resulting from the establishment of a new 
economic ideology. Therefore, macroeconomic and social policies which are acceptable to 
parties and coalitions become limited by the boundaries of the economic ideology 
established at the time of the last great crisis. The result is convergence and consensus to a 
predetermined set of macroeconomic policies. This dissertation establishes a model 
formalising this process, first using the Brazilian case, then applying it  to Latvia, and 
finally creating a structural analysis of the Latvian economy’s transformation from 
independence until 2008.
Key Words: Macroeconomic Policy; Ideology; Neoliberalism; Business Cycles; Brazil; 
Latvia. 
Anotācija
Ekonomiskās aktivitātes pieauguma un krituma periodi, kas var izpausties kā krīzes, 
novērojami dažādos vēstures posmos. Gadījumos, kad krīze ir ļoti dziļa, politiķiem ir 
jāmeklē tāda makroekonomikas politikas stratēģija, kas radītu jaunu izaugsmes un 
attīstības posmu. Ja tobrīd par vadošo uzskatītā makroekonomikas politika nespēj atgriezt 
pietiekamu ekonomiskās aktivitātes un nodarbinātības līmeni, tā galu galā tiek aizstāta ar 
citu makroekonomikas politikas stratēģiju, kas tādējādi kļūst par vadošo. Ja līdz 20. gs. 30. 
gadiem vadošais bija klasiskais liberālisms, tad pēc Lielās depresijas to nomainīja 
keinsisms; 20. gs. 60. - 70. gadu stagflācijas rezultātā keinsismu aizstāja neoliberālisms. Šo 
procesu virza tas, ka makroekonomiskā situācija lielā mērā nosaka vēlētāju izvēli. Tā kā 
politiskās partijas saskaras ar izaicinājumu iegūt  varu vai saglabāt esošo varu, notiek 
politisko partiju konverģence uz iepriekš noteiktām makroekenomiskām rīcībpolitikām, 
kas rodas no jaunas ekonomiskās ideoloģijas. Tādējādi pēdējās lielās krīzes laikā radusies 
ekonomiskā ideoloģija nosaka partijām un koalīcijai pieņemamas jaunās makroekonomikas 
politikas izvēli. Rezultātā rodas konverģence un vienprātība par iepriekš noteikto 
makroekonomikas politikas stratēģiju. Promocijas darbā ir radīts modelis iepriekš 
aprakstītā procesa formalizēšanai, vispirms izmantojot Brazīlijas piemēru, tad piemērojot 
to Latvijai, un, visbeidzot, veicot strukturālo analīzi par Latvijas ekonomikas 
transformāciju laika posmā no neatkarības atgūšanas līdz 2008. gadam.
Atslēgas vārdi: makroekonomikas politika; ideoloģija; neoliberālisms; biznesa cikli; 
Brazīlija; Latvija.  
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Neoclassical revolution initiated by W. Stanley Jevons in 1871, 
economics is supposed to have been ideology-free. For many, the use of mathematical 
methods would avoid ideology interfering in economic research. However, many years 
later, the question about economic theory having been invalidated by ideological bias is 
still relevant. For example, Joseph Schumpeter was still absorbed with this question in 
1950. For him, Social Sciences could not be ideology-free, since “(A)nalytic work begins 
with material provided by  our vision of things, and this vision is ideological almost by 
definition.”1 Unfortunately, Schumpeter did not develop the theme. After briefly discussing 
the issue in his History of Economic Analysis, the text breaks and a new chapter starts. 
Joan Robinson, from the University of Cambridge, discussed its relevance in the first 
chapter of her 1962’s book “Economic Philosophy.” For her, economics “has always been 
a vehicle for the ruling ideology of each period as well as partly  a method of scientific 
investigation.”2 She wrote an entire chapter analysing the metaphysics, moral, and science 
of economics, but did not develop the mechanisms of interaction between economics and 
ideology mediated by politics.
Therefore, the issue was never fully  analysed. During the 1960s, Daniel Bell 
presented the idea that traditional grand humanistic ideologies were exhausted and more 
conservative ideologies would arise.3  Later, during the 1970’s, both right and left-wing 
authors scuttled their ideas, resulting in a new “end of ideology.” In the beginning of the 
1990’s, as predicted by  Bell, right-wing conservative ideology became again popular. Its 
adherents announced its superiority  proclaiming the “end of history,” thus the end of all 
ideologies.4
A common characteristic of the debate is that  every author claims his/her personal 
beliefs to be pragmatism, while other ideas are considered to be “ideologies,” or false 
beliefs and distorted reality. A second one is that these authors, implicitly or not, assume to 
know the real truth about human nature. Finally, a third characteristic is that usually  it is 
also established a political and economic system based on the newly established 
pragmatism. As politics and economics presuppose relationships of power, from the very 
beginning personal convictions masked as policy are used to justify or to deny the 
established order. This includes choosing specific macroeconomic policies as vehicle for 
ideological dominance.
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1 Schumpeter, J. A. (1987). History of Economic Analysis. London: Routledge, p. 42.
2 Robinson, J. (1978). Economic Philosophy. New York: Penguin Books, p. 1.
3 Bell, D. (2000). The End of Ideology: on the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
4 Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
It follows that during crises the established order can be questioned. In this case, 
ideology can be used as foundation for changing the political and/or economic system, at 
the same time maintaining the established relationships of power unchanged. Ideology, in 
this case, is the agent permitting change to occur, resulting in renewing or maintaining the 
established relations of power. When macroeconomic policy is used as an instrument for 
maintaining or changing the established relations of power, it becomes an ideology itself.
By the beginning of the 1970’s, after approximately  thirty years of Keynesian 
macroeconomic policies, a great number of changes ended the period of economic growth 
and full-employment in advanced countries, sustained by strategies of active national state 
intervention. These changes included the effects of the collapse of Bretton Woods and the 
first oil shock, which resulted in the world economy entering into defensive recession.5 
With the crisis and the process of stagflation, supporters of economic liberalism began to 
questioning the Keynesian postulates, mostly in Europe and in the United States. It turned 
that neoliberalism, a regime of commercial and monetary policy coordinated by  the United 
States and based on Neoclassical utilitarianism, became the new mainstream.6 As a result, 
direct state intervention in the economy to promote growth and development became 
unacceptable.7 Countries with huge structural, cultural, and political differences basically 
pursued very similar macroeconomic policies, basically based on the neoliberal 
framework. This can only be explained as the result of the interaction between politics, 
ideology, and macroeconomic theory, as presented in the model proposed in this 
dissertation.
From the discussion above, this dissertation’s topicality is:
a) Since the Latvian economy is still recovering from the consequences of the 
previous economic crisis, it is necessary to examine its roots and consequences, including 
the choice of the current economic development model;
b) There is a need for economists and politicians to look outside the neoliberal 
paradigm to resolve present economic problems;
c) Until the end of the XIX century, there was not a clear division among politics, 
economics, sociology, philosophy, and anthropology. With the individualisation and 
specialisation of these disciplines, the interrelations between economics, politics, and 
ideology became increasingly ignored by the economic mainstream research agenda.
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5 In a strict sense, the Bretton Woods system was a certain monetary order that was in force during the period 
1946-1973, where the exchange parity fastens, however adjustable, based on the gold-dollar standard, 
although the concept can also refer, in general,  to the applied economic policies for International Monetary 
Fund IMF and for World bank, under the United States government's orientation.
6 Hirst, P., Thompson, G., & Bromley, S.  (2009). Globalization in question: the international economy and 
the possibilities of governance, 3rd edition fully revised and updated. Cambridge: Thompson Polity Press.
7 The reduction of economic growth, the increase of inflation and unemployment, and deficits in the balance 
of payments were considered a result of the Keynesian politics. Key Neoliberal policies are free trade, free 
capital mobility,  monetary restraint, budgetary austerity, the flexibilisation of labour markets and the 
repression of wage demands, the privatisation of public companies and services.
d) This dissertation is based on a multidisciplinary  methodological approach, 
including a dialogue between macroeconomics and politics;
e) It develops a new general model explaining the process transforming economic 
theory  into political ideology. This model is robust enough to explain why Latvia has 
pursued Neoliberal policies since its independence.
f) Finally, the dissertation uncovers the process by  which macroeconomic theory, 
instrumentalised as macroeconomic policy, turns out to be an ideological instrument.
 This dissertation’s research object can be defined as the interrelation among 
economics, politics, and ideology. At the same time, its research subject is the business 
cycle’s influence on macroeconomic policy, reflecting economic and political ideological 
changes, mediated and instrumentalised by politics. In other words, by  occasion of deep 
economic crisis, politicians try to choose the best set of macroeconomic policies to solve 
the crisis, aiming to remain in power. As economic theory  is ideological by definition, the 
chosen set of macroeconomic policies results in politicians and parties converging to some 
specific political ideology. It will be expressed by macroeconomic theory, and 
instrumentalised by macroeconomic policies. This new ideology will substitute the 
previous one, until a new crisis occurs.
Therefore, the following general hypothesis can be formulated: macroeconomic 
policy is determined at the political level, following ideological changes in economic 
paradigms as the output of long-wave business cycles.
From the above hypothesis and theses the following research questions arise:
a) What is the relationship  between economics, ideology, politics, and 
macroeconomic policy?
b) In what manner do business cycles change political ideology and 
macroeconomic policy?
c) Does the preference of left-wing parties for more state intervention in the 
economy and/or of right-wing parties for less state intervention in the economy change in 
direction according to the economic ideology in force? Is there convergence for a specific 
set of macroeconomic policies? 
d) In Latvia’s case, is the idea of convergence valid? Was there only one acceptable 
alternative at the political level for macroeconomic policy?
e) What were and are the consequences for the Latvian economy from the choice of 
macroeconomic policies?
To answer to these questions the main aim in this dissertation is to analyse the 
relationship  between business cycles, the preference for specific macroeconomic policies, 
and ideology aiming to establish a new general theoretical model. The specific tasks to 
achieve this aim are:
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a) To conduct a review of the main literature about business cycles;
b) To discuss the patterns of preference for macroeconomic policy  from the general 
population’s perspective.
c) To discuss the patterns of preference for macroeconomic policy from the 
politicians’ perspective.
d) To determine the relationship between self-positioning in a left-right spatial scale 
and the preference for concrete models of state intervention in the economy, and its 
consistency with the assumed idea that left-wing ideology presupposes more state 
intervention in the economy, while right-wing ideology presupposes no state intervention. 
e) To analyse the pattern of convergence for preferring a specific economic 
ideology and its macroeconomic policies, from the side of the general population and 
politicians, taking political ideology into consideration.
f) To establish a model explaining the relationship between macroeconomic policy 
and ideology.
g) To apply the model to explain the process by which the preference for 
macroeconomic policy is determined in Latvia, and the implications for its economic 
structure. 
This dissertation’s novelty can be recognised in the following aspects:
a) The author presents a new formal model explaining the existence and dynamics 
of macroeconomic ideological cycles, as a result of the economic crisis changing political 
ideology.
b) The analysis and discussion of the results demonstrates that there is a process of 
political ideological change following economic crises, which results in the idea that  there 
is a process of political convergence for a determined average set of political and economic 
ideals expressed as macroeconomic policy;
c) It  uncovers and discusses the process by which macroeconomic policy, since it is 
used as instrument of political legitimisation, turns into an ideology in itself;
d) For the first time in Latvia, it presents an account of the political process in 
Brazil. It also introduces the Brazilian academic literature on the subject, its approach and 
findings, to the Latvian public, thus making it unique in Latvia.
e) It  renews the discussion of economics as ideology initiated by Joseph 
Schumpeter and Joan Robinson;
f) It discusses the influence of business cycles and crisis on determining 
macroeconomic policies;
g) It proves that what became mainstream macroeconomic policy today was 
politically determined during the latest deep economic crisis.
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The defended theses are:
a) Ideological changes follow long-wave economic cycles;
b) As political ideology  changes, the left-right scale moves through time, meaning 
that policies considered to be right-wing, for example, 50 years ago, turn to be considered 
centre or even left-centre policies as demonstrated on the third chapter;
c) These ideological changes result in the establishment of a situation where there is 
no alternative to implementing non-mainstream economic and social policies, because of 
the general belief these policies are right.
d) Macroeconomic policy can be a vehicle for ideology;
e) It  can change political ideology to accommodate the necessities of implementing 
the new economic mainstream's policies;
Approbation of the Research Results
This dissertation is the result of several years of research, which started in Brazil. 
The following peer-reviewed publications is the ones of the author’s more than 60 
publications reflecting the ideas and model developed in this dissertation and their 
application to Latvia:
Books
Berzins, J. (2013). Struggling for Development. Riga: Lux Sit, ISBN 978-9934-8396-4-1.
Berzins, J. (2013). A Desnacionalizacao da Economia Brasileira. Riga: Lux Sit, ISBN 
978-9934-8396-0-3.
Karnite, R., Berzins, J., Popovica, S. (2007). Ārvalstu Kapitāls Latvijas banku 
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Chapters of Books
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Pluto Press.
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Central and Eastern European transitions. New York: Palgrave McMillan.
Articles in Peer-Reviewed Academic Journals
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Duality.” Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, DOI:
10.1080/0965156X.2013.873190.
Berzins, J. (2010). “Neoliberalism and the Development of Underdevelopment in Latvia: a 
Latvian Disease?.” Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies, vol. 1, no. 3.
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Bērziņš, J. (2010). “Political aspects of the Knowledge Society in Latvia: Neoliberalism, 
Schumpeterian Democracy and populism.” Humanities, vol. 1., no. 61.
Bērziņš, J. (2009). “Latvia and the Knowledge Society: Development, Underdevelopment 
and Macroeconomic Performance.” Humanities, vol. 1, no. 58.
Bērziņš, J. (2009). “The Political Economy of Latvia or the Development of 
Underdevelopment.” RSU Zinātnisko rakstu krajūms, Rīga, 2009.
Presentations in International Academic Conferences
Berzins, J. (2014). Brazilian Political Parties’ Ideological Convergence to Neoliberalism 
between 1990 and 2009. ECPR General Conference 2014, 3 to 6 September, University of 
Glasgow, Scotland, presented paper.
Berzins, J. (2012). The Effects of Austerity and Pro-Cyclical Policies upon Latvia. ECPR 
Sixth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 13 to 15 September 2012, University of 
Tampere, Finland, presented paper.
Sommers, J. & Berzins, J. (2011). Development without development: the case of Latvia. 
The Eurozone in Crisis: Challenges and Controversies in the European Political 
Economy(ies) and in Political Economy  Research, Friday  18 - Saturday 19 February 2011, 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany, presented paper.
Sommers, J. & Berzins, J. (2010). Twenty years lost: Latvia and the entropy of order. 
Historical Annual Conference 2010. School of Oriental and African Studies - SOAS, 
London, November 11-14, 2010, presented paper.
Berzins, J. (2010). The International Political Economy of Crisis in Latvia: a Debate 
About the Role of the External and Internal Sides. SGIR 7th Pan-European International 
Relations Conference: Politics in hard times: International Relations Responses to the 
Financial Crisis, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, September 
9-11, 2010, presented paper.
Bērziņš, J. (2010). Neoliberalism and the Development of Underdevelopment in Latvia: 
Perspectives for the Future. Latvia at Crossroads: Scenarios and Strategies for Socio-
Economic Development, RTU Riga Business School, Riga, January 15, 2010, presented 
paper.
Sommers, J. & Bērziņš, J. (2009). Twenty years lost: entropy and Latvia in the Post Soviet 
World. University of London Union, Conference stream: Post-1989 transitions, Journal of 
Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, London, 17-18 October, presented paper.
Bērziņš, J. (2009). The Latvian Disease: Neoliberalism and the Development of 
Underdevelopment. III Workshop of the International Initiative to Promote Political 
Economy SOAS/University of London, Ankara, Turkey, 14-16 September, presented paper.
Bērziņš, J. (2008) Latvia and EU: the Political Economy of Underdevelopment. Fourth 
Pan-European Conference on EU politics, Riga, 25-27 September, presented paper.
Articles in Popular Media
Berzins, J. (2011). “You Made your Bed, Now Lie on It”. The Baltic Times, November 10, 
2011.
Berzins, J. (2011). “Privatize What to Develop Who?”. The Baltic Times, August 31, 2011.
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Berzins, J. (2011). “Latvia and Development: Learning from Previous Mistakes?”. The 
Baltic Times, August 03,2011.
Berzins, J. (2011). “The Magic is Lost”. The Baltic Times, July 06, 2011.
Berzins, J. (2011). “We Still Can Develop. Please, Hurry Up!”. The Baltic Times, March 
09, 2011.
Bērziņš, J. (2011). “Defending Nationalism”. The Baltic Times, February 10.
Bērziņš, J. (2011). “Neo-liberal Populism and the State or who is Really Rational?”. The 
Baltic Times, January 12, 2011.
Bērziņš, J. (2010). “Crisis and State reform in Latvia”. The Baltic Times, December 08, 
2010.
Bērziņš, J. (2010). “‘Schadenfreude’ and Economic Development”. The Baltic Times, 
October 21, 2010.
Bērziņš, J. (2010). “Cut to Grow?”. TheBaltic Times, August, 19.
Bērziņš, J. (2010). “Simple or useful?”. TheBaltic Times, May, 20.
Bērziņš, J. (2010). “The Euro and its Crisis: a Financial or Structural Question?”. The 
Baltic Times, April, 22.
Bērziņš, J. (2010). “Does the State Have a Role in Helping Latvia Exit This Crisis?”. The 
Baltic Times, January, 28.
Bērziņš, J. (2008). “Jautrība ir beigusies: nu jādomā, kā tikt galā ar ekonomiku.” 
Komersanta Vēstnesis, vol. 16, no. 123, pp. 16.04.
Bērziņš, J. (2006). “Kurp ej, Latvija?”. Komersanta Vēstnesis, 25 (31), 28.06.2006, pp. 
3-4.
Lectures as Guest Lecturer
Berzins, J. (2010). Twenty Years Lost or the Development of Underdevelopment in Latvia. 
Lecture at New York University’s Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy, 
28.04.2010.
This dissertation is divided in three chapters plus the introduction and conclusion. It 
has 267 literature references, 22 figures, 39 tables, and one annex. In the first chapter the 
literature on business cycles on both economic and political perspectives is discussed, 
linking their occurrence with changes on ideology, macroeconomic policy, and political 
parties’ behaviour. The second chapter presents the process of ideological transition in 
Brazil, discussing how right and left-wing parties changed from supporting state economic 
intervention for neoliberal policies. The third chapter uses empirical evidence and statistic 
methods to show how much the population and politicians converged to a newly 
established economic and political ideological model based on Neoliberalism, adopting its 
macroeconomic policies as panacea for any economic condition.
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Methodology
The development of this dissertation followed an analytical, descriptive, and 
quantitative methodological approach. The idea of writing about the influence of business 
cycles and the ideological determination of macroeconomic policies surged when once 
reading Kenneth Hoover’s book “Economics as Ideology.”8 There he cites Nixon saying 
“we’re all Keynesians now” (p. 161), even though Nixon was a conservative himself, 
Milton Friedman was his special advisor, and George Schultz was in charge of the budget. 
As Friedman later said, the problem with Nixon “was not intelligence and not prejudices. 
The problem with him was that he was willing to sacrifice principles too easily for political 
advantage.”9 Taking in consideration that economic policy  is determined politically, thus 
changed accordingly to political needs, the main question of this dissertation was ready: 
what is the relationship among business cycles, ideology, and political preference for 
macroeconomics policy?
To answer to this and the other questions mentioned above, as well to fulfil this 
dissertation’s main and specific objectives, its development is divided in two parts. The 
first part privileges an analytical and descriptive methodological approach to present the 
discussion about the interaction between business cycles, politics, and macroeconomic 
policy, as the borders between both fields are very unclear. Thus, instead of choosing one 
single theory and author, the first chapter discuses the main approaches and authors on 
business cycles. This dissertation is interdisciplinary since there are many interpretations 
and understandings about  the inter-relationship between business cycles and politics. 
Therefore, since this dissertation attempts to propose a new theoretical approach, its 
theoretical analysis privileged a multi-level and multi-faceted interaction among several 
authors and approaches, aiming to construct a logic causality among them.
The first step was to structure the theoretical framework to be analysed. The choice 
was to discuss the literature on business cycles from the perspective of the main schools of 
economic thought. Second, the literature on what is called political business cycles was 
also discussed, aiming to find theoretical support for the idea that, on one hand, politics 
and political ideology are influenced by macroeconomic performance, but on the other, the 
former determine macroeconomic policy. Thus, this dissertation’s theoretical discussion 
privileges the causality among business cycles, political ideology, and the preference for 
macroeconomic policy, advancing Joan Robinson and Joseph Schumpeter’s discussion 
about ideology and economics. It  also presents an alternative development to Anthony 
Downs’ theorem of the medium voter, as presented in his book “An Economic Theory of 
Democracy.”
14
8 Hoover, K. R. (2003). Economics as Ideology: Keynes, Laski, Hayek, and the Creation of Contemporary 
Politics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
9  Interview with Milton Friedman. Available in http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/
minitextlo/int_miltonfriedman.html. Access in August 21, 2009.
Thus, this dissertation’s theoretical and methodological fundament is based on 
original texts of leading scholars in Economics and Political Science, providing a unique 
set of the most relevant literature in the field. Below are cited only the most important 
authors.
- About ideology: D. Bell, F. Fukuyama, T. Eagleton, M. B. Hamilton, J. B. 
Thompson, T. Veblen, K. R. Hoover, J. A. Schumpeter, J. V. Robinson, D. de Tracy, R. 
Williams, H. Barth, G. Lichtheim, G. Kennedy, A. Cassels, W. J. Stankiewicz, J. Larrain, 
A. Gouldner, G. Lukács, D. Hawkes, J. Decker, T. W. Adorno, H. Marcuse, L. Althusser, 
F. Nietzche, M. Foucault, N. Chomsky, and others.
- About economic cycles: J. A. Schumpeter, S. Kuznets, I. Wallerstein, M. J. 
Gasiorowski, A. Shaikh, W. S. Jevons, M. Ezekial, T. A. Knoop, J. C. L. S. Sismondi, C. 
Juglar, K. Wicksell, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, C. Diebolt, R. G. Hawtrey, F. A. Hayek, G. 
Haberler, N. Kondratiev, J. M. Keynes, M. Kalecki, M. Friedman, R. E. Lucas, G. J. 
Stigler, G. Myrdal, and others.
- About the interaction between economics, including cycles, and politics: W. D. 
Nordhaus, B. T. McCallum, A. Alesina, C. D. MacRae, V. Ginsburgh, P. Michel, S. Price, 
R. E. Lucas, F. S. Mishkin, T. J. Sargent, K. A. Schulz, A. Downs, G. H Kramer, G. J. 
Stigler, E. Tufte, M. P. Fiorina, H. Eulau, G. Myrdal, and others.
To empirically  demonstrate this dissertation’s theoretical innovation and its 
possibility of generalisation, the first step was to determine the country  to be used as case 
study and the period of time necessary to conduct the analysis. The choice was Brazil. 
First, because it is sufficiently big, both territorially  and economically, to have sufficient 
independency  from the influence of external actors on internal affairs, such as development 
and macroeconomic policies. Second, because the Brazilian economic academia is 
considerably independent. Instead of trying to adapt foreign theories to explain economic 
phenomena in Brazil, Brazilian economists always tried to develop their own theories. One 
example is Mario Henrique Simonsen’s Theory  of Inertial Inflation, Ignacio Rangel’s idea 
that budget deficits result from inflation, thus inverting the Monetarist logic, Celso 
Furtado’s contribution to the debate on economic development, just to cite a few. Third, 
because the economic/business cycles in Brazil are detached from the ones experienced in 
Europe and the USA, exactly  because the country is relatively independent as mentioned 
before. Fourth, because there are the databases of the University of Campinas’ Centre of 
Studies of Public Opinion - CESOP (see below) and the IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative 
Survey (Pesquisa Legislativa IUPERJ - Oxford in Portuguese or PLIO). Both databases 
provide a unique source of raw data for making a comprehensive empirical analysis.
The year of 1989 was chosen as the beginning, because it can be considered the 
year national-developmentalism ended. In this year occurred the first direct elections for 
President in Brazil in 25 years. Second, during the second round the dispute was clearly 
between two distinct ideological models expressed by concurrent concrete macroeconomic 
15
policies: one, supported by Fernando Collor, reflected what became known as economic 
Neoliberalism, mostly based on the conclusions of the Washington Consensus; other, 
supported by Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, reflected the national-developmentalist ideal in 
force since 1930. As Fernando Collor won the elections, 1989 can be considered as the 
very year national-developmentalism was substituted by a new political economic 
ideology. Twelve years later, following the theoretical assumption that parties with 
radically different ideologic and macroeconomic approaches than the mainstream are not 
elected, Lula da Silva’s election as President in 2002 marks the consolidation of his party 
convergence to the mainstream economic ideology and its macroeconomic policies. 
To empirically  demonstrate this dissertation’s hypothesis, a quantitative descriptive 
analysis based upon data from two sources followed: from the population’s perspective, the 
database of the University of Campinas’ Centre of Studies of Public Opinion - CESOP, an 
interdisciplinary  initiative combining the academic and scientific area with private 
institutes of public opinion research, such as IBOPE and DATAFOLHA. Its main objective 
is to recover and make available to researchers the public opinion surveys covering 
politics, society, culture, behaviour, among others. Its database has more than 2300 surveys 
covering the period 1968 - 2012. From the politicians’ and political parties’ perspective, the 
source was the IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey (Pesquisa Legislativa IUPERJ - 
Oxford in Portuguese or PLIO). This is a longitudinal project initiated in 1990, covering all 
elected legislatures since the ending of the military dictatorship. It seeks the congressmen’s 
views on ideology, legislative activity, institutional design, social policy, state reform, and 
foreign policy, among other issues. Between 1990 and 2009 more than 800 different 
congressmen have answered the survey in the years 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, and 
2009.
First, all CESOP’s database consisting of more than 2300 surveys was researched to 
find the ones containing questions relevant for this dissertation. Second, the variables of 
the surveys were selected and prepared for statistical analysis with IBM’s SPSS Statistics 
version 18. First, basic statistical analysis was made, to determine the distribution of the 
variables. Then cross tabulations among the variables were made to check the logic 
consistence between them and to visualise their relationship. The second step was to make 
cross-tabulations among the variables to apprehend the pattern of ideological change. From 
the electors’ side, the chosen years were 1989, 1993, and 2002. From the politicians’ side, 
1990, 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2009. Specifically in these years the surveys’ questions and 
answers were the most adequate to show the relationship between ideology, economic 
policy, and politics. For the first time the CESOP’s database was analysed in such an 
extent. Also, for the first time, the CESOP’s database was analysed together with the PLIO 
database, resulting in this dissertation’s empirical analysis being completely unprecedented 
and unique.
Additionally  to cross-tabulations, regressions were also made to statically test this 
dissertation’s hypothesis. Instead of just running a linear model or merely  testing 
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correlation between/among variables, a simple model based on ordinal logistic regressions 
was established. Ordinary regression analysis is not appropriate for ordinal response 
variables as it is an incoherent model for discrete data.10 In the logistic ordinal model, the 
predictions are logits for the cumulative probabilities associated with being at or below a 
particular category  “j” that can be exponentiated to arrive at the cumulative probabilities 
associated with being at or below the category “j”. Thus, the basic model used on chapter 3 
can be written as:11
 To test the relevance of the relationship between the variables, self-positioning 
following a left-right Likert Scale was set as the independent variable and the preference 
regarding state intervention in the economy is the dependent variable. The tested 
hypothesis by  regressions is this dissertations’s hypothesis: that self-positioning in the left-
right spatial scale has no or small influence in the political choice for state intervention.
Finally, to spatially demonstrate the hypothesis that the ideological self-awareness 
of both population and political parties’ converges to reflect the ideology connected to 
specific macroeconomic policies, two figures representing the mean and the standard-error 
of general people and politicians’ self-positioning in the Likert Scale were made using the 
software package Statsoft Statistica version 7. These figures show not only the ideological 
spatial change, but also the uniformity of opinion among the population and politicians 
(shorter whiskers meaning greater uniformity and vice-versa) between 1990 and 2006 
(population) and 1990 and 2009 (politicians). The model than is applied to Latvia. The 
economic platforms of the political parties that got sits in the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Saeima 
were analysed to establish their convergence to Neoliberalism. Second, a comparative 
analysis was made with the objective to show the effects of Neoliberal ideology manifested 
as macroeconomic policy on the Latvian economy.
ln(Yj' ) = ln
π j(x)
1−π j(x)
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=α j + (β1X1 + β2X2 + ...β pXp )
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11 O’Connell, A. A. (2006). Logistic Regression Models for Ordinal Response Variables. London: Sage, p. 31.
1. BUSINESS CYCLES, IDEOLOGY, AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY
Before discussing ideology, business cycles, and macroeconomic policies, an 
important question must be answered: if economics is to be a “hard science” as proposed 
by W. Stanley Jevons, is it correct to suppose that economists will be rather pragmatic and 
committed to reality than to their own personal moral and political convictions? The 
answer is “usualy not.” Therefore, economics as discipline is by definition ideological. As 
a result, although economists claim to pursue “truth,” they are very often influenced by 
personal ambition, rigid defence of theories, and the weight of tradition in detriment of 
creative participation directed to the common objectives of science. This establishes a 
system of beliefs instead of a system of knowledge.
Thus, an important question that need to be answered is what is or is not  economic 
in nature, and how economics can contribute to the understanding of problems like politics, 
culture, crime, and other topics? The University  of Chicago Economics Department’s 
answer was that Political Economy means the application of economics to politics, law, 
culture, and even family  life, i.e. Gary Becker’s “Rotten Kid theorem.” For others like 
Mishan (1982), Political Economy is the “specific advice given by one or more economists 
(...) to governments or to the public at  large either on broad policy issues or on particular 
proposals or, alternatively, as another term for “normative economics”.”12
In this sense, Political Economy could be considered another word for 
macroeconomics. However, in the scope of this dissertation,it is argued that the term must 
be understood in the same way Adam Smith and the Classics did: Political Economy deals 
with the structure and dynamics of modes of production. In other words, it refers to the 
relationship  of the economic sector with the government, including regulations, customs, 
and law, the distribution of income and wealth, including national socioeconomic 
development as well. In this sense, since macroeconomics deals with the economy as role, 
it is part of Political Economy as discipline. 
In this dissertation it is proposed a division between “macroeconomic theory” and 
“macroeconomic policy.” The first is the formalisation and scientificisation of 
interpretations of economic reality. The second is the application of macroeconomic theory 
to specific economic frameworks, taking in consideration political needs. As a result, 
macroeconomic policy is the adaptation/deformation of macroeconomic theory  by political 
means to deal with political needs. It is politically  determined, at the same time retaining a 
pseudo-scientific character. As macroeconomic policy shapes economic relations, the result 
is a self-reinforcing circle where macroeconomic theory determines macroeconomic 
policy, which will determine macroeconomic theory, starting all over again. This economic 
ideological cycle is the very base for the model developed in this dissertation.
18
12 Mishan, E. J. (1982). Introduction to Political Economy. London: Hutchison.
This scientificisation of economics is very important for politics. First, politics is 
the vehicle putting macroeconomic policy in practice. Second, to a great  extent, the 
popularity of politicians depends on economic performance. Third, macroeconomic theory 
can provide the theoretical justification politicians need for supporting their ideology and 
its policies. Fourth, macroeconomic theory can be an instrument of political legitimisation. 
Since politics is basically about groups of interest struggling for power, macroeconomic 
theory  is used to discredit rival groups, at the same time giving a scientific character to 
shield one own policies from criticism. 
On one hand, during periods of economic stability, the ruling party/coalition and its/
their politicians gain social and political prestige. On the other, as society is the laboratory 
for Economic Science, the apparent success of some school of economic thought’s 
macroeconomic policies in delivering economic stability and even development makes this 
specific approach to become the mainstream, as it is empirically proven to be correct. This 
specific school of thought will then set the research agenda and the valid ideas and 
presuppositions determining economic models, gaining importance and prestige. However, 
as economics is basically a moral science, when an economic school of thought becomes 
the mainstream, it  helps to legitimise the moral and politics associate with it. The 
interaction between politics and economics results in the latter being used to consolidate 
and reinforce the power, dominance, and interests of specific social groups through 
concrete macroeconomic policies. In this case macroeconomics acts as instrument of 
ideological control.
However, economic stability  and growth do not last forever. They are followed by 
periods of crisis and contraction. During these turbulent times, the set of macroeconomic 
policies in force looses credibility. If the crisis is superficial, the social pressure for change 
is not very  strong. Politicians will try to adjust  the macroeconomic policies in force to 
revert the crisis. This includes changing the interest rate, increasing government’s 
investment, reducing taxes, or even devaluating the currency  to boost exports. 
Nevertheless, the core economic theoretical fundaments supporting such policies remains 
intact.
On contrary, when a crisis is very  deep, the economic theory sustaining the policies 
in force becomes discredit. As such crisis often result  in the impoverishment of the middle 
and lower social classes, including because of increasing unemployment, politicians are 
forced to look for different macroeconomic policies to make the economy stable. Naturally, 
the first changes will be within the boundaries of the established economic ideology. 
However, deep crisis usually result from inadequate economic paradigms, having structural 
roots. In this case, it is not enough to superficially change some policies. As they  are 
ineffective, it is necessary to change the basic premises of their determinants. The 
challenge is to find a new political economic model that will give the necessary theoretical 
base to establish a new set of macroeconomic policies that will promote growth and 
development again.
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In the case of softer crisis, the incumbent political group will loose credibility and, 
possibly, will be substituted by other in the next elections. In this case, the economic 
ideology in force will not change. However, when there is a deep crisis, the established 
macroeconomic wisdom is unable to revert the downturn. It is necessary  to go beyond the 
established economic ideology’s boundaries, as the ideas considered to be mainstream turn 
discredited. The process of ideological transition starts first among opposition parties. As 
the incumbent group becomes associated with the crisis and its economic ideology, 
opposition parties try to disconnect from the ideas supporting the policies in force and start 
providing alternatives, usually found in the academic field.
As economics is not an exact science, always there is disagreement among 
academics. Even during good times, when a specific theory  seems to be leading to the best 
macroeconomic policy, there are always some people disagreeing and claiming that  the 
mainstream is wrong. For them, a new crisis is always coming. Since capitalism is cyclical, 
sooner or later they will be correct. As society  is the real laboratory to test economic 
theories, crisis will make the mainstream theories to loose credibility, thus academic 
prestige. Some of the unorthodox/heterodox considered to be marginal will be able to 
explain and to revert the crisis, turning to be the new mainstream. Opposition groups will 
adhere to the new mainstream, if not entirely, at least to the extent of what is politically 
acceptable at that moment.
As macroeconomic theory reflects a Political Economy, with the establishment of a 
new theoretical mainstream, economic ideology also changes followed by  a process of 
political convergence to these new paradigms. However, although crisis can change 
economic ideology, thus macroeconomic policy, the extent of change will be limited by  the 
severity of the crisis and by politicians’ own individual moral and political convictions. 
One example is the British Labour Party which, with Tony Blair, started pursuing 
Neoliberal policies in the 1990’s, although trying to deceive its electorate by  calling these 
policies “Third Way.” Other examples are George Papandreou’s Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, Romano 
Prodi’s the Olive Tree, just to cite some.
This movement can be explained by  a quote of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s 
book The Leopard: “if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.”13 In 
other words, the political parties’ economic ideology is flexible, changing accordingly to 
their necessity of maintaining the relations of power in force. It happened with Classical 
Liberalism, later with Keynesianism, and now it  is happening with Financial 
Neoliberalism. This is consequence of capitalism presenting appealing crises that, in spite 
of a difference in appearance, resemble each other in its essence as they  are fruits of its 
endogenous contradictions. Thus, every crisis is followed by  ideologic change in some 
extent. As capitalism itself, economic and political ideology is also cyclical.
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In a similar way, the debate about the level of state economic intervention since the 
1930’s seems to follow the economic cycles of expansion and contraction in such a way 
that, if in some moments the presence of the state in the economy is desirable, in others it 
is undesirable. In other words, Classical Liberalism (1790-1930) was substituted by 
Keynesianism after the crisis of the 1930s; and Keynesianism (1930-1970) was substituted 
by Neoliberalism since the 1980’s. In each case, although different  levels of state 
intervention were defended with passion, the result was the establishment at the political 
level of a specific set of economic policies with a correspondent level and form of state 
intervention.
Economic liberalism first surged in France during the XVIII century, after an 
intellectual movement called Physiocracy. Its main hypothesis was that all social wealth is 
originated from agriculture, and trade and industry were just transforming agents of the 
wealth produced by earth. Through his Tableau Economiqué, François Quesnay 
demonstrated the interdependence of several economic activities, showing how 
manufactured products in cities were changed for agricultural products, these changes 
being mediated by money. As there would be a natural social order of social and economic 
relations, the government should not intervene in the circular flow of goods, above all 
imposing price controls, because just free competition would be enough.14 
After the I Industrial Revolution, Physiocracy’s main postulates lost their validity, 
although some subjects as the rent of the land and the support for economic liberalism 
continued to be discussed in pieces like Adam Smith’s “The Wealth of Nations.” Adam 
Smith’s liberalism is based upon the idea that each individual seeks the best for him/
herself, so the union of all individual actions in searching individual well-being would 
automatically result  in maximum social well-being. More precisely, the private capitalists 
individual actions would lead to an optimal situation for the society that could not be 
improved by the action of a political leader or legislator. More precisely, the actions of 
individual private economic agents would result in a well-being situation for the society 
that could not be improved by any action of a political leader or legislator. Therefore, there 
would be an "invisible hand" that would harmonise the social relationships, solving the 
conflicts of interest, especially those present  in the existent contradictions between 
production and consumption. As a result, this process could be compared as if there was a 
sort of "invisible hand" that would harmonise social relations, thus solving conflicts of 
interest, including those relative to the contradictions between production and 
consumption.15
After the appearance still in the first half of the XIX century of several left-wing 
theories, including socialism, supporting broader state intervention in the economy as 
reaction to Classical Liberalism, the Marginalist school, also called Neoclassical School, 
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offered a renewed intellectual support  for economic liberalism. It  was established based on 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill’s epicurean concept of utilitarianism. The concept of 
maximum happiness is the fundamental generalisation of human nature, transforming 
morals in a type of calculation of pleasure and pain, abstracting to selfishness or altruism. 
With base in that concept, Neoclassical authors built a system where there is an 
unequivocal tendency  to equilibrium, as the result  of the human capacity to calculate 
suffering and pain using a compound mathematical tool. It  gives the base to the theory  of 
marginal utility. Still, social well-being would not come from the individual actions of 
capitalists, but from the consumers’ capacity  to choose what maximise their utility and 
whose demands are perfectly  understood and fulfilled by the capitalists. This way 
consumers, holders of complete information when maximising their utility, would submit 
the capitalists to their desires and needs. Again, the state is not needed.
The same logic applies to the labor market. Labor consumers (the capitalists) would 
naturally  maximise the amount of labor being demanded if there is no state intervention; in 
other words, they would maximise their utility relative to labor. The same applies to 
workers. They would calculate pleasure (the salary) in relation to pain (the work) and each 
individual would rationally  decide how much labor to offer. Therefore, there would be only 
voluntary and frictional unemployment because, if the economy is in equilibrium, all those 
accepting a certain wage level proposed by the market would find work.16  That 
presupposition indicates that, without state interference, there would be no crisis as the 
economy would be always at full employment. Thus, crises shall be understood as the 
result of state and its inefficient bureaucracy limiting individual freedom.
Albeit there was a period of economic depression (1873 - 1890’s) at the same time 
the Neoclassical School was established, liberal economic policies continued to be 
considered the most proper to promote economic development and growth. This can be 
explained as the result of a peculiar economic moment: the level of economic activity 
continued to considerably  grow because although commerce experienced some sharp 
depressions between 1873 and 1890, the world production, far from stagnating, continued 
to increase strongly.17 
Thus, the depression during this period was not within the productive and 
commercial sectors, but in falling prices, interests, and, more relevant, profits. However, 
thanks to the colonialist pulse and to the great volume of investments abroad, the crisis’ 
negative effects were minimised thanks to the reversion of the fall of the profit  tax by 
economic policies opposed to economic liberalism. Thus, the role of the state was not 
limited to just guaranteeing the right to private property, but to pursue protectionist policies 
while letting the internal private sector to be free. This combination of colonialist 
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expansion with nationalist protectionist policies resulted in the was the World War I with 
the state assuming the rule of the economy.18
With the end of the conflict, there was an attempt of reestablishing the effective 
economical order of the previous period by readopting old liberal dogmas, personified in 
the gold standard and in price deflation.19  Despite the attempts of reproduction of the 
paradigms anterior to the World War I, there was the depression of the 1930s. During the 
1920s, the process of internationalisation had reduced its expansion thanks to the 
maintenance of protectionism policies and to the fact that most  of the big economies were 
self-sufficient. Still, there was an asymmetry in the level of economic development 
between the United States and the rest of the world so the former except  to some raw 
materials, did not need the latter. Finally, the economy did not generate enough demand for 
a sustained expansion. This was the result of falling general wages, augmenting profits, 
income concentration, and the incapacity  of mass demand in accompanying the growth of 
the industrial productivity. With the expansion of consumer credit  and the increase of 
financial speculation in the United States, the fall of the stock exchange of New York 
triggered the Great Depression of the 1930’s.20
The idea supported by liberals that a fall in the consumption would result in falling 
interest rate, thus increasing investment, and leading the economy to a new equilibrium 
and to full employment, was unable to give a credible answer to the crisis. Concomitantly, 
the notion that state intervention would disturb private initiative and maintaining the gold 
standard through deflationary politics and fiscal rigidity was necessary were not effective 
to take the economy to full employment. Only direct state intervention reverted the 
situation.
Making a critic to the precepts of the liberal political economy, Keynes 
demonstrated that the economy would admit multiple levels of equilibrium, but only one 
would result in full employment. This way, he showed that besides frictional 
unemployment and voluntary unemployment, involuntary  unemployment would still exist; 
an individual would accept the salary determined by the market and anyway he would not 
be able to find a job. This happens because of the "Say’s Law" not being true. Instead of 
supply determining its own demand, expectations about future demand determine the level 
of economic activity. In other words, future demand determines present supply and not the 
contrary. This way, the direct intervention of the State in the economy was necessary  to 
alter the expectations of the economic agents, making the economy to experience a new 
expansion cycle.21 The years that followed the Great Depression, mainly  those after the 
World War II, were marked by the state planning and regulation of the economy in the 
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capitalist block, both in developed as in underdeveloped countries, to avoid the occurrence 
of systemic crises.
The answer is that there was no alternative. Following the model developed in this 
dissertation, I shall argue that, in case Latvia had become independent during the 1950s, it 
would have adopted Keynesian macroeconomic policies with developmentalist tendencies, 
similar to Finland, South Korea, or Brazil. At that time, these economic policies were 
considered centrist in the political spectrum. Nowadays they are considered to be left-wing. 
As Latvia regained its independence in the beginning of the 1990s, it  based its 
macroeconomic and development policies in the - at that time - newly established 
economic ideology, Neoliberalism. In Latvia’s case, the model developed in this 
dissertation also can be used to answer to the questions presented above.
First, when Latvia was part  of the Soviet Union, the economic theory in force was 
Marxism-Leninism. On the political side, it was enforced by  the Communist Party, 
resulting in the establishment of Soviet Communism as macroeconomic ideology, with 
specific monetary  and fiscal policies, trade regulations, among others. It also had its 
specific economic institutions and structures, reflected by  Soviet industrial, educational, 
and social policy, and political institutions and structures like, for example, the state 
bureaucracy. The interaction of these three factors determined the USSR’s macroeconomic 
performance. With the poor economic performance of the 1980s, the support for the system 
experienced a huge decline. As it was impossible to change the incumbent party  and its 
macroeconomic policies, thus changing its ideology itself, the regime and its system 
collapsed. As the result was the former Soviet countries’ converging in a greater or smaller 
scale to capitalism, they automatically were pushed to adopt Neoliberal ideology as their 
nexus. In Latvia’s case, this transition was quite radical.
This was done in the article “Ignacio Rangel visits Latvia: Crisis and the Political 
Economy of Duality,” published in Routledge’s Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central 
and Eastern Europe, by this dissertation’s author. Latvia’s transition to Neoliberalism is 
dually determined. On the one hand, it reflects the ideological imposition of Neoliberalism 
by the international community, mainly  by the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and the European Union. On the other, it reflects the political alliance between the 
major (oligarchs and politicians) and the minor partners (industrial and financial economic 
agents).
As both have no specific economic ambition other than immediate short-term 
profits, both major and minor partner are indifferent to the internal consequences of the 
secondary  pole external side’s (the foreign one) interests. Oligarchs are satisfied with their 
business: although they lost some political power, they  still have a great level of influence 
upon the state to keep things as usual. The minor partners are more worried about budget 
consolidation than with economic development, while people are emigrating with such 
intensity that  demography became a matter of national security. In the political sphere, the 
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result is the establishment of a model similar to Schumpeterian democracy; in the 
economic sphere, the result was the last economic crisis.22
To make clear the relationship between business cycles, ideology, and 
macroeconomics policy, first it is necessary to define the meaning of ideology to be used 
within this dissertation. The term ‘ideology’ has a whole range of useful meanings, not all 
compatible with each other. In this way, to try to determine a unique universal concept of 
ideology would be to put aside the wealth of the particular idiosyncrasies of each of the 
various existing concepts. To unmask the process of economic and political change that 
follows crisis, it  is necessary  to find a concept that apprehends the richness of the process. 
Most concepts of ideology are not able to help enlightening the process of political and 
economic change triggered by crisis. As a result, it is necessary  to find or establish a 
concept of ideology reflecting the interaction between politics and economics, without 
simplifying the process to the usual notion of distorted reality.
The most usual notion of the term “ideology” can be find on dictionaries. One of 
the most common dictionaries on the Internet, the Microsoft’s Encarta, defines the term as:
1. system of social beliefs: a closely organized system of beliefs, values, and ideas forming the basis 
of a social, economic,  or political philosophy or program; 2.  meaningful belief system: a set of beliefs, 
values,  and opinions that shapes the way a person or a group such as a social class thinks, acts, and 
understands the world.
Accordingly to the Dictionary of Latvian Language,23 ideology is a “(…) form of 
consciousness, which reflects the reality regarding the interest of a political, juridical, 
moral, aesthetic, philosophic system of judgement.”24
The Houaiss Dictionary of Portuguese language defines the term as a25
System of interdependent ideas (beliefs, traditions, principles and myths) sustained by a social group 
of any nature or dimension reflecting, rationalising and defending its own moral, religious, political or 
economic interests and institutional engagements; (…) body of philosophical,  social, political, etc, 
convictions of an individual or group of individuals.26
Terry Eagleton has compiled a list  of notions about the concept of ideology in 
recent decades as:27
i. the process of production of meanings, signs and value in social life; 
ii. a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class;
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iii. ideas that help to legitimate a dominant political power; 
iv. false ideas, which help to legitimate a dominant political power; 
v. systematically distorted communication; 
vi. that which offers a position for a subject; 
vii. forms of thought motivated by social interests; 
viii. identity thinking; 
ix. socially necessary illusion; 
x. the conjuncture of discourse and power; 
xi. the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world;
xii. action-oriented sets of beliefs;
xiii. the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality;
xiv. semiotic closure;
xv. the indispensable medium in which individuals live out  their relation to a social 
structure;
xvi. the process whereby said life is converted to a natural reality.
A common feature of Eagleton’s list is that the ‘term’ ideology  is mostly attached to 
expressions as “faith,” “political power,” “false ideas,” “distorted communication,” “social 
interests,” “illusion,” “confusion.” In other words, that the concept of ‘ideology’ is attached 
to the notion of falsification of the reality, to defend interests of some social group, what 
meet the usage by the person-in-the-street. When in an ordinary conversation someone 
claims the other is speaking ideologically, the first  is judging that what is being said is the 
result of the judgement of a particular issue through some rigid framework of preconceived 
ideas distorting their understanding, being rather connected to fanaticism or to the 
manipulation of consciousness. In this case, the opposite of ideology would be “empirical” 
and/or “pragmatic,” as in a positivist sense.28
On the one hand, most of these formulations are incompatible with each other. If 
some of them are based on the idea that ideology  means any  sets of beliefs motivated by 
social interests, it cannot mean dominant forms of thought within a society. On the other, 
some formulations are compatible with each other. In this case “ideology  is both illusion 
and the medium in which social actors make sense of their word, then this tells us 
something rather depressing about our routine modes of sense-making.”29  Also, some of 
these formulations are pejorative, while other are ambiguous or not pejorative at all. 
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Nobody would claim that  his/her own thinking is ideological, in other words, nobody 
would acknowledge having convictions based on illusions.
The concept of ‘ideology’ has myriad definitions. Some of them are positive, like 
Lenin’s “class consciousness”; some are negative, like Marx and the distortion of the 
reality  of social relations to conceal forms of social domination; some are neutral, like the 
notion that ideology is the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their 
world. Also, it has been used to describe different phenomena, like distorted 
communication and semiotic closure. Even, there were attempts by  the postmodernists to 
give the term an accessory character, substituting the term ideology  by  discourse. However, 
a common feature among all definitions of the term is its relationship to a particular social 
class, representing its moral, costumes, patterns of conduct, and, most relevant, its social 
order and social stratification, which will determine class structure and the relations of 
social subordination.
Hamilton (1987) made an extensive examination of the literature on the concept of 
ideology finding “no fewer than 27 different elements or definitional criteria which have 
been combined in various permutations of from two to at least seven.”30  He proposed a 
definition of ideology as “a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual 
ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and 
arrangements, and/or aimed to justify  a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents 
seek to promote, realise, pursue or maintain.”31
However, as Terry Eagleton noted, “the force of the term ideology lies in its 
capacity to discriminate between those powers struggles which are somehow central to a 
whole form of social life, and those which are not.”32 This determines the essence of the 
term’s various concepts, making possible to establish a division between two main groups: 
one, to whom ideology acts as a vehicle to establishing and sustaining social domination 
(Marx, Lukács, Gramsci, Althusser, Adorno, Foucault); other, to whom ideology  represents 
a system of ideas reflecting the world view of a specific class, without an active role in 
determining the process of dominance (Lenin, Stalin). Although both share the idea of 
social stratification, the first deals with the idea that ideology  is part  of the mechanism of 
dominance; for the second, ideology has a neutral character and is not a direct mechanism 
of domination. It  is rather a system of ideas, a world view to be imposed establishing a 
social structure of domination.33
The second notion is sterile for understanding the role of ideology on shaping the 
sociopolitical process in the form of macroeconomic policies. As ideology  presupposes 
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relations of domination and it just represents the world view of a particular social class, it 
may  be used only to clarify its idiosyncrasies, thus being a characteriser and assuming the 
character of “system of ideas.” It is this notion that assumes the role of system of ideas 
giving the justification to totalitarian regimes to establish ideal societies through direct 
relations of power resulting in social dominance. In this case, what is being called ideology 
is not a vehicle of dominance, but merely the representation of the ideal. That is why where 
there are direct  relations of power there is no place for ideology. Totalitarian regimes use 
direct coercion, making the concept of ideology to be invalid in this case.
Taking in consideration that ideology is a vehicle for dominance, a general 
definition for the term can be “the combined systemic ways in which social and political 
dominance is established and sustained through subliminal means.” This meet much the 
notion of ideology accordingly  to Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, and Foucault. However, 
Althusser was right when affirming that ideology is manifested through material actions. 
Thus, it is necessary to complete the proposed definition to “the combined systemic ways in 
which social and political dominance is established and sustained through subliminal 
means, and which is manifested through material actions”.
The base of this definition is Marx’s notion that ideology  is a system of ideas 
expressing the interests of the dominant class, representing class relations in an illusory 
form.34  However, this concept is insufficient to include the theoretical developments 
reflecting the social changes of the last 150 years. As society become more developed, raw 
forms of ideological domination loose their appeal, making the idea of illusory 
representation of class relations to represent just one part of the process. Much more 
important is the subliminal character of the process of domination. In the place of direct 
indoctrination, power relations must appear to be natural, like Marx’s idea that “sie wissen 
das nicht, aber sie tun es” (they do not know it, but they are doing it).35
This is one of the most important features of the nowadays process of ideological 
control, where even the most ideological individual claims to not being subjected to 
ideology. The postmodern claim that ideologies do not exist anymore, together with false 
claims such as “end of history”, “end of politics,” among others, is one of the most peculiar 
and subliminal forms of ideological indoctrination and domination. It uniformises the 
possibilities of thought, offering a supposed non-ideological ideological version of truth. 
Making a paraphrase, “they do not know, but their thought is determined and subordinated 
to it,” because it is the culmination of the process of establishing a universal pseudo-truth 
in the form of a standardised thought which cannot be denied, because of the lack of 
acceptable alternatives. Thus, its power results from the suffocation of doubt.
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This acceptance of a standardising process of thought is mostly favoured by  the 
natural tendency of mankind to socialise and to belong to some social group. Since self-
respect is usually  determined by the respect accorded by the other members of the social 
group one is part, only individuals with a very peculiar self-consciousness can in the long 
run maintain their self-esteem when facing the disesteem of their fellows.36 As ideology 
unifies and uniformises the process of social though, to be accepted as part of some social 
group is necessary to agree with this group’s thought under certain limits of freedom, 
accepting its intrinsic moral values, social codes, world view, etc.
It is not the case to affirm there is a unique universal thought, and every individual 
thinks exactly  in the same way. Also, that there is only one social group in the society. 
Rather, there are a multitude of social groups interacting simultaneously  in different social 
levels, with individuals often participating in more than one group at the same time. 
However, there are specific levels of ideological social hierarchy among these groups 
resulting from their social impact, from the group  considered as the entire social fabric to 
specific micro-groups like social clubs and student organisations. The ideology of groups 
in social smaller positions - if there is any - is always subordinated to the upper ideology of 
the society  they are part. An exception are revolutionary or anarchist groups. In this case, 
as ideology is not sufficient to control their members, most probably they will be arrested 
in the very first moment they constitute a serious threat to the established social order.
Individual thought is also differently influenced by ideology. Individuals have some 
degree of liberty to form their thought independently from ideology. They may even 
recognise the mechanisms of ideological dominance they are being submitted to. The way 
to do so is to acquire knowledge avoiding intellectual myopia. The ideological use of the 
educational system resulting in increasingly  lower levels of educational quality, together 
with the process of glamorisation of ignorance in postmodern societies, and the reification 
of television as determinant of social reality together with sports as factor of social and 
political alienation, are making reality to be false consciousness. As this process is seen as 
unavoidable and there is no place for the establishment of other realities, reality became 
itself an ideology.
To understand how reality becomes ideology is fundamental to apprehend the 
process by  which politics and economics turn to be ideologies themselves, and 
macroeconomic policy  becomes an ideological instrument. As discussed before, as reality 
is also ideology, it can be shaped accordingly to particular interests. The media, the 
educational system, the legal apparatus, just to cite a few, can be used to alter, if not reality 
itself, the way it is understood and apprehended. Economic crisis can trigger deep  changes, 
including changing the structure of established relations of power. At the same time, 
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economic interests - in a broader sense - determines much of politics. As a result, the 
behaviour the economy expressed in the form of business cycles affects the political 
sphere. Since politics by  definition cannot be ideology-free, it is possible to conclude that 
there are ideological cycles connected to business cycles.
In other words, the political, economic, and social order is determined a priori, 
being imposed from above. Ideology will change to guarantee that the established relations 
of power will remain the same. This means that the instruments of ideological control, 
including macroeconomic policy, will also change to reinforce the established order. In this 
case, as economic crises are able to change the established relations of power, it is 
necessary  to understand the process by which macroeconomic policy starts to 
instrumentalise some determined ideology reflecting specific relations of power. To 
understand this process, it is necessary  to make a short discussion about ideology and 
economics as discipline. 
When Adam Smith was alive, there was not a clear division between “economics” 
and “politics,” thus Political Economy was expected to be ideological. During the XVIII 
century, it was clear that what happen in the economic sphere is the result of decisions 
made in the political realm. This explains why Smith’s “The Wealth of Nations” is a piece 
of political advice upon how to make a nation wealthier, in this case the United Kingdom. 
Other authors of the Classical School of Economics as John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, 
Thomas Malthus, and Jean-Baptiste Say, although mostly  concerned with economic 
questions and supporting liberalism, were also aware that the economic system is regulated 
at the political level. The same applies to Karl Marx, who wanted to change the political 
structure with the objective of transforming the economic system or, at  least, to increase 
the political bargaining power of trade unions to get  social benefits, thus moulding the 
economic system accordingly to the needs of a specific social class. During this period, 
instead of “Economic Science” there was “Political Economy,” the study  of the process of 
distribution of national income including government expenses.
It was only in the late XIX century that politics and economics became completely 
independent fields. The publication of W. Stanley Jevons’ “The Theory  of Political 
Economy” in 1871. In this book, Jevons for the first time used the term “Economics” 
instead of “Political Economy.” Jevons was convinced that Political Economy should be 
transformed into Economic Science, a field of mathematics. Accordingly to him “it is clear 
that Economics, if it is to be a science at all, must be a mathematical science. (...) As the 
complete theory  of almost every other science involves the use of that calculus, so we 
cannot have a true theory of Economics without its aid.”37
With the publication of Alfred Marshall’s “Principles of Economics” in 1890, 
“Political Economy” became out of fashion. It was substituted by “Economic Science,” 
which ignores social, political, and cultural aspects in its analysis. Economists tried to 
30
37 Jevons, W. S. (1965). The Theory of Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 3.
subordinate the study of social questions - here in an ample meaning and including 
political relations - to a very limited framework based on Bentham’s utilitarianism: there is 
no society, but a market where people are perfectly rational and information is freely 
available for every individual. Thus, to be an exact science economics turned asocial, 
apolitical, and acultural, at the same time pretending to be non-ideological.
Nevertheless, economics never got rid of ideology. First, although economics 
turned to be formalised by quantitative methods, all econometric models must follow a 
strong logic based on economic theory. In other words, these models are based on the same 
philosophic presuppositions economic theory is. If some philosophical assumption is 
flawed, the result is that even if the model is methodologically correct, it can be wrong 
because of its philosophical presuppositions; second, because economists have political 
positions. Making a simplification, Marxian/Marxist economists are left-wing, Keynesians 
economists orbit in the centre, and Neoclassical/Orthodox economists are conservative 
right-wing. As a result, the philosophical presuppositions giving base to economic models 
are the result of a subjective notion of the world determined by personal views about 
reality. The interaction of every  person with reality  is unique; it is determined by  individual 
views and experiences, as well as personal idiosyncrasies, resulting in a particular concept 
of the real. As a result, the mathematisation of individual convictions and world-views 
turned into economic models does not make them to be scientific.
Macroeconomic performance is one of the most important factors influencing 
election output. Usually, the most stable a country’s economy is, the better to the 
incumbent political group. Unfortunately to politicians, capitalism presents appealing 
crises that, in spite of being apparently different, they  are similar to each other in their 
essence as the result of systemic disequilibriums. Each time a crisis is very deep, not only 
incumbent political groups are penalised, but the economic policies being enforced loose 
credibility. There is a double movement. By one side, the ideological pendulum changes 
from left to right or vice-versa, including new economic policies considered to be correct 
ones. By other, politicians change their rhetoric trying to connect themselves with the new 
correct set of ideologies recently established. This movement very  often is very subtle, as it 
is the result  of ideological change, in the sense discussed in the introduction. As the 
establishment and/or maintenance of relations of power is determined ideologically, 
macroeconomic policy  turns to be an ideology itself independent of political convictions. 
However, on contrary, it can determine political convictions.
It is possible to notice expansion and contraction periods of the capitalist activity 
along History, that some times appear in the form of crises, other times in the form of a 
high accumulation level. Several authors researched the occurrence of economic cycles as, 
for instance, Kitchin, Juglar, Kuznets and Kondratiev, the following division could be used 
as for their duration:38
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Seasonal cycles: until one year
Cycles of Kitchin: 3 years 
Cycles of Juglar: 9-10 years
Cycles of Kuznets: 15-20 years
Cycles of Kondratiev: 48-60 years
In a similar way, the debate about State intervention in the economy seems to 
follow somehow the expansion and contraction cycles of the economic activity in such a 
way that, if in some moments the presence of the state in the economy is desirable, in 
others it is undesirable. Since the capitalist system’s establishment, three main phases of 
political and economic regulation may be perceived:39  Laissez-faire before the Great 
Slump, planning/interventionism from the 1930s until the middle of the 1970s, and 
Neoliberalism since then. In each one, the hierarchical relationship between politics and 
economics have changed.
Economic, political and social paradigms’ changes occur on different levels, usually 
resulting from crisis; it may  be social, political or economic, with each factor occurring 
isolated or in combination. With a crisis, the social, political and economic models in force 
start to be questioned by social, political, and economic actors. In other words, the 
mainstream is challenged by the historical process natural outcomes, on three levels. The 
first is on the economic level, as a matter of course. The second is on political economy, as 
politicians start  to look for answers for the question “how to solve the crisis,” following 
different levels of radicalism, depending on how deep the crisis is. Thus, one group  of 
ideas is substituted by others. Also, usually, society/voters are more prone to support 
political and economic reforms in times of crisis, resulting in a more favourable 
environment for change.40 The third level is the intellectual, as it seems to exist a cyclical 
character affecting intellectual certainty, in a process where people's analysis become fuzzy 
and distorted by beliefs, and dialogue turns to be ideological rather than academic. As a 
result, what was once considered absurd and revolutionary turns to be dogmatic common 
sense until a new idea appears.
The existence of crisis and their cyclical character have always been of interest to 
economists. In political economy it is possible to distinguish three basic lines explaining 
how capitalism reproduces itself.41  First, there is the practically common sense that 
capitalism is able to regulate itself: it may be smooth and efficient accordingly  to the 
neoclassical school, or it may be erratic and wasteful accordingly to Keynes, but in both 
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cases nevertheless being always self-equilibrating. As a result, if left for itself 
(Neoclassical theory) or if adequately managed (Keynesianism), it may last forever.42
Second, there is the idea that capitalism itself is incapable of self-expansion, as it is 
necessary  an external source of demand to assure growth. Malthus, and even Marx, 
discussed the existence of fluctuations due to temporary deficiencies in the demand for 
goods, although without assuming the existence of a regular pattern. Although John Stuart 
Mill and Sismondi perceived some regularity, but only in 1910 John A. Hobson developed 
the idea of a cyclic “underconsumption theory.” Third, there is the notion that although 
capitalism is able to expand itself, the process of economic reproduction deepens its 
internal contradictions resulting in a crisis. This line is almost  exclusively Marxists, 
including such ideas like “falling rate profit” and “profit squeeze” explanations of crisis.43 
In the next section the main theories of business cycle are presented, arbitrarily organised 
in time, from the oldest to the newest.
1.1 Business Cycle Theories
1.1.1 The Laissez-Faire Tradition
The laissez-faire tradition relies on the well known assumption that capitalism is a 
self-regulating harmonious system, regulated by the natural tendency of reaching a general 
equilibrium determined by  Adam Smith’s invisible hand, and supported by  Say’s Law.44 In 
this sense, crisis result from Human Nature meeting Physical Nature, with economists 
focusing on agriculture’s cyclical nature. One of the first of these models is William 
Stanley Jevons’ ‘Sunspot Theory,’ appearing for the first time in his ‘The solar period and 
the price of corn’ of 1875.
Between 1875 and 1882, Jevons outlined a theory  of economic fluctuations relying 
upon the notion of a corn-generated surplus.45  He explicitly attributed the existence of 
economic crisis as a result of fluctuations in the corn harvest as consequence of weather 
variations, arguing for the existence of a cyclical pattern. Accordingly to Jevons, low 
sunspot activity  on the sun’s surface negatively influences plant growth, thus agricultural 
output. As a result, there would be an economic cycle closely following the sunspot’s 
cyclical behaviour.46  The argument was that merchants, bankers, and investors base the 
decisions about credit and investment on observed data concerning the harvest.47
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Jevons presented statistical evidence that economic cycles lasted approximately 
10.43 years from peak to peak, while sunspot cycles lasted 10.45 years. As there is 
statistical correlation between both variables, Jevons was convinced that his theory was 
scientifically proved. Nevertheless, when new evidence showed that  in reality sunspot 
cycles lasted 11 years, Jevons tried to preserve his theory arguing that this was well known 
by farmers, implying they would also change their behaviour accordingly, thus resulting in 
a break between real sunspot activity  and economic pattern.48 However, although today  the 
sunspot theory is discredited, the hypothesis that expectations can be self-fulfilling, 
meaning that falling expectations can result in diminishing outputs without any real 
changes in the economy, anticipates the debate on how expectations might affect 
behaviour.49
Another theory explaining economic cycles through agricultural behaviour was 
Mordecai Ezekial’s Cobweb theorem. The model explained the influence of shocks to 
supply and demand resulting in cyclical fluctuations in prices and output. It is based on the 
idea that there is a time lag between supply and demand decisions, specially to agricultural 
markets, since there is a time lag between planting and harvesting.50 The model has two 
main assumptions: a) goods are perishable, so farmers must accept the current price, and b) 
the decision about the amount to be planted in the spring is based on what  the price was 
last fall, meaning that expectations are backward and not forward looking. In the case of 
bad weather conditions resulting in poor harvesting, the shortage of a determined crop  X 
results in higher prices. If farmers are expecting the high price conditions to continue next 
year, they will raise the crop X’s production, resulting in a high and in lower prices. 
Following, if they  expect the prices to be low, they will decrease the production of the crop 
X, resulting in high prices again.51
The equilibrium price is at the intersection of the supply and demand curves. A bad 
harvest in period 1 makes supply  falls to Q1 and price rises to P1. If farmers expect the 
higher price to continue, the supply of the period 2 will be high, at Q2, making prices fall 
to P2. The process repeat itself, oscillating between periods of low supply with high prices 
and high supply with low prices. Nevertheless, although the Cobweb theorem is not  a 
useful explanation of modern market’s behaviour, because of its two assumptions, it 
represents very truthfully  the essence of the laissez-faire tradition, where the system is 
disrupted by crisis, but their determinants are external to the system’s normal functioning. 
In this sense, crisis are determined either by  Nature (sunspots, crop failures, etc) and/or by 
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human nature (psychological cycles of optimism and despair, wars revolutions, etc). The 
figure below shows how the model works.52
Figure 1.1
Cobweb Theorem
A development of this approach is the Neoclassical Marginalist  School. As 
discussed before, the concept  of maximal happiness is the fundamental generalisation of 
human nature, transforming morality in a type of calculation of pleasure and pain, 
abstracting the selfishness or the altruism.53  As a result, as each individual is looking to 
obtain the maximum amount of pleasure - here understood as satisfaction and well-being - 
the result is always the best for the society as a whole. Any kind of interference from the 
State is thought to promote undesirable disequilibriums.54 In other words, the absence of 
state intervention is the best guarantee for achieving growth and development.
This model has three fundamental assumptions. First, that  there is perfect 
competition in all markets. This means that all firms and consumers are price takers, and 
wages and prices are perfectly  flexible. Also, that there are no barriers to entry and/or exit, 
there is perfect information of economic conditions, all goods (including labour) are 
perfect substitutes, and markets always clear. Second, decisions are made based on real 
and not on nominal values, meaning there are no monetary illusions and the economic 
agents adjust all nominal variables changing the price level before they act. Third, all 
individuals have the same preferences and act alike in every way. Combined with the other 
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assumptions, this means that  macroeconomic pattern is the simple summation of average 
microeconomic behaviour.55
In the Neoclassical model, the aggregate output results from the combination of two 
factors of production, labour and capital. A very  important feature is that both inputs are 
subject to diminishing marginal returns.56  As consequence, as the demand for labour is 
determined by firms, this implies that firms will hire more workers only at lower real 
wages, looking to maximise profits. With the workers, it is the contrary. As people are 
making supply decisions, utility maximisation rather than profit  maximisation is the main 
objective. As completely  rational agents, workers will decide how many hours of work 
they  will supply, basing their decision in the calculation between the benefits resulting 
from the income earned from working and leisure (pleasure), and working hours (pain).57 
As a result, the supply of labour will increase if wages are also increasing.58 
As they are determined by  the labour market, in other words, between supply  and 
demand for labour, there would be just voluntary  and frictional unemployment. If the 
economy is in equilibrium, all workers accepting market wages would be able to work. 
This presupposition indicates that, without State interference, workers and firms are free to 
maximise their utility and profits, taking the economy to the equilibrium point, thus to full 
employment of the productive forces. As a direct result, unemployment is assumed to exist 
only as a result  of voluntary  rational choice. An individual is unemployed because of his/
her own rational choice of not accepting the market wage.
As there is no unemployment, by derivation there is no crisis. This implies that, 
without state’s interference, there are no cycles in the Neoclassical model, as all changes in 
output are temporary and automatically  corrected by the market mechanism. However, 
when there is state interference, changes in output are considered to be permanent as a 
result of changes in the aggregate supply as the output of tax policy and government 
regulation. In this case, although the market reaches the equilibrium point. it  is not the 
optimal. Thus, the responsibility for crisis fall on the State and its inefficient bureaucracy 
impeding individual freedom.59
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1.1.2 Overinvestment Theories
Jean Charles Léonard Sismondi in his 1819’s “New Principles of Political 
Economy” argued that  the circularity of transactions was not always complete and 
immediate, questioning capitalism’s self-equilibrating character, and denying Say’s Law. 
His argument was that investment allied with technological improvements would result in 
an over-supply. Usually  receiving subsistence wages, the workers are unable to purchase 
all the products the economic system is able to produce. With further technological 
developments, competition among businessmen to profitably employ their capital will 
intensify over-production. As a result, the increasing gap  between supply and demand turns 
into an economic crisis.60
Thomas Malthus, more known because of his Law of Population than his debate 
about the need of unproductive consumption, also defended a considerably different idea 
about the nature of the aggregate demand than Say’s view. Accordingly to him, it  is the 
demand for consumer goods that regulates production and only a certain rate of growth is 
‘sustainable.’ Malthus was convinced that workers’ consumption was insufficient to 
maintain the level of economic activity. On the other hand, with increasing investments, 
production, and thus profits, there is a tendency for businessmen to spend a smaller 
proportion of their gains, saving more, as they are more interested in accumulating than in 
consuming. Although wages are source of purchasing power, they are also costs of 
production inversely related to profits, in the sense that higher wages mean lower profits. 
As a result, the only way to not reduce profits is to find a differential surplus whose 
expenditure increases the aggregate demand without inflating costs of production. The 
solution proposed by Malthus was to assure the existence of unproductive consumption to 
compensate the effects of overinvestment. In this sense, the expenditures of statesmen, 
judges, lawyers, clergymen, etc, would compensate the deficiency of consumer demand.
Only in the second half of the XIX century there was an attempt to establish a 
theory  of the economic cycle. In 1862, the French doctor Clement Juglar published his 
“Des Crises commerciales et leur retour périodique en France, en Angleterre, et aux États-
Unis,” identifying a 7-11 years industrial cycle related to the credit  cycle.61  Analysing 
time-series material,62  he established three main phases determining a cycle: upgrade - 
explosion - liquidation. This led him to diagnose the nature of depression as a natural 
consequence of prosperity,63  meaning that depressions are adaptations of the economic 
37
60 Sismondi, J. C. L. S. (2009). Novos Princíncipios de Economia Política. Curitiba: Segesta Editora.
61  Juglar, C.  (1862). Des crises commerciales et leur retour périodique en France, en Angleterre, et aux 
États-Unis. Paris: Guillaumin, available for download in http://books.google.com. Downloaded in 
15/03/2010.
62 Mainly prices, interest rates and central banks balances.
63  For an analysis of Juglar’s method and chain of thought, see Schumpeter, J. A. (1987). History of 
Economic Analysis. London: Routledge, specially pages 1089-90.
system to previously periods of prosperity. Thus, it would be necessary to determine the 
causes of prosperity, in what Juglar has failed.64
Knut Wicksell was one of the first to explore the relationship between investment 
and prosperity. He focused on the effects of money supply’s fluctuations over investment, 
thus over output and employment. Accordingly  to Wicksell’s ‘cumulative process,’ there is 
a ‘natural’ rate of interest, where savings are equal to investment. In the case fluctuations in 
the money supply  change the interest  rates either above or below the natural rate of interest 
there are changes in the level of economic activity.65  As a result, if the market rate of 
interest is under the ‘natural’ rate of interest there is a period of economic expansion with 
rising prices; on contrary, if the market rate of interest is above the ‘natural’ rate of interest 
there is a period of economic contraction with falling prices. As there is a natural tendency 
to equilibrium, sooner or later there is a period of correction/recession, where the level of 
investment, production of consumer goods is pushed back to a level compatible with the 
‘natural’ rate of interest.66
M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky used Wicksell’s notion of freedom of investment levered 
by credit. In his theoretical explanation of the cycles free loanable capital had a crucial 
role. The accumulation of capital occurs practically at a constant rate, because it results 
from the flow of savings of those groups whose income is not affected by  the economic 
cycle. On contrary, the transformation of these savings into fixed capital, i.e. investment, is 
essentially  discontinuous. This different dynamic behaviour between the supply and 
demand of loanable funds is the basic cause of economic fluctuations.67
In a contraction phase, falling investments results in free capital, which lie in banks 
waiting for investment. Thus, this excess supply  will result in a continuous fall in the 
interest rate, resulting in a high degree of instability. The idea is the more there is such 
paralysed capital, the more powerful must be drive towards productive investment. As a 
result of lower interest  rates and of re-established positive profit expectations, the stock of 
capital will flow to all productive sectors, mainly  to those producing capital goods. The 
economic system enters an expansionary phase of the cycle.68
In this phase, the rate of investment accelerates sooner or later making the demand 
for free capital to be greater than its demand. The consequence is the progressive 
exhausting of free capital, whose shortage will result in a fall in share prices, and ipso facto 
to a stock market crash. As turn to be impossible to direct new free capital into fixed 
capital, there is a fall in the aggregate demand in all sectors, thus ending overproduction.. 
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This downturn turns into a recession, establishing the conditions for a new expansionary 
phase.69  During this period loanable funds are established in banks again, by savings on 
fixed incomes of those gaining on deflation, making the economic system ready for 
another expansion, as banks start to lend again.
Arthur Spiethoff, a student of Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, built his 
theory  of cycles upon Tugan-Baranovsky’s cycles. His main contribution was giving credit 
an endogenous character through innovation. The expansion originates in some capital 
goods industry, probably from technological change resulting in reducing costs, or from 
opportunities in some underdeveloped country, i.e. new markets; the increase of profits 
results into a sectorial expansion, ending in a phase of general economic expansion 
financed by an explosive credit expansion.70
As a result, there is a sharp increase in the demand for raw materials necessary  to 
the production of durable goods, like cement, iron, glass, lumber, and other construction 
materials, resulting in new investment to add capacity  in these sectors. Although much of 
the investment occurs during the expansion period, as new plants start producing, there is 
an increase of the supply, reducing prices, thus profitability. With the social need for these 
sectors being fulfilled, and as these sectors are overdeveloped, their consequent downturn 
spreads to the entire economic system, resulting in cumulative decline of income and 
employment. A new phase of expansion stay latent, waiting for innovations.71
Dennis H. Robertson followed Spiethoff’s theoretical base, albeit concentrating on 
money  as vehicle of fluctuations resulting from expansionary  credit. There is a 
considerable time-gap between the moment the decision to invest is made, and the moment 
the implementation of the investment starts. Also, to make all investment plans real, huge 
loans are necessary, which the existing savings and profits are not sufficient to finance. As 
a result, there is a natural expansion of the monetary  base resulting in inflation, creating an 
illusory inducement to expansion. The downturn follows Spiethoff’s approach.72
1.1.3 Early Monetary Overinvestment Theories
Three main authors turned a monetary theory into a cycle theory: Ralph G. 
Hawtrey, Friedrich A. von Hayek, and Gottfried von Haberler. The common feature on 
their theories is that they are highly based on Wicksell’s idea of the relationship between 
the natural rate of interest and the money  rate of interest. However, as Wicksell argued, the 
critical source of cyclical disturbance is the nature and operation of monetary institutions, 
i.e. the Central Bank and private banks. Since banks may  create their own money, thus 
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increasing the monetary  base, they focused on the role of credit in the relationship between 
money, prices, investment level, and the cycle.
For Hawtrey, the economy is a ‘single sector’ system and the cycles result  from 
vertical imbalances caused by miscoordination of monetary resources through time. He 
built  his system on Marshall’s oral tradition and Wicksell’s analysis of credit expansion 
and contraction.73 Accordingly  to him, changes in bank credit make the economy to go out 
of the equilibrium point, as they change the the effective demand for commodities which is 
compatible with the money outlay  of consumers. As Hawtrey accepted Say’s Law, in 
equilibrium consumption equals production, and consumers’ outlays equals consumers’ 
income. As consequence, consumers and traders are not changing their cash balances, 
banks are not changing the volume of bank credit, and there is no net export or import of 
gold. This extremely delicate equilibrium, which is easily  disturbed, will turn to be 
cumulative disequilibrium.74
The key  to understand Hawtrey’s cycle is traders’ future expectations in relation to 
the interest rate, meaning that increased spending by consumers out of their balance is the 
least source of economic disturbance.75  As traders’ future expectations improve,76  they 
release cash and look for bank credit to increase their working capital. Thus, the interest 
rate turns to be working capital’s price, explaining why traders are so sensitive to its 
changes. If the aggregate money income rises as a result of increasing loans,77 the interest 
rate goes down. As a result, traders will borrow more money from the banks to increase 
their inventories demanding increases in production. As increasing production takes time, 
the aggregate money supply is momentarily  too large for the level of economic activity. 
The increased income will be spent in consumption, stimulating excess demand, resulting 
in additional cash being released by traders and banks. This again adds to consumers’ 
income, again reducing traders’ stocks. A vicious cycle is established, where profits 
increase because wages and interest rates are relatively rigid in the short-run.78
The downturn comes when bank reserves drain, what may be aggravated by  an 
increase of imports and a flow of capital abroad, forcing the interest rates up, stopping the 
expansion. Traders will stop  investing in their inventories reducing their demand for goods, 
what will make production to contract. However, monetary  contraction comes first, 
resulting in consumers lowering their demand for goods, what will partially rebuild 
inventories and make traders to reduce their demand on firms even more. In the ending, the 
result is crisis and depression until the banks are well supplied with money and start 
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lending again.79  In resume, changes in bank credit, following changes in the state of 
monetary reserves is, in Hawtrey’s view, the only  cause of business cycles, what Friedrich 
Hayek disagreed.80
Although Hayek believed that bank credit is the ultimate cause of cycles, he gave 
more importance to its impact in the productive structure. His theory combines a 
Wicksellian theoretical base with the process of increasing and decreasing the production 
of capital goods relative to consumer goods. Two fundamental elements of his analysis are: 
(a) the idea of domestic economic equilibrium resulting from the equality  of domestic 
savings and investment, and (b) the disruption of this equilibrium is caused by monetary/
credit disturbances, rather than price disturbances.81
The cycle starts following a credit expansion resulting from the accumulation of 
loanable funds making the natural rate of interest to fall below the real interest rate,82 i.e. 
the interest  rate resulting in equilibrium. An investment expansion follows, increasing the 
demand for capital goods, thus making the aggregate demand to be greater than the 
aggregate supply. However, as loans are used to increase the production of capital goods, 
there is a momentary relative shortage of consumer goods resulting in rising prices and in 
forced savings, funding a further expansion of credit. As the rising prices of consumer 
goods increase sectorial profits, their production also expands pressuring the capital goods 
sector. In this moment, the production of both consumer and capital goods can even 
increase together.83
This process will take place until there is full-employment. In this case, the rising 
demand for consumer goods will result  in rising prices again. This will make the consumer 
goods sector more profitable than the capital-goods sector, making both sectors to inter-
compete for factors of production. This process will result in rising factor-costs, i.e. wage 
and interest rate. As capital goods sector dynamics are structurally fragile, higher wages 
resulting in decreasing profits, and higher interest rate reducing the overall investment 
level decrease the demand for its products. As consequence of the natural contraction 
process, people are fired, first  on the capital goods sector. As these people stop  to 
consuming, the consumer goods sector also shrink, making the investment level to fall 
further, as consumer goods firms also demand capital goods. The production of capital 
goods fall again, etc.84 Thus, the business cycle is inherent to a credit economy.
Accordingly to Hayek, the divergence between the natural and real interest rate is a 
natural output of the process of economic development. It represents a tendency  in the 
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economic system. It is endogenous to the system.85 Although the disturbance may not be 
monetary, money is what gets in the way of an immediate adjustment to a new equilibrium. 
In this sense, monetary creation is the most sensitive issue. Although changes in the money 
supply may result from flows of capital and issuance of central banks, the most important 
issue is the often disputed creation of deposits by other banks.86  That’s why Hayek 
defended the idea that bank activity should be regulated.87 
Another Austrian scholar in both senses, nationally and theoretically, Gottfried von 
Haberler stressed the role of money but also of institutional arrangements influencing the 
determination of wages and prices. Emphasising the similarities and differences among 
episodes of business cycles and downplaying their deterministic approaches, he believed 
the German word Konjunkturschwankungen (conjunctural fluctuations) to be more 
adequate to describe the phenomenon.88 
Haberler believed that economic cycles were mainly  determined by credit, which 
has a much deeper and fundamental influence on the whole economic system. In a process 
of increasing money supply through banking credit enough to avoid general prices from 
declining even with lower relative costs and greater output, the interest rate goes below 
what the market level, i.e. the relationship between savings and demand for credit would 
determine. As a result, there will be long-term investment projects in excess to real savings 
in the market, what will manifest itself as an economic downturn and depression. During 
this period, people become reluctant to spend money due to pessimism and negative 
expectations about the future, wishing to hold their wealth in a liquid form. However, as 
prices decrease, their purchasing power, i.e. ‘real’ assets increase until a point where 
people start spending again. This will increase the demand for both consumer and capital 
goods, resulting in higher employment rates, and ending the recession/crisis.89
Even if people were reluctant to spend in the depression because of pessimism and 
a desire to hold their wealth in a more liquid form, as prices and wages decreased, the real 
value and purchasing power of their money assets would be increasing, since each unit of 
money  at  lower prices could now buy more. A point would be reached at which people 
would find it advantageous to start spending again, at which time prices and wages would 
no longer have to fall, and all those desiring employment would find employers willing to 
hire them to satisfy this renewed demand for goods and services.
1.1.4 Long Wave Theories
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Great booms and great breakdowns occur in Capitalism, attracting the attention of 
both economists and businessmen.90  At first, crises were mainly looked as individual 
catastrophes, the interruption an even flow or of an expansion, caused by  some external 
factor and not by the idiosyncrasies of the process of economic reproduction.91 The laissez-
faire authors, including those of the overinvestment school as Hayek, believed that 
business cycles are short as proposed by Clément Juglar.
The Russian economist Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kondratiev in 1925, by occasion of 
the publication of his book “The Major Economic Cycles,” was the first to present to the 
international audience the idea that, from an empirical perspective, prices, wages, interest 
rates, investment, production, and consumption fluctuated in both short and long waves.92 
Mainstream economists do not accept Kondratiev’s idea, rejecting it with considerable 
hostility, as it can pose a threat to policymaking based on Neoclassical orthodox monetarist 
theory  and other similar ideologies like the Austrian School. In this sense, it is considered 
part of heterodox economics.93 Besides the polemic, ten features of the Kondratiev cycle - 
also commonly know as Kondratiev’s waves - which can be joined in a broader theory, 
may be identified as follow:94
a) There have been four Kondratiev’s waves starting around 1785;
b) The Kondratiev’s waves are not simple periodicities, as they differ in duration;
c) The Kondratiev’s waves differ as to dominant technologies and industries;
d) The Kondratiev’s waves differ as to dominant forms of energy; 
e) Consecutive Kondratiev’s waves show the advent of newly prominent nations;
f) The Kondratiev’s waves is characterised by four qualitatively and quantitatively 
discernible stager: recovery, prosperity, recession, and depression;
g) The Kondratiev’s waves must be fitted into a wider framework of shorter cycles (as 
Juglar’s cycles, for example) and longer cycles, and histories (i.e. the hegemonic cycle and 
the life history of contemporary civilisation);
h) The four stages of the Kondratiev’s waves can be represented by logistic functions with 
diminishing returns;
i) The stages of the Kondratiev’s waves differ macropsychologically, with the phases of 
recovery and prosperity being more exciting (i.e. open to new ideas and practices), and 
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more dangerous (i.e. greater tendency to wars, rebellions, etc.); the phases of recession and 
depression show increasing conservatism in thought and behaviour;
j) The interfaces between consecutive Kondratiev’s waves show mounting instability and 
chaotic behaviour.
Nevertheless, the literature is not very  clear about the idea of growing complexity 
of successive Kondratiev’s waves. Globalisation and the establishment of the United States 
as main hegemon, together with increasing environmental problems, may have resulted in 
previous indicators of Kondratiev’s waves loosing their diagnostic value because “among 
other reasons, data are distorted or masked by the authorities and even by some scholars.”95 
Although this maybe a real problem, another much more important factor is the process of 
restructurisation capitalism is passing through. Since the ending of the gold standard, a 
relevant part of the financial sector has been gradually  constituting itself as an independent 
corpse from the productive sphere, but which has the power to determine the crisis since 
then. As Kondratiev’s waves are based mainly on the real economy, this disconnection may 
have jeopardised its validity.
In any way, Kondratiev himself identified three long waves. The first Kondratiev’s 
wave may be understood as the First Industrial Revolution, including the prolonged of its 
absorption. It is usually dated from the eighties of the XVIII century to 1842. The second 
goes through what is called the age of steam and steel, running between 1842 and 1897.96 
The third is connected with the Second Industrial Revolution, being known as the 
Kondratiev of electricity, chemistry, and motors, being dated from 1898 until the beginning 
of the II World War. After Kondratiev’s death, some authors have identified at least one 
more, usually two waves. One going from 1940 until the ending of the 1980s, and another 
from 1990 which is still happening. Table 1.1 presents the dates and technological 
developments which hypothetically have been driving these long cycles.
Table 1.1
Kondratiev’s Long Waves
Length Innovations
First Wave
1780-1815: Expansion
1815-1842: Contraction
Water power; Textiles; Iron
Second Wave
1842-1875: Expansion
1875-1896: Contraction
Steam; Rail; Steel
Third Wave
1896-1920: Expansion
1920-1940: Contraction
Electricity; Chemicals; Internal-
combustion engine
Fourth Wave
1940-1970: Expansion
1970-1990: Contraction
Petrochemicals; Electronics; 
Aviation
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Length Innovations
Fifth Wave
1990-2010: Expansion
2010-20??: Contraction
Digital Networks; Software; 
New Media; Financialisation
Source: Author’s own schematisation based on Schumpeter, 1989 and Knoop, 2004.97
The explanation that these long waves are driven by  technological innovation was 
given by Joseph Schumpeter in his 1928’s book “The instability of capitalism.”98 The base 
of his argument is the idea of innovations destroying any stable economic system. 
Accordingly to him, there is one element in the capitalist process incarnated in the kind and 
function of the entrepreneur, which by its mere working and from within, will destroy  any 
equilibrium that is already established or in process of establishing itself, even in the 
absence of outside disturbances. Thus, the action of the process of innovation is not 
reducible to description by means of infinitesimal steps, as it produces the cyclical waves; 
by its time, these waves are fundamentally  the form progress assumes in competitive 
capitalism. As an answer to periods of depression, a new equilibrium that absorbs the result 
of innovation carried out in the preceding periods of prosperity will emerge.99 The result is 
necessarily a new equilibrium, where “the old ones adapt themselves or drop out; incomes 
are rearranged; prosperity  inflation is corrected by automatic self-deflation through the 
repayment of credits out of profits, through the new consumers' goods entering the markets 
and through saving stepping into the place of " created " credits. So the instabilities (...) do 
not go on accumulating.”100  This forms the base of Schumpeter’s concept of creative 
destruction.
However, as Schumpeter argued later, technological innovation resulting in creative 
destruction is not constant, as it  results from ideas developed sporadically  among different 
industries. As consequence, business cycles must be understood as pulsations of the rate of 
economic evolution. In general, economic changes are attributed to three group of 
forces:101  external factors as the demand of governments for new military weapons; the 
factor of growth, meaning “the continuous gradual changes in population and in the 
volume of savings and accumulation, changes that do not require drastic shifts in the 
combination of productive factors and thus may be attained by the ordinary, run of the mill 
economic agent addicted to an habitual and adaptive type of activity;”102  and those 
innovations resulting into effective changes in the combination of productive factors.
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Thus, business cycles are periodic fluctuations in the intensity at which innovations 
are introduced into the economy, but which are discontinued due to the fact that innovative 
ability  is unequally distributed. The capacity to initiate and to overcome obstacles to to 
innovations is limited to only few individuals, while a majority will only follow. In a state 
of equilibrium, some individuals will pioneer the innovative process; if they  succeed, 
others will follow, until the innovation turns to be a common thing, what will turn into a 
new equilibrium.103  However, simultaneously to this process, there is an expansion of 
banking credit making prices and interest rates to rise, resulting in the first phase of the 
business cycle to be a boom.104
As innovations are usually  concentrated in one or few industries, and the increase in 
risk of uncertainty is more effective if all opportunities to innovate are finished, the boom 
ends as soon as the perturbation of the previous equilibrium had gone far enough to make 
future expectations about the relations of prices, costs, and quantities to be fuzzy.105 Also, 
as resources are diverted from known to unknown productive processes, which may not be 
efficient or reliable, productivity is overall reduced. While the rate of innovation 
diminishes, a period of readjustment in which entrepreneurs hold stock follows, receding 
the level of economic activity to a new equilibrium level. As a result, credit  volume, 
interest rates, and prices decrease, although total output usually is larger than in the time of 
the first equilibrium.106
Thus, the primary model accounts for a two-phase cycle: an upward boom from the 
equilibrium level that is followed by  a recession resulting into a new equilibrium level. But 
as entrepreneurial activity  is erratic, the fundamental process of innovation may intensify 
the boom and the depression, establishing a secondary model. Even in this case, the 
economy returns to equilibrium whatever the intensity  of depression is, although the new 
equilibrium is not necessarily identical with that which would have been achieved without 
the depression. The combination of the primary and secondary  models produces a four-
phase cycle of prosperity, recession, depression, and revival. The upper turning point is 
determined mainly by the primary model, while the revival point is essentially determined 
by the secondary model’s dynamics.107
1.1.5 Keynes and Business Cycles
Keynes was the first economist to develop a truly aggregate model of economics, 
making a distinction between microeconomics and macroeconomics. His model was also 
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one of the first quasi-general equilibrium macroeconomic models, as it looked for the 
interactions between the goods, money, labour, and financial market at the same time.108 
Although Chapter 22 of his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money is 
dedicated to the analysis of the business cycles, the entire General Theory is about business 
cycles, as Keynes believed capitalism is naturally unstable. Thus, business cycles are 
natural phenomena in this economic system. In order to discuss his vision about  the 
business cycle, it is necessary to analyse his concepts of employment/unemployment, 
effective demand, as the role of expectations as determinant of the economic activity level.
He did not have a high regard for the Classical (or laissez-faire) theory of business 
cycle, as he thought it was incomplete. In his general theory, he wrote about the 
(Neo)Classical tradition that “it is astonishing what foolish things one can temporarily 
believe if one thinks too long alone, particularly  in economics (along with the other moral 
sciences), where it  is often impossible to bring one’s ideas to a conclusive test either formal 
or experimental.”109  Keynes critic was mainly directed to the (Neo)Classics’ assumption 
that only  voluntary  unemployment exists, as discussed before; in resume, that only those 
works who do not accept the current real wage will be unemployed 
His belief was that employment is very volatile. Thus, the (Neo)Classical 
economists’ explanation that unemployment results from changes in people’s incentives to 
work or by changes in the marginal product of labour could not be applied to the real world 
as these factors do not fluctuate in a month-to-month perspective as employment does.110 
More, the (Neo)Classical approach do not consider involuntary  unemployment as 
plausible, as it  goes against perfect competition model’s fundaments. This exposed this 
approach to ridicule, when they  had to argue the 25% unemployment rate observed during 
the Great Slump was the result of too many workers being unwilling to work for the 
current wage, preferring to stand in breadlines for hours.111 In this case, the usual solution 
to cut wages - direct or indirect) to increase employment would not work.
First, since there is imperfect mobility of labour, imperfect competition - and not 
perfect competition - is a better model to explain how markets work. Second, “wages do 
not tend to an exact equality  of net advantage in different occupations, any individual or 
group of individuals, who consent to a reduction of money-wages relatively  to others, will 
suffer a relative reduction in real wages, which is a sufficient justification for them to resist 
it.”112 In other words, workers do not take real-wage in consideration, but rather compare 
their own money-wages relative to what similar workers are receiving. Third, even in the 
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case workers are organised and not prepared to work for lower money-wage, although a 
reduction in the current level of money-wages could result in strikes or in withdraw from 
the labour market of currently employed labour, if there is inflation resulting in lower real-
wages the same is not to happen. Accordingly to Keynes, “it would be impracticable to 
resist every reduction of real wages, due to a change in the purchasing-power of money 
which affects all workers alike; and in fact  reductions of real wages arising in this way are 
not, as a rule, resisted unless they  proceed to an extreme degree.”113 Thus, voluntary and 
frictional unemployment are rather exception than norm.
Nevertheless, there is a third category of unemployment introduced by  Keynes, 
named “involuntary” in the strict sense, what is not admitted by the (Neo)classical theory. 
Keynes concluded that “men are involuntarily unemployed if, in the event of a small rise in 
the price of wage-goods relatively to the money-wage, both the aggregate supply of labour 
willing to work for the current money-wage and the aggregate demand for it  at that wage 
would be greater than the existing volume of employment.”114  In other words, there are 
situations where the workers are ready to work for lower money-wages, there would be a 
demand for such labour by such price, but the actual volume of employment is smaller. 
Thus, the economy may be at equilibrium without full-employment, meaning there are 
several levels of equilibrium, with only one resulting in full-employment.
What Keynes did was to deny Say’s Law, inverting the causality of aggregate 
demand’s determinants. Say viewed the economy as an exchange society, where goods are 
exchanged by other goods. Thus, every act of production automatically creates a market for 
the product produced, making available the monetary  means for purchasing it. As a result, 
any excess supply of goods is a logical impossibility, and aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply are necessarily equal. However, if this were true, competition between business 
would always result in an expansion of employment until the point where a further increase 
in the value of the aggregate demand will no longer be followed by any increase in output, 
in other words, it is a situation of full employment. 
Keynes denied this idea following two assumptions. First, that the present level of 
investment is determined following expectations about future demand. These expectations 
are dependent of the economic agents’ psychological state, together with what Keynes 
called inducement to invest.115  Second, following Malthus idea that a society will often 
suffer from an inadequate level of effective demand,116 that when aggregate real income is 
increased aggregate supply also increases, but less than income. In other words, higher 
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incomes result in higher savings; part of the money invested to produce determined level of 
services and goods is not being used to demand these services and goods.117 As a result, “to 
justify  any given amount of employment there must be an amount of current investment 
sufficient to absorb the excess of total output over what the society chooses to 
consume.”118 This adds uncertainty to Keynes’ approach.
The conclusion is that  given the relationship between the propensity  to consume 
and the amount of new investment, only  one level of employment is consistent  with full 
employment.119  Thus, if the propensity  to consume and the amount of new investment 
result in an insufficient aggregate demand, the level of employment will fall below the 
supply of labour potentially available at  the current real wage.120 In this case, the richer a 
community  is, the broader will tend to be the gap between its real and potential production. 
Nevertheless, the result is a paradox. A poor community will be able to consume by  far 
most of its output, thus a small amount of investment is sufficient  to result in full 
employment. On contrary, a wealthy  society will have to find much more opportunities for 
investment to bestow full employment, as usually in this case much of what is earned is 
saved.
Keynes used this analysis to explain economic crisis in General Theory’s chapter 
22. As he states in the beginning of the chapter, “we shall find that it (the trade cycle) is 
highly  complex and that every element in our analysis will be required for its complete 
explanation.”121  Keynes’ explanation of business cycles relies in two elements. First, 
behaviour rooted in uncertainty  and, second, cumulative dynamic processes taking place in 
historical time. Nevertheless, Keynes was convinced that macroeconomic instability was 
mainly caused by fluctuations in investment. He explained periodic economic fluctuations 
following two main ideas: a) investor behaviour is rooted in uncertainty; and b) 
fluctuations in investment reflects divergence between objective and speculative marginal 
efficiency of capital.122
Keynes defined investment as the process of wealth accumulation in the form of 
durable capital, which is associated with fluxes of expected revenues and costs that are 
projected into the future. The decision to invest is based on expectations about the 
unknown future revenue and costs. As a result, the level of investment fluctuates because 
the future is uncertain, making investor’s expectations to change. These expectations are 
largely based on the economic agents’ impressions of what others believe will happen in 
the market, usually made with little confidence, mostly relying on conventional wisdom in 
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face of individual ignorance. Nevertheless, economic agents are inherently optimistic. The 
natural forecast of this optimism as market sentiment, which does not  reflex real economic 
conditions, will lead to them to continue to expect positive returns well beyond the point 
where would be acceptable. As reality appears, when real profits are compared with prior 
projections, the insubstantial fundaments of the expectations means that the re-evaluation 
is sudden and even catastrophic.123  Thus, expectations’ volatility  explains the dynamic 
nature of investment patterns.
The volatility  of expectations reflects behaviour based on uncertainty  in place of 
optimising behaviour in an environment characterised by risk. Keynes in General Theory’s 
chapter 12 made a clear distinction between risk and uncertainty. The state of long-term 
expectations, which forms the base for decisions, depends not only on the most probable 
forecast possible to be made, but also on the confidence with which this forecast is made. 
In other words, on how much is possible a forecast  to be wrong; if large changes are 
expected, at the same time it  is very uncertain as to what concrete form these changes will 
take, then the confidence will be weak.124  It is the lack of confidence resulting from 
uncertainty that will result into wrong decisions concerning investment. At the same time, 
it is the divergence between objective and speculative expectations during a boom that will 
result in crisis.
 Following this idea, Keynes proposed the existence of a business cycle following 
the usual pattern, where a boom is followed by  a recession, then a recover followed by 
another boom. The interaction of four factors explains the wave. First, the negative impact 
of rising stock of capital on the marginal efficiency  of capital. As the stock of capital rises 
with net increases in investment, the expectations of future profits decline. It is a 
characteristic of the boom that investments are made with expectations of a much bigger 
yield than can be achieved in reality. For example, to expect an investment to yield 16%, 
when in conditions of full employment it would yield 8%. Keynes explain this behaviour 
as the result of the nature of organised investment markets under the influence of buyers 
ignorant of what they are buying, together with speculators who are more concerned with 
speculative than with reasonable estimations of capital assets’ future yield. When 
disillusion comes, the optimistic expectation is replaced by a contrary pessimistic mood, 
where an investment that, for example, would in fact yield 8% is expected to yield near 
nothing.125
Second, as the marginal efficiency  of capital collapses, there is a sharp  increase in 
the demand for liquid money. In other words, a collapse in the marginal efficiency of 
capital is associated with a rise in the interest rate, leading to a decline in investment. 
Nevertheless, increasing demand for liquid money, except those associated with increasing 
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trade and speculation, does not increase until after the marginal efficiency  of capital’s 
collapse. As the collapse has begun and economic agents in general start to fight for 
liquidity, the interest rate increases even more, sharpening the downturn even more. Third, 
the marginal propensity to consume accompanies the decline in the fall in asset values. As 
people see their assets being reduced they feel impoverished, what exerts a very depressing 
influence. Much worst is the case of people who have employed borrowed funds to 
increase their assets as, for example, in the case of investments in real estate or in the stock 
market. Fourth, the durability  of capital and the carrying cost of surplus inventories will 
determine the persistence of stagnation. The depression is to remain until the economic 
agents’ expectations change, resulting in more investment.126
In resume, the boom which will result in a slump is the result of the combination of 
a rate of interest, which in the correct state of expectation is too high for full employment, 
with a distorted state of expectations preventing this rate of interest from being 
discouraging. Thus, a boom is a condition when over-optimism wins a rate of interest that 
would be seem as excessive in normal conditions. As a result, the remedy to avoid booms 
turning into recessions is a low interest rate. From here, Keynes reached two main 
conclusions.
First, that the remedy for the business cycle “is not to be found in abolishing booms 
and thus keeping us permanently  in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus 
keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.”127  Second, that in “conditions of laissez-faire 
the avoidance of wide fluctuations in employment may, therefore, prove impossible 
without a far-reaching change in the psychology of investment markets such as there is no 
reason to expect.”128 Still, the conclusion is “that the duty of ordering the current volume 
of investment cannot safely  be left in private hands.”129  In other words, the State must 
guarantee a low interest rate, or a level of investment sufficient to the economy to reach 
full employment, or both.
1.1.6 Chicago’s Neoclassical Economics and Business Cycles
Chicago’s neoclassical economics is today’s mainstream. Also, it has also 
influenced much of Social Sciences in general, making Political Sciences, Anthropology, 
Sociology, among others, to apply neoclassical economic presuppositions, mainly rational 
choice behaviour based on utilitarianism, consumers theory, and perfect competition, as 
base to explain voters and candidates behaviour, social movements, psychology, 
international relations, in other words, it turned to be a universal methodological panacea 
of modern times. However, before the 1970s it was not. Rather, to disagree with 
Keynesianism until the ending of the 1960s was considered a heresy, in the same intensity 
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then it  is now to disagree with Neoliberal Chicago’s economic neoclassical monetarism. 
Monetarism’s main features are practically the same than traditional neoclassical economic 
theory. Thus, its fundaments relies in three basic principles, each one presenting a slight 
modification from the original.
First, prices and wages are perfectly flexible, although perfect information does not 
exist. Monetarists believe that perfect competition best  describes market behaviour. 
Nevertheless, perfect information about the money supply  and the price level is impossible 
as a result of central banks’ interference in the market mechanism. Firms and households 
have adaptive expectations, meaning that they  are looking to the past instead to the future, 
and only change their expectations gradually based on past perceptions.130  Second, 
changes in the aggregate demand do not affect real output in the long run, but they do 
affect real output in the short run. This means that money is neutral only  in the long run, 
and not in the short run. The reason again is that there is not perfect information and there 
are prices misperceptions.
When the monetary supply abruptly changes, firms and consumers may be fooled 
into changing their real behaviour. However, they will eventually recognise their mistakes 
and gradually  adjust their expectations, making prices and wages to adjust and return the 
market to its long-run equilibrium. As a result, changes in the aggregate demand can result 
into temporary economic fluctuations.131  Third, fluctuations in the money supply drive 
fluctuations in aggregate demand and are responsible for business cycles. Agreeing with 
the classical quantity  theory of money demand and aggregate demand, monetarists believe 
that money is necessary to conduct transactions. Thus, there is a direct relationship 
between the amount of money in circulation and the level of nominal aggregate 
spending.132
The conclusion is that business cycles are caused by unanticipated changes in the 
money  supply that lead to fluctuations in aggregate demand. However, expectations’ 
stickiness - and not price stickiness as in Keynes’ model - is responsible for changes in the 
aggregate demand, hence influencing output and unemployment. Depressions are caused 
by money growth being lower than anticipated, while booms are caused by  higher than 
anticipated money  growth. Thus, business cycles are the result of unstable monetary 
policies.133
Lucas’ rational expectations model is based on Friedman’s notion of long-run 
equilibrium in a market where firms and workers are in a large number, and prices and 
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wages are perfectly flexible.134 The unique imperfection is about information, as firms and 
workers are assumed to not observe changes in aggregate demand and price level. Rather, 
they  only  observe the price of the good they produce.135  Nevertheless, the difference 
between Friedman’s and Lucas’ model is that the public has rational expectations and not 
adaptive expectations.136  This implies that the agents take in consideration both the past 
and the future, and that individuals fully understand how changes in economic policy are 
likely to affect their income. As a result, business cycles are temporary deviations from 
equilibrium, resulting from unanticipated changes in aggregate demand.
Although the Rational Expectations approach permits the construction of models 
with high degree of rigour, it has also a high degree of scientificism. Critics have referred 
to Rational Expectations as a model “in which theory  proceeds with impeccable logic from 
unrealistic assumptions that contradict the historical record.”137  Lucas himself has 
acknowledged that some implications of the Rational Expectation approach are not 
validated by what is observed in the real world. This reflects much what is considered 
science nowadays.
In spite of the claims to pursue “truth,” scientific enterprise is often influenced by 
personal ambition, rigid defence of theories, and the weight of tradition, in detriment of 
creative participation directed to the common objectives of science.138 A system of beliefs 
is established, instead of a system of knowledge based on dialogue, resulting in the 
dogmatisation of beliefs, like Hans Albert’s idea of dogmatisation as the expression of the 
tendency to give priority to the need of intellectual certainty  over the need to achieve 
optimal solutions of actual important problems.139  As a result, economics turns to be 
ideology, helping to reinforce political relations of power following the business cycle.
1.2 Business Cycles and Politics: the Political Business Cycles Theory
The notion of political business cycles can be traced back to Kalecki, when he 
discussed the link between economic performance and politics in a lecture delivered in 
Cambridge in 1942 and published in the Political Quarterly  in 1943.140  Nevertheless, the 
first formal attempt to establish a theory of political business cycles was made by 
Nordhaus in 1975.141  Although early  discussions assumed adaptive expectations, either 
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implicitly  or explicitly, it  became dominated by the new-classical movement,142  more 
specifically by rational expectations.143
This created a methodological problem. First, because in the very  beginning the 
political business cycle literature was most influenced by the idea that governments would 
use their power to manipulate the economy for electoral objectives, resulting in political 
business cycles. As a strict understanding of rational expectations supposes that 
governments are unable to manipulate real variables to create booms in elections years, the 
result is a strong theoretical incompatibility between both approaches. Second, because 
there are significant doubts as to if the strict version of rational expectations is supported 
by empirical tests, in other words, by  reality.144 Nevertheless, the inclusion in more recent 
debates of uncertainty about government competence, preference over economic outcomes, 
and the emphasis in expectation errors resulting from party-dependent policy reaction 
functions and uncertainty about election outcomes have been trying to put both theories 
together again.145
The term “political business cycle” has no single definition. Primarily, the term is 
understood as a relationship between elections and cyclical fluctuations in output, although 
the term can encompass other aspects. These include pre- and post-electoral fluctuations in 
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inflation and policy instruments, and partisan effects which are not necessarily  connected 
with elections at all.146 Basically, the theory assumes that (1) incumbent politicians want to 
be re-elected; (2) their electoral success depend heavily  upon how well the economy is 
doing by the time of the election; and (3) they  can use some policy instruments that at least 
to a certain extent determine macroeconomic performance.147  On the other hand, 
ideological and electoral incentives have a considerable influence on politicians’ choice of 
macroeconomic policies. Voters care about the economy, but politicians care about power. 
Thus, five sets of questions are central to Political Business Cycles’ models:148
a) Voters: What determines voter behaviour? Have economic events large influence in 
voting behaviour? Are voters rational and well informed or irrational and poorly informed? 
Are voters past-looking or future-looking?
b) Parties: What motivate political leaders or parties? Are they vote-maximising and 
opportunistic, or do they ideologically pursue a set of economic and social objectives as 
they serve a given constituency?
c) Economic structure: What is the economy’s structure? Can parties affect economic 
outcomes, or is policy ineffective? What are the important instruments of policy (i.e., fiscal 
policy, monetary  policy), and who controls them (the central bank, the Parliament, the 
Cabinet of Ministries)?
d) Shocks: What are the shocks to politics and the economy? Are shocks external (i.e. 
revolutions, natural disasters, wars) or internal to the political process (i.e. when one 
government leaves its successor high inflation or large deficits)?
e) Competence: Do parties seek their objectives efficiently, or do they neither satisfy voters 
nor achieve their ideological objectives? 
At the same time, there are at least five versions of the political business cycle:149 
First, the “Opportunistic Cycle,” one of the first approaches. It combines opportunistic 
parties and non-rational voters. Accordingly to this approach, voters evaluate politicians in 
power by examining performance retrospectively, as they  do not try to predict the future. 
Politicians choose economic policies to maximise their vote at  the next election. These 
models use the Phillips Curve as main analytical tool,150 where low unemployment results 
into higher inflation now and in the future. The main conclusions are, first, that parties will 
engage in anti-inflation policies early, but will stimulate the economy when elections are 
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coming; and second, as voters evaluate retrospectively, the political system has a short time 
horizon, moving to a high-inflation equilibrium.
Second, the “Ideological Cycle.” It presupposes ideological parties and non-rational 
voters, also dealing with the Phillips Curve. In this approach, parties are ideologically 
identifiable, i.e., left wing and right wing. Left-wing parties choose high inflation and low 
unemployment, while right-wing parties choose low inflation and high unemployment. 
Voters will choose the parties that best represent their preferences, and parties in power 
will be replaced when they do not manipulate the economy to be reelected. It is expected 
that policies change as parties replace one another.
Third, the “Ultrarational Voters” model. This is one of the most influential critic of 
the theory  of political business cycle. The main presupposition is that voters have the same 
information as parties, are looking to the future, and do not suffer from memory lapses. In 
this case, parties can not fool voters by undertaking partisan manipulation of the economy. 
In the case the government were to stimulate the economy before an election, the 
ultrarational voters would perceive the manipulative policies as populism. As parties are 
rational and opportunistic, they know that they  could not fool the voters. Thus, they would 
not attempt to induce a political business cycle.
Fourth, the ‘External Shocks’ model. In the previous models, economic shocks 
result from the political system (Opportunistic Cycle) or do not have explicit sources 
(Ideological Cycle and Ultrarational Voters’ model). This approach deals with the idea that 
shocks from external events, like war or natural catastrophes, are responsible for political 
business cycles. In the case of opportunistic parties, the responses depend upon the 
rationality of voters. Ultrarational voters will recognise that the government is not 
responsible, and the its popularity will remain intact. Still, poorly  informed voters may 
misunderstand the source of the shock, blaming the government and voting for the 
opposition. In the case of ideological parties, rational voters will respond to the external 
shock by choosing the party  they see the best equipped to deal with the shock. For 
example, an inflationary shock may  induce voters to favour conservative parties, changing 
the regime and the policies in force.
Fifth, the ‘Differences of Competence’ model. The first four models assume that all 
parties are perfectly competent and act in intransigent ideological ways or in venal and 
opportunistic ways. This model contradict this idea, dealing with the notion that elections 
are about competence and not about the ideology  of parties. In this model, a party is 
competent to the extent that it manages the economy efficiently. The presupposition is that 
parties have the best available information about the structure of the economy, and use it 
effectively. As a result, the model implies Pareto-efficient outcomes. The table 1.2 shows a 
resume of the assumptions and predictions for the political business cycle models 
discussed before.
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Table 1.2
Assumptions and Predictions for Different Political Business Cycle Models
Assumptions
Model 1
Opportunistic 
Cycle
Model 2
Ideological Cycle
Model 3
Ultrarational 
Voters
Model 4
External Shocks
Model 5
Differences of 
Competence
Voters
Non-rational; 
backward 
looking; weight 
recent events 
more heavily
Non-rational; 
backward 
looking; weight 
recent events 
more heavily
Ultrarational 
(make optimal 
forecast on the 
basis of full 
information)
Ultrarational or 
non-rational
Ultrarational or 
non-rational
Parties
Opportunistic 
(choose policies 
to maximise 
vote)
Ideological 
(privilege 
economic 
outcome then 
prospects of 
election)
Rational and 
either 
opportunistic or 
ideological
Rational and 
either 
opportunistic or 
ideological
Parties differ in 
competence
Economic 
Structure
Parties control 
policy 
instruments; 
policy is effective
Parties control 
policy 
instruments; 
policy is effective
Parties control 
policy 
instruments; 
policy is effective
Parties control 
policy 
instruments; 
policy is effective
Parties control 
policy 
instruments; 
policy is effective
Source of Shocks Internal political decisions Unclear
Internal or 
external External
Internal or 
external
Competence of 
Parties
Parties are 
competent
Parties are 
competent
Parties are 
competent
Parties are 
competent
Parties vary in 
competence
Predictions of 
Model
A business cycle 
within the 
electoral cycle 
(austerity after 
elections and 
boom before 
elections)
Changes in 
economic policy 
are connected 
with changes in 
regime (booms 
with left-wing, 
contraction with 
right-wing)
There are no 
politically 
induced cycles. 
Popularity is a 
random variable. 
With 
opportunistic 
parties, 
popularity and 
elections are 
invariant to the 
state of the 
economy
With ultrarational 
voters and 
opportunistic 
parties, 
popularity and 
elections 
unaffected by 
true external 
shocks
Ultrarational 
voters evaluate 
parties on basis of 
competence; 
more competent 
parties survive 
longer. Voters 
may weight 
recent events 
more heavily if 
there is on-the-
job learning
Source: Nordhaus, W. D., Alesina, A. et al. (1989).”Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle.” Brooking 
Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1989, no. 2, pp. 1-68, p. 8.
At this point, a question must be answered: are parties opportunistic vote 
maximisers or are they ideological and issue-oriented? A way  to answer to this question is 
to refer to Anthony Downs divide the literature of party behaviour in three groups, 
following the stipulated objectives of political parties: (a) vote-seeking, (b) office-seeking, 
and (c) policy-seeking.
The vote-seeking model is based on Anthony Downs’ seminal An Economic Theory 
of Political Action in a Democracy, where he applied microeconomic principles, basically 
consumers’ theory, to demonstrate a behavioural pattern of democratic governments. Thus, 
Downs main presupposition is that  political agents behave in the same way rational 
economic agents do, making an analogy between market economics and politics. In this 
way, Downs supports the idea that in the same way firms maximise profits and consumers 
maximise utility, politicians aim to maximise profits (being elected) and electors to 
maximise utility (choosing the best basket of policies). As a result, electoral behaviour 
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follows five criteria: a) agents are able to choose among many alternatives; b) they  classify 
the alternatives in order of preference; c) the rank of alternatives is transitive; d) the first 
preference is always the one chosen; e) the decision will be always the same if the 
preferences are also the same. Downs’ model is based on two definitions:
1. Government is the agency that has the power to coerce all other agents in the 
society, being the locus of “ultimate” power in a given area.
2. A democracy is a political system that exhibits the following characteristics:
a) Two or more parties compete in periodic elections for control of the governing 
apparatus.
b) The party (or coalition of parties) winning a majority of votes gains control of 
the governing apparatus until the next election.
c) Losing parties never attempt to prevent the winners from taking office,  nor do 
winners use the powers of office to vitiate the ability of losers to compete in the 
next election.
d) All sane, law-abiding adults who are governed are citizens and every citizen 
has one only vote in each elections151
Downs also added five axioms:
1. Each political party is a team of men who seek office solely in order to enjoy 
the income, prestige, and power that go with running the governing apparatus.
2. The winning party (or coalition) has complete control over the government’s 
actions until the next election. There are no votes of confidence between 
elections either by a legislature or by the electorate, so the governing party 
cannot be ousted before the next election. Nor are any of its orders resisted or 
sabotaged by an intransigent bureaucracy.
3. Government’s economic powers are unlimited. It can nationalize everything, 
hand everything over private interests, or strike any balance between these 
extremes.
4. The only limit on government’s powers is that the incumbent party cannot in 
any way restrict the political freedom of opposition parties or of individual 
citizens, unless they seek to overthrow it by force.
5. Every agent in the model - whether an individual, a party or a private coalition 
- behaves rationally at all times; that is,  it proceeds toward its goals with a 
minimal use of scarce resources and undertakes only those actions for which 
marginal return exceeds marginal cost.152
From these axioms, Downs established his central hypothesis that political parties 
“in a democracy formulate policy strictly  as a means of gaining votes. They do not seek to 
gain office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies or to serve any particular 
interest groups; rather they formulate policies and serve interest groups to gain office. Thus 
their social function (...) is to attain the income, power, and prestige of being in office,”153 
implying that these parties are not simply  vote seekers but vote maximisers. This implies 
that parties’ platforms will tend to converge to a common set of policies, which represents 
the preferences of the median voter. 
In this case, parties use ideology  is to minimise uncertainty. Downs presented four 
assumptions about the role of ideology:154
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1. Because of uncertainty, widely varying ideologies may be employed by 
political parties even if all are motivated solely by the desire to maximize votes.
2. Some rational voters decide how to vote ideologically instead of by comparing 
policies.
3. The competitive struggle for office compels parties in our model to be both 
honest and consistent in formulating policies and ideologies and developing them 
over time.
4. Rational and institutional immobilities sometimes cause ideologies and 
policies to lag behind the real conditions relevant to party behavior.
From this, it is possible to conclude that, first, uncertainty limits the electors’ 
possibility to relate government policies to his/her own views. Second, ideology is to be 
defined as each party’s view of the good society, in other words, the views about what 
policies are needed to achieve this good society. Taking in consideration that there is a 
price to pay for getting acquainted with a party’s every policy, for example spending time 
to know and understand them. As a result, ideology cut information costs. Thus ideology is 
a vehicle for providing information being neutral. A key  point is that parties also consider 
ideology to cut decisions about the set of policies that  will maximise votes. It  follows that a 
diversity of parties ideologies can only  exist because uncertainty  impedes any one to be 
proved as superior. If one ideology can be proven to be more effective in gaining votes, 
other parties imitate it and subtler differentiation takes place, at the same time that when 
policies change significantly, ideologies also change.155
Thus, Downs’ model presupposes that parties seek to maximise their control over 
political office, as their main objective is to get private goods in the form of available 
governmental and subgovernmental appointments. Office-seeking behaviour consists in the 
pursuit of such goods, above their electoral or policy value. Although political-office may 
contribute to electoral success or policy effectiveness, behaviour resulting from such 
expectations is not to be considered office seeking. If vote-seeking parties are familiar with 
electoral competition, office-seeking parties look to be part of government coalitions in 
parliamentary  democracies, as they aim to maximise their control of elected office through 
government portfolios.156  Finally, Downs presupposed the relationship  between ideology 
and policy, including macroeconomic policy, to be static, meaning that right-wing parties 
will support right-wing policies and left-wing parties will support left-wing policies.
On one hand, if turnout is variable and voting seeking serves office ambitions, in a 
single district is better to maximise pluralities than votes. On the other hand, in multi-
district contests the rational party  leader maximises his/her probability of winning a 
majority  of the seats. These implications are extensively  explored in spatial models of 
electoral competition.157 I also argue that the presupposition that ideology is a vehicle for 
informing policy preference is flawed, as it does not take in consideration the fact that 
ideology meaning “system of ideas” from which policies are derived is contradictory to the 
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idea of convergence that result in the medium voter. If all parties converge to a specific 
ideology, ideology looses its role in providing information about policy  preferences, 
because there are no significant differences among them. In the next section I discuss a 
macroeconomic model of political business cycles.
1.3 Macroeconomics, Business Cycles, Political Business Cycles, and Ideology
Macroeconomic models explaining politico-economic interaction are being 
developed since the 1970s. Accordingly to Gärtner (1994):158
The endogenous treatment of policy makers has become a frequently 
encountered, if not standard, feature of macroeconomic policy analyses. The 
incentive structure of policy makers is now a centerpiece in the discussion of 
policy, be they budget deficits, the size of the government sector, business 
cycles, exchange rate and trade regimes, policy cooperation, or the design of a 
European central bank.
To analyse this issues, economists usually  adapt consumers‘ choice theory to 
political issues, including budget constraints, preferences, and rational behaviour meaning 
maximising utility. This led to the question “what do politicians want” and “why 
politicians choose the policies they  do, sometimes adopting and sometimes ignoring advice 
from economists”? Also, why  they shape institutions the way  they do? The answer for the 
first question is rather a complicate one.
The first aspect to be taken in consideration is the relationship between politics and 
economics or, in other words, the relationship  between voting and macroeconomics 
performance. The main question is “does macroeconomic performance affects electoral 
outputs?” The seminal work on this question is Gerald Kramer’s article “Short-Term 
Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964,” inspired by Anthony Downs’ “An 
Economic Theory of Democracy.”159 Kramer performed econometric tests to explain short-
term fluctuations in the division of national vote for the USA House of Representatives in 
the period 1896-1964, yielding “quantitative estimates of the impact of economic 
conditions on congressional elections, and of the effects of incumbency and presidential 
“coattails” as well.”160 As the presupposition of voting as the output of a rational choice 
between alternatives is difficult to test  empirically, Kramer’s model subordinated voting to 
macroeconomic performance, assuming that if the macroeconomy is doing well, vote 
retain to the incumbent party, and vice-versa.161
Accordingly to Kramer’s model, the traditional idea that voters are rational, 
information-processing individuals who collects information, analyse it in light of their 
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own interest, and than vote accordingly is not realistic.162  Rather, voters consider the 
performance over the most recent year, taking in consideration growth rates of per capita 
real personal income and inflation, and the unemployment rate. The result of Kramer’s 
regression was that per capital real personal income had positive effects on voting outcome 
while, in the presence of real income growth rates, unemployment and inflation had little 
or no electoral influence. Kramer’s findings were later criticised, with some studies 
claiming that no relationship existed between economic conditions and electoral output. 
The first strong critic was made by George Stigler in 1973, who argued that voters did not 
answer to changing economic conditions.163  Another study in 1976 stated that the 
American president’s popularity was not influenced by economic conditions, as it followed 
a simply and regular cycle over time.164  Nevertheless, these discussions did not end with 
the criticisms and in the following years several studies proved the connection between 
economics and politics.
In 1978, Tufte showed that in systems with single-party governments, short-term 
macroeconomic fluctuations, as unemployment, cost of living, and inflation, results in 
incumbent parties loosing support.165  Also in 1978, Fiorina demonstrated that voters will 
withdraw support from incumbent parties, when they experience deteriorating economic 
conditions.166 This is the same conclusion reached by  Eulau & Lewis-Beck (1985), who 
affirmed that “economic hard times can cause a voter to cast a ballot against the 
government.”167  In multiparty parliamentary systems like France and Germany, as most 
politics occurs around oppositional and situational blocks, poor economic performance had 
resulted in rising support for parties in concurrent coalitions.168  More recently, Drazen 
(2001), Hibbs (2006), Van der Brug et al (2007), and Duch & Stevenson (2008) made clear 
that good economic performance benefits incumbents.169  Although most of the studies 
about the relationship between voting and economics have been done focusing in the USA 
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or in Western Europe, scholars have demonstrated the existence of economic voting in 
Eastern Europe,170 Africa and Asia,171 and Latin America.172
Within this dissertation’s scope, an important conclusion from the discussion above 
is that, although the linkage between macroeconomic performance and voting has been 
demonstrated, it  is not the case to affirm that economic performance is the only 
determinant of voting. Rather, there are multiple determinants interacting with each other 
as, for example, welfare system, internal conflicts, including ethnic problems, presence or 
absence of war, just to cite a few. Thus, what can be affirmed is that when people feel 
poorer, they will tend to penalise incumbents trying to change things for better. In other 
words, bad macroeconomic performance will negatively affect incumbents only when it 
hurts people. As a result, the intensity of political change depends of the intensity of the 
crisis.
As discussed above, politicians can be opportunist, ideological, rational and either 
opportunistic or ideological, meaning that politicians want different things. As a result, to 
establish a utility  function for political choice is extremely difficult.173  However, 
politicians can only maximise their utility  if in office, thus politicians need public support 
to get elected. There is a strong link between public support and the economy, with the 
main variables being inflation and unemployment, which the public like to be low.174 
Unemployment can also be substituted by income, in such a way that it is possible to say 
that the public’s preference can be resumed as the public likes low inflation and high 
income or:175
where s is public support for the incumbent party or government, for example, by  voting 
share, π is inflation and Y is income. This means that if the government is interested in 
public support, it  will rise when income rises and will decrease when inflation increases. 
This model’s premiss can be used to construct a Nordhaus-type political business cycle:176
s = s − 0.5π 2 + βY
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where Y is the national aggregate demand, y  is aggregate income, p. = inflation 
(policy instrument), V is the government’s vote share, v is the voters’ period utility stream, 
E is the expectations operator, ω is the voter memory coefficient, The model’s structure is:
1. a “Lucas-surprise” aggregate supply  curve, with inflation representing the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy on the aggregate demand;
2. represents adaptive expectations in a very basic form;
3. this equation makes voters’ period utility dependent on inflation and output;
4. this equation shows that voters are backward-looking, thus elections’ output depends on 
past and present voter utility.
 Substituting (1), (2), and (3) into (4):
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 If governments maximise voting exactly when there are elections (E), not doing so 
during non-election periods (N), and if t = E in (5), and t-1 = N and t-2 = E, thus:
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As the inflation rate is a proxy for policies during election and non-election periods, 
vote maximisation is determined by:
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As a result, there is a policy cycle that can be written as:
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 With the resulting output levels being:
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The result is that governments deliberately generate inflation during election 
periods, increasing output beyond full-employment levels. The contrary is valid during 
non-election periods, resulting in output below full-employment to control inflation. Thus, 
the cycle’s amplitude depends on three parameters:177
a. it depends on the weight of income (
ς ) in the public support equation (5). The 
greater this weight, the greater the cycle’s amplitude;
b. as income is dependent on current inflation and expectations based on past 
inflation that affects monetary and fiscal policy. As a result, the smaller is π (inflation), 
the flatter is the Lucas-surprise aggregate supply  curve, thus the larger the cyclical 
swings;
c. although voters are rational, they have limited memory (ω), the last  parameter. In 
other words, the cycle’s amplitude depends on whether voters forget past events. In other 
words, if voters completely  forget about  the past, the amplitude of political business 
cycles become infinitely large; if it  is the contrary (ω = 1), the political business cycle 
disappears and inflation is kept constant ( !pN = !pN = 0 ) and income stays at the yt level.
The model above describes shifts on macroeconomic policy as a result of changing 
which macroeconomic policy instruments are used to increase or reduce inflation. Thus, it 
reveals that democratic regimes have an inflationary  bias as a result of political business 
cycles following elections. However, two fundamental interconnected points must be 
stressed. First, the macroeconomic policy instruments being used to promote inflation/
increase the level of economic activity are within the established macroeconomic ideology. 
As a result, and second, it does not explain ideological shifts on macroeconomic policy. 
Taking in consideration that what is acceptable in terms of macroeconomic policy 
follows ideological changes, this led to a question: how this ideological change occurs? 
How politicians shift from using one set of of macroeconomic policies to another? The 
answer still relies on the process of economic voting. As discussed before, bad 
macroeconomic performance will influence voting accordingly to its impact on voters’ 
wealth, forcing politicians to look for alternatives. In this case, there are two variables 
determining how far macroeconomic policies will change. 
First, the gravity  of the crisis. Second, its geographic extent. Regional or country-
specific crisis will not result  in ideological change, thus the base of the macroeeconomic 
policy will be intact. As the economic system passes through deep structural crisis, 
sometimes the established economic ideology is not able to make the system to go back to 
the previous level of accumulation, what makes the incumbents’ popularity to fall. Than, 
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with the involvement of the media, of private interests, and contending political parties, a 
societal debate starts. This process soon becomes tied up with electoral competition. As a 
result, each party’s and/or coalition’s offered economic policies become under a process of 
social scrutiny  leaded by the media and its pundits. This is the moment when politics meets 
the academic system, mainly Social Sciences and Economics.
The interest of politicians on the academic system are dual. On one hand, as the 
academic system represents “science.” To have the support of its members (or part of 
them) for some set of policies is a form of legitimisation. It is almost tantamount to affirm 
that some specific set of policies is science. On the other, during serious crisis politicians 
will look for policy advice at  the universities and research centres, as it  is natural to 
suppose that the best specialists on a subject are those people working in the academic 
system. As Myrdal (2004) put it, politics “is an art which is circumscribed by the Actual 
and the Possible, and precisely for this reason (...) (T)he politician may (...) expect of the 
economist that he should explain the actual situation and the state and effects of different 
possible modes of action.”178 It is also possible to have a third one, when there is a genuine 
interest in Science, as politicians may be interested in acquiring knowledge for personal 
purposes.
Although it is to expect that the task of Social Sciences, including here Economics, 
“is to observe and describe empirical social reality  and to analyse and explain causal 
relations between (...) facts,”179  usually a social scientist “proceeds to explain how the 
existence of the facts in question is consistent with social well-being and natural equity,” 
while generally succeeding “in deluding himself with the idea that he has solved an 
economic problem, when, in fact, he has only  vindicated, or persuaded himself he has 
vindicated, a social arrangement.”180  As a result, social scientists express views on what 
they  consider to be socially  imperative, implying the notion that social and economic 
analysis are able “of yielding laws in the sense of norms, and not merely  laws in the sense 
of demonstrable recurrences and regularities of actual and possible events.”181  One 
example is the theory of ‘free competition.’ Accordingly to Myrdal (2004):
(T)he theory of ‘free competition’ is not intended to be merely a scientific 
explanation of what course economic relations would take under certain 
specified assumptions. It simultaneously constitutes a kind of proof that these 
hypothetical conditions would result in maximum ‘total income’ or the greatest 
possible ‘satisfaction of needs’ in society as a whole. ‘Free competition’  thus on 
logical and factual grounds becomes more than a set of abstract assumptions, 
used as a tool in theoretical analysis of the causal relation of facts. It becomes a 
political desideratum.182
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In other words, no author has ever discussed the economic consequences of 
determined monetary system or principles of foreign trade without also providing precepts 
for political conduct. This attitude is explained by the fact that social scientists, including 
economists, have the honest  ambition of seeing their work recognised as true science.183 
However, social scientists have values reflecting a moral system determined by their own 
life experience. This implies that even if these values are suppressed in the beginning of 
the research process, they  may re-appear when establishing economic policy 
recommendations. As these economic policy recommendations reflect also an ideal model 
of social organisation to be achieved, it presupposes some form of social and economic 
control. Thus, they  are ideological and, as ideology, they are transformed into political 
discourse/rhetoric, changing political ideology itself.
The ideological transformation occurs when, in times of crisis, agents expect the 
government to find a set  of economic policies to end the crisis and to promote economic 
growth and development. Accordingly to the magnitude of the crisis, a more or less radical 
set of policies is chosen. In the case of a very serious crisis like the Great Slump or the 
stagflation of the 1960’s, the economic ideology  in force looses its validity. It is substituted 
by another ideology and the group connected to the previous ideology looses its academic 
prestige and respect. What was mainstream turn to be marginal, at the same time that what 
was marginal turns to be the new mainstream.
Because of ideological determinism, the set of economic policies available to the 
parties and coalitions to deal with crisis is limited to the boundaries of the macroeconomic 
ideology that became mainstream by the time of the last big crisis. The result is the process 
of party convergence identified by several authors,184 where there was a general turn to the 
left until the 1980’s, with macroeconomic policy privileging more state intervention in the 
economy, when centre-right and right-wing parties abandoned traditional ideologies 
seeking a broader electoral support.185 After the 1980’s it the contrary: there is general turn 
to the right, with macroeconomic policy  privileging less state intervention in the economy. 
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As noted by other authors, in the last 20 years the process of convergence has been more 
intense, due to effect of economic globalisation on national economic policies.186
The process of ideological convergence of the last years is different from the one 
that resulted in the Bretton Woods System. Rather, it is the result of major parties 
abandoning their role in linking citizens to the political system, while becoming agents of 
elites who do not believe in government action and support  minimal state roles.187  The 
result is that the formal political system has been increasingly ceasing to be a medium that 
represents, articulates, redresses, and refines citizen concerns, in favour of a specific 
ideology to guarantee political survival. This process of ideological convergence provides 
the evidence of political collusion, establishing cartel parties.188  There are four 
developments determining ideological convergence and the preference for macroeconomic 
policies.
First, the downsizing of voters’ expectations as all parties had an interest in 
reducing their policy commitments, including state intervention in the economy and 
offering public goods for free. Despite their political complexation, giving the systemic 
economic changes started in the 1970’s, none of them could deal with traditional electoral 
demands like over-increasing public goods. Second, the externalisation of policy 
commitments. The answer to the problem of competition over less was to create binding 
institutional fixes, making them not responsible for a large number of economic outcomes, 
at the same time insulating politicians from voters’ preferences. Third, the declining 
relevance of the mass base changed the relationship between voters and politicians. At 
election time, politicians can effectively convince voters to vote for them. However, since 
the sources of funding, and thus re-election, are outside traditional mass-organisations and 
party  membership has been reformed to the point of redundancy, after election voters have 
no effective power over politicians.189
From the discussion above, the process of economic ideology change of the last 40 
years has three outputs. First, and most important, it leads to the decline of policy makers’ 
capacity to establish and conduct national policies independently of external ideological 
constraints. Second, it results in a situation near Shumpeterian democracy  with voters 
loosing their capacity to influence politicians when the electoral period ends. Third, and as 
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consequence of the second, voter turnout in established democracies is declining.190  The 
concrete result is that although Milton Friedman was convinced that under Neoliberalism 
people would be free to choose, in reality  it is the contrary: there is no choice. Thus, it is 
possible to affirm that short-term political business cycles are determined and/or restricted 
by long-term ideological business cycles. However, as history  is inexorable, after some 
time the prevalent ideology will change. Then, the economic and political paradigms will 
also change, resulting in the establishment of a new ideology, and the cycle will start again.
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2. CRISIS, MACROECONOMIC POLICY, AND IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE
Being verified that the academic literature supports the idea that there is a strong 
relationship  between economic performance and politics, a general model is proposed in 
this dissertation, it is necessary  to test  its presuppositions against empirical evidence. This 
chapter analyses the relationship  between business cycles, ideology, and macroeconomic 
policy, first in the United States, and second in Brazil. To analyse the United States is 
necessary  to apprehend the movements changing what is the mainstream in economics. 
The change from classic liberalism to Keynesianism after the Great Slump and from the 
latter to Neoliberal Chicago Monetarism during the 1970’s reflected the United States’ 
choice in terms of macroeconomic policy. Thus, although not very clear, and still a subject 
to be researched, it seems to exist a correlation between the United States choice of 
economic policy and the economic approach turning into mainstream. 
The Brazilian case is used as empirical base to support the model proposed in the 
next chapter. As discussed in the methodology before, the country of choice was Brazil. 
First, because it is big enough to choose its own policies. Second, because its economic 
academic field is original and independent. Third, and as consequence of the previous two, 
business cycles are independent from the ones experienced by the United States and 
Europe. Finally, because there is a considerable amount of data available to construct the 
models necessary for analysis.
Small crises or bad macroeconomic performance without any  dramatic output may 
result in political changes, while serious crisis not only  affect  political output but  also 
change much of the ideology in force. Thus, there are two political cycles: one resulting 
from small crises in relatively short periods of time, i.e. 5-10 years, and another one 
resulting from much more serious structural economic failure. The first case, short cycles 
resulting from small crisis, is the one studied by the literature. The second one, which 
comprehends ideological changes, thus economic policy paradigms, is neglected, even 
taking in consideration that  it  determines the scope of the policies available to deal with 
short-cycle crisis.
The existence of long-wave political cycles may be shown using History, following 
Kondratiev. The first serious depression in capitalism was the one observed in the period 
from 1873 to mid 1890s. Although it would be to expect a paradigmatic change, liberal 
economic policies continued to be in force. This may be explained by the particularities of 
the period. As the depression was the result of falling prices, interest rates, and profits, and 
not of structural problems of the productive and commercial spheres, the world production 
continued to increase strongly, most as a result of commercial activity.191 Together with the 
colonialist pulse and the great volume of investments abroad, the effects of the crisis were 
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minimised as the profit  rates remained the same. At the same time, there was a lack 
between the ideology in force - economic and political liberalism - and practical reality. As 
colonialism was promoted and controlled at the state level, the state was not only  simply 
guaranteeing the right for private property and national security as idealised by  liberal 
philosophers, but was actively increasing the levels of economic protectionism, while 
leaving the practical aspects of the economy under responsibility of private initiative. 
Nevertheless, the conjunction of colonialist expansion with protectionist policies of 
nationalist stamp resulted in the I World War, with the State assuming the rule of the 
economy.192 With the end of the conflict, there was a turn back to the old liberalism, with 
countries adopting the gold standard while practising deflationary policies.193
2.1 The Crisis of the 1930’s and Stagflation in the 1960s
The 1930’s crisis was the result of the interaction of five points. First, during the 
1920’s, the process of economic internationalisation had reduced its expansion thanks to 
the maintenance of protectionist policies and to the fact that most of the big economies 
were self-sufficient. Second, there was an asymmetry in the level of economic 
development between the United States and the rest of the world in such a way that the 
first, except in relation to some raw materials, did not need the second. Third, the economy 
did not generate enough demand for a sustained expansion, as a result of the fall of the 
general wages resulting in a process of wealth concentration and in the incapacity of mass 
demand to accompany the industrial productivity’s growth. Fourth, the expansion of 
consumer credit combined with speculation with real estate actives. Fifth, internal savings 
being directed to speculative investments in the stock market. The conjunction of these 
factors resulted in the Great  Slump, which was deflagrated by  the the collapse of New 
York’s stock exchange.194
At this point, there was the first political and economical ideological change, from 
classical liberalism in favour to Keynesianism. In general economic terms, the most 
significative consequences were a) the change in the way the state regulates the economy, 
favouring a more direct intervention to guarantee full employment, b) the establishment of 
welfare estates, c) the subordination of the financial system to the real system, d) the 
adoption of economic policies with the objective of promoting economic development 
even in the periphery. In other words, a softening of the process of international economic 
domination.
Classical liberalism was unable to give a pertinent solution for the crisis. 
Accordingly to economic liberalism, a fall in consumption results in a fall in the interest 
rate. As consequence, investment should increase leading the economy to a new 
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equilibrium, thus to full employment. Concomitantly, it was maintained that state 
intervention would disturb private initiative and that gold standard and deflationary 
policies, including fiscal rigidity, were necessary to reduce the general level of prices, what 
should result into an economic boom. As it would be to expect, these policies were unable 
to produce the expected result. Although Keynesian policies have been used by the 
Roosevelt administration since the 1930’s, only in 1944 Keynesian policies turned a 
consensus with the establishment of the Bretton Woods System.
In the beginning of the 1970’s, after approximately thirty years of Keynesian 
economic policy, the world economy started to experience a process of stagflation.195 To 
deal with the problem, the United Stated unilaterally  dismantled the Bretton Woods system 
in 1971. The main objective was to boost exports at the same time reducing public deficit 
and inflation. Nevertheless, with the first oil shock in 1973, the price of oil quadruplicated. 
This led the world economy to a deep recession. The conjunction of these factors 
established the way for a second ideological change: Keynesianism became a marginal 
approach, while Neoliberalism turned to be the new mainstream. This represented the 
second ideological change of the XX century.
Figure 2.1
USA’s Yearly Inflation, 1917 - 2002
Source: USA Census.
As can be seen in chart 2.1 above, inflation started to increase in the USA already  in 
the ending of the 1960’s. During the next decade, there were two episodes of double digit 
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inflation, one in 1974 and another in 1979-80. The significant acceleration of inflation 
between 1972 and 1974 and 1979-80 was the consequence of three shocks: rising food 
prices, rising energy prices, and the end of Nixon wage-price controls program. The food 
shock was consequence of bad weather conditions not only  in the United States, but in the 
world in general, resulted in significant retail food prices increases. The energy  shock was 
the direct output of the establishment of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) after the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973, when oil prices quadrupled in a 
few months. Finally, the end of wage-price controls fuelled inflation as it would be to 
expect: artificially depressed prices snapped back in 1974 when the program was 
abolished. In 1979, food and energy shocks also substantially changed relative prices.196
Figure 2.2
Average USA Wages, 2000’s USD, 1917 - 2002
Source: USA Census.
The effects of changing relative prices on real wages also were significant. As 
shown on figure 2.2 above, the average real wage as measured in 2000 US dollars felt from 
US$ 32,255.82 in 1973 to US$ 28,984.64 in 1981 or a contraction of 10.14% in real terms. 
Although this contraction can be considered severe, it is based on averages. In fact, the 
effects on common people was much more dramatic. Taking in consideration the amount of 
time for nominal wages to be readjusted in face of inflation, the lost of purchasing power 
experienced by people was much deeper than average statistics show. As a result, the 
feeling of being impoverished was much stronger. At the same time, as shown on figure 2.3 
below, in 1975 the unemployment rate reached the highest  point since the Great Slump 
(8.5%). There was a new record in 1982 (9.7%). Keynesianism was not working. It had to 
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be substituted by  a new political economic model. The choice was Conservatism and 
Neoliberalism. Although not close in comparison with the Keynesian years, Neoliberalism 
reduced unemployment and increased real wages until the 2007’s financial crisis.
Figure 2.3
Unemployment USA, % 1917 - 2009
Source: USA Census.gov.
2.2 Economic Crisis, Ideological Change and Macroeconomic Policy in Brazil
During the XX century, Brazil had three different ideological phases, resulting in 
three main patterns of macroeconomic policy. The first, from 1889 until 1930, was based 
on Classical Liberalism; the second, from 1930 until 1989 was based on National-
Developmentalism; the third, from 1990 until now is based on Neoliberalism. As argued in 
this dissertation before, and also in Brazilian case, each ideological change is the direct 
output of the exhaustion of specific political economic models to deal with changing 
economic paradigms: a new ideology is established to substitute the previous resulting in 
new relations of power and dominance. As a result, the political groups that lost power will 
adapt their ideas to the new established ideology to retain or regain power.
The first change was the outcome of the exhaustion of the political and economic 
model based on coffee exports, resulting in the Revolution of 1930 and the establishment 
of developmentalism. The term “developmentalism” is usually associated to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean - ECLAC theories of 
socioeconomic development, while as historic phenomena it is commonly  associated to the 
Brazilian governments of the period 1950-85. It is often reduced to some forms of State 
intervention, from the support to industrialisation and interventionism through expansionist 
economic policies until economic planning, here included the creation of state owned 
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enterprises and banks of development, usually  with an ideological rhetoric related to 
nationalist appeals.197 
However, developmentalism is more than ECLAC theories or a specific form of 
state intervention. It has its antecedents in the development of coffee cultivation after the 
middle of the nineteenth century, with the concomitant decadence of the production of 
sugar and the mining of gold in favour to coffee. The main point  is that although the 
sugarcane and gold cycles have taken place into an explicit colonial period and have used 
slave labor, the cultivation of coffee marks the beginning of the use of wage labor in large 
scale as the coffee producers realised that the latter was cheaper,198  with large 
consequences in the social, economic and political spheres.
On the social and economic sphere, remunerated labor appeared outside the urban 
centres on a large scale resulting in the establishment of an incipient domestic market. This 
gave the base that  would permit the internally semi feudal Brazilian economy to develop 
capitalist features. The abolition of slavery  in 1888 and the expansion of the cultivation of 
coffee intensified this process, together with a process of massive migratory flux from 
Europe, Japan and the Ottoman Empire.199 Other important factors that must be considered 
antecedents of developmentalism are a) the development of the textile industry  after the 
1950s; b) the industrial expansion associated with the Baron of Mauá; c) the establishment 
of a system of railroad transportation; d) the establishment of a system of ports, 
hydroelectric facilities, communications systems, etc; e) the weak and speculative attempt 
to create a national industry just after the proclamation of the Republic in 1889 with the 
Encilhamento; f) the I World War, which forced the country to substitute imports, forcing 
the establishment/development of some industrial activities; g) the establishment of a 
middle class; h) the formation of the national army as an essentially  middle-class 
organisation (in contrast with the navy and its aristocratic origins).200
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Although the break with the patrimonial regime of the Empire by  the Republic 
meant the victory for decentralisation and the landed aristocracy, at the same time it also 
signified the continuation of oligarchic rule in the so called Old Republic (1889-1930). The 
levels of popular participation did not increase, as the groups that  had previously  occupied 
important positions during the Empire continued to do so, making the patrimonial state to 
remain the dominant influence in the development of Brazil.201 At the same time, although 
the electorate increased in the early years of the Republic, suffrage was still very  restricted. 
Illiterates did not have the right to vote and the population. Since only 14,8% of the 
population was literate in 1890 - and 24,5% in 1920 - deducing females and literate males 
under 21, it is possible to deduce how small the electorate really was.202
The two most influential groups in this period were the military  and the state 
governors. The militaries were never far from politics and power. They  dominated the first 
five years of the Republic and Marshall Hermes da Fonseca served as president in the 
period 1910-14. The power of the state governors was based on a system called 
coronelismo or “rule of the colonels” in the regional level,203 and on an agreement among 
state leaders that granted to São Paulo and Minas Gerais axis preeminence in national 
political and economic affairs, while the central government would not interfere in the 
internal affairs of the smaller states known as the politics of “coffee with milk”.204  This 
was a system where the president guaranteed that the parties of the governors of the states 
would always win elections in their jurisdictions, in exchange for support  of president 
policies in the parliament as support of the president successor.
The fragile political stability of the Old Republic ended in 1929 when President 
Washington Luís chose another Paulista, Júlio Prestes, after a consultation to the 
Presidents of the 20 Brazilian states.205 Only the governors of the states of Minas Gerais, 
Rio Grande do Sul and Paraiba denied support to Júlio Prestes. However, the Republican 
Party of Minas Gerais,206  specially the supporters of Minas Gerais’ Governor Antônio 
Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada, disagreed with what they  considered a break of the Republican 
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pact. In response, they  articulated together with the oligarchy  of the states of Rio Grande 
do Sul and Paraiba a coalition called Aliança Liberal,207  which also had the support 
opposition groups of other states, as the Democratic Party of São Paulo, as part  of the 
militaries as well. In July of 1929, the Aliança Liberal launched Getúlio Vargas as an 
alternative candidate for the Presidential elections, with the President of the State of 
Paraiba, João Pessoa, as candidate for vice-president. The Aliança Liberal’s electoral 
platform was based on three points: the end of the policy of artificial valorisation of coffee, 
measures to protect the urban workers, and a deep political reform.208
The first point  was mainly directed to the middle class, which not only did not fell 
politically  represented, but also felt penalised by  the policies of coffee price support. The 
second was clearly directed to the emerging urban working class, which was neglected as 
political force by the oligarchs, as the establishment of mandatory vacations and a special 
labor regulation to women and children. The third was directed to attract the support of the 
lieutenants and other minor political groups, including the establishment of secret vote and 
a special electoral judiciary system, as amnesty to political prisoners as well.
However, as the government had the control of the political machine, the official 
candidate Júlio Prestes won the elections in March of 1930, having 1.091.709 votes while 
Getúlio Vargas had 742.794. As usual, the official result of the elections was received with 
discredit not  only by  the defeated candidates, but by the population in general. The 
members of the Aliança Liberal started a conspiracy  against the government, leaded by 
Vargas, aiming the deposition of the still president Washington Luís. The assassination of 
João Pessoa in 26th of July gave more impulse to the revolutionary movement and in 3rd 
of october of 1930 armed forces started the 1930 Revolution.209
There are nine concurrent interpretations of the causes of the 1930 Revolution, 
which are, sometimes, complementary. Some defend the idea that 1930 was the result of 
the interests of the surging middle class.210 A second interpretation is that  the revolution 
was a movement of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie, in collaboration with the 
middle class and the working class.211 A third one stresses the role of the Tenente revolts in 
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the 1920s,212 as Virgínio Santa Rosa, John Wirth and Michael Conniff.213 Another view 
bases on the idea that  the crisis or even lack of hegemonic forces in the political process 
resulted in the establishment of a state of compromise, where the diversity and 
disarticulation of the sectors of the new pact would have resulted in a lack of power, which 
started to occur autonomously and in a personalist way. 
A fifth interpretation is that the agrarian pact that was renewed in 1930 was not 
merely the result of the oligarchs’ residual power, but rather an intentional arrangement, 
where old oligarchs were substituted by new ones in a complex system of alliances 
reinforcing decadent and marginal groups, while neutralising other sectors more resistant 
to changes. In this case, the state would have assumed vaster amplitude, as it included the 
urban middle and working classes, resulting in a populist variant of two extremes, the 
oligarchy and the masses.214
Another one deals with the idea that the oligarchies had a fundamental role in the 
transitional process accelerated by  the 1930 Revolution, in a process lead by an 
interventionist state representing the industrial bourgeoisie, which had absorbed the 
members of the oligarchy.215 By the economic side, there is the idea that the igniting spark 
of the 1930 Revolution was the crisis initiated in 1929. This interpretation deals with the 
idea that  the fall of the international price of coffee, together with the general bankruptcy 
experienced in the industrial sector, resulted in an impulse to the Brazilian industrialisation. 
As the capital moved from the production of coffee to urban industry, the old political 
order did not fit the new model. The solution was the 1930 Revolution.216
A more recent work aims to provide a neo-institutionalist interpretation of the 
events culminating in the Revolution of 1930, which seeks to incorporate the insights of 
the two main currents of the modern new institutional economics: the transaction costs 
economics217 and the theory of collective action. The core of the argument is that the Old 
Republic was not overthrown on that year due economic reasons, as the coincidence of that 
episode with the beginning of the great world depression of the decade of 1930. The main 
conclusion is that the political conflict can be better explained by factors essentially linked 
to the collective action logic. Francisco Weffort defended the idea of extreme ample and 
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unbalanced political alliances, where old and new actors juxtaposed, in a case of 
conservative modernisation where the old oligarchs still controlled the state apparatus.218
Boris Fausto offers a more comprehensive interpretation. Accordingly to him, the 
break of the political system must be understood as the result of the combination of various 
points of friction reaching the melt. The regional oligarchies were dragged to fight by the 
younger sectors, giving transparency to the regional disputes accumulated throughout the 
Old Republic. The dissatisfaction of the militaries had won encouragement by  both the 
association between oligarchy and dissident rebel lieutenants, as by the fact that it  was 
growing more extensively within the armed forces. The agitation of the middle class, the 
urban manifestations in favour of Vargas assured the political support of a significant part 
of the society to the revolution.219
Finally, Thomas Skidmore (2007) understands that the forces supporting the 
Revolution of 1930 must be divided between non-revolutionary and revolutionary.220 The 
former can be further divided in three groups. First, there were high-rank militaries, like 
General Tasso Fragoso, the head of the junta that transferred power to Vargas. They were 
resentful over the policies of the political elite, which they considered shortsighted and 
unpopular. Also, the unwillingness of civilian governments to increase the budget  of the 
armed forces. A second group were the coffee farmers, although the federal government 
was committed to a coffee support  program since the beginning of the XX century. By one 
side, the government did nothing to help the sector by  suppling further credit from São 
Paulo’s Coffee Institute for purchasing surplus stocks. The idea was to reduce the 
previously  fixed price of Brazilian coffee in the international market to increase sales. This 
strategy not only contradicted Washington Luiz previous policy, but reduced farmers’ 
revenues as it did not increase the demand for coffee.221 By the other, as Washington Luiz’s 
maintained a fixed exchange rate for the Brazilian currency, the coffee sector’s income fell 
following the decline of international coffee prices. Third, there were dissidents from the 
established political elite who were aiming to use a coup for their own purposes. 
In this way, the Revolution of 1930 should be understood as the result  of the 
association between part of the oligarchy  with dissident military forces, strengthened by 
classes that were feeling politically underrepresented. However, as it  was impossible to any 
political force to seize power exclusively, the collapse of the coffee oligarchy resulted into 
an emptied power represented by  the Estado de Compromisso (State of Compromise).222 
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Due the heterogeneity of the political forces supporting the Revolution of 1930, their 
expectations were not common. Instead, dissident oligarchs wanted to achieve a bigger 
political control to minimise reforms and guarantee new policies to help agriculture, more 
specifically coffee; young civilians wanted a deep reform of the political system; tenentes 
defended the centralisation of power and the introduction of social reforms; the sectors 
connected to the Democratic Party  had as objective to control São Paulo state’s 
government, besides the effective adoption of liberal principles. As none of them had 
supremacy, the Estado de Compromisso must be understood as a state opened to all 
pressures without submitting itself to any of them.223
These interpretations explain the changes observed on the Brazilian political model, 
but not on economic policy after the Revolution of 1930. On the economic side, the fact is 
that the balance of payment’s disequilibrium observed already  in the ending of the 1920’s 
became unsustainable after 1929. The contraction of the international trade’s levels 
together with the hyper-production of coffee jeopardised the economic model consolidated 
during the First Republic. Even taking in consideration that the Brazilian economy was 
passing through a period of strong economic growth between 1927 and 1928, it was based 
on a very  fragile base, as it was completely dependent of the favourable international 
economic conditions observed already in 1926. As a result, the financial viability  of the 
coffee valorisation policy depended of three factors: a) the amount of coffee produced; b) 
the world demand for coffee; and c) the conditions of domestic liquidity. As a result, 
because the Brazilian monetary policy was under the gold standard and the trade balance 
was deteriorating, the private sector’s propensity for increasing credit was reducing.224
Thus, at the same time, the financing requirements for sustaining coffee prices were 
increasing because of a falling world demand, thus increasing the necessity of obtaining 
financial resources in the international market. Thus, in case of external instability and 
difficulties in obtaining external financing, there would follow a monetary shock and 
deteriorating the external accounts.225 For the first  time since the end of the monarchy, the 
strategy of maintaining internal economic stability  in face of external shock by artificially 
maintaining coffee prices very  high was not working. In this case, the recomposition of the 
Brazilian state’s political base as outcome of the Revolution of 1930 must be understood as 
the result of the exhaustion of the economic model of the First Republic, which by its time 
deteriorated the political support for the regime in force. With the First Republic’s collapse, 
it was necessary to establish a new political economic model. Thus, the rationality  of the 
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economic policies after 1930 were the result of the new dynamics of the international 
political economic system reflecting the Great Slump,226 and the new economic ideology 
being established at that time.
Figure 2.4
Brazil’s Monthly Inflation, January 1984/December 1992 - %
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the IPEADATA.
As the figure 2.4 shows, the second time economic instability  was strong enough to 
change the political economic system was in the ending of the 1980’s. This time the 
problem was inflation. In 1989, it reached an annual index of 1,972.9%. that, even taking 
in consideration that prices and wages were indexed, strongly  reduced households’ income. 
The idea is that there is a hidden tax represented by inflation affecting both households’ 
and government’s budgets, called in Portuguese imposto inflacionário (literally  translated 
as ‘inflationary tax’). It results from the Central Bank printing money to compensate the 
effects of inflation on the governments budget. As the monetary base expands and the 
government’s spending - in nominal terms - also raises, inflation also increases. Thus, 
accordingly  to Rangel (1981), the causality  ‘public deficit resulting in inflation’ is inverted: 
it is the public deficit that results from inflation and not the contrary.227 On the other hand, 
households are affected as, even if wages are fully indexed, from the moment wages are 
received until the next month, when wages are raised, residual real wages fall in the same 
proportion of inflation, thus reducing real income. Also, inflation distorts the price system, 
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making real income also to fall. The result was the collapse of national-developmentalism 
and its substitution by Neoliberalism, what already  occurred in the USA some years before. 
In the Brazilian case, as discussed in the next two chapters, Neoliberalism was not imposed 
but rather it was seen to be the natural choice for the new Brazilian economic model. After 
all, as was very often said during the 1950’s, what is good for the USA is good for Brazil.
Neoliberalism is a conservative economic philosophy based on some principles of 
XIX century’s liberalism. The common points are (a) the efficiency of market  competition, 
(b) the role of individuals in determining economic outcomes, and (c) distortions 
associated with government intervention and regulated markets. However, differently  from 
classical laissez-faire, Neoliberalism is not  a system where market regulates economy. On 
contrary, it is a specific form of political and economic regulation within a financialised 
economy aiming to artificially  reproduce the conditions of perfect competition, not only  in 
the economic sphere, but also in the political and social levels. Thus, it is an ideology as it 
is essentially an instrument of social control based on specific values and moral.
2.3 The Birth of Neoliberalism in Brazil: Economic Crisis and the 1989 Elections
From the ideological point  of view, the Revolution of 1930 represented the 
progressive abandonment of the traditional liberal policies. It marks the end of the Old 
Republic, changing the way  the State interrelates with the society through politics and 
economics. It “(...) redistributed power among social classes, created national political 
parties, established a code of labor laws, a new university  system, a widespread 
democratisation of Brazilian life, a reform of the State apparatus and many other 
changes”.228  By the economic side, it established the notion that the state must lead the 
process of economic development directing the private economic agents through specific 
policies or, in certain cases, even establishing state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors. 
In other words, it established National-Developmentalism as main political and economic 
ideology. Although National-Developmentalism can be considered a leftist  set of economic 
and social policies, the Revolution of 1930’s legacy was strong enough to survive the 
period of conservative right-wing military dictatorship (1964-1984). Only the crisis of the 
1980’s would be strong enough to result in a new ideological cycle represented by 
Fernando Collor de Mello’s victory in the 1989 presidential elections.
2.4 The 1989 Election
Fernando Collor de Mello was a relatively unknown politician, from a small and 
poor state from Northeastern Brazil. The election occurred in two turns: the first  in 
November 15, 1989 and the second in 17 December, 1989. In total, there were 22 
candidates, representing political forces ranging from the radical left to the extreme 
conservative right. As figure 2.5 shows, only five candidates surpassed the 5% barrier: 
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Fernando Collor, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, Leonel Brizola, Mário Covas, e Paulo Salim 
Maluf.229
In the first turn, Fernando Collor defeated the traditional political forces represented 
by Leonel Brizola, Mário Covas, and Paulo Maluf. Brizola represented a left-wing Varguist 
tradition; Covas represented PSDB’s social-democrat project of the PSDB, a relatively new 
party  formed in 1988 by dissidents of Sarney’s PMDB; Paulo Maluf represented a 
conservative wing connected with the militaries, as his PDS was the government’s party 
during the military  dictatorship. As figure 2.6 below shows, in the second round, Fernando 
Collor defeated Lula da Silva being elected president, by a difference of 6.06 percentage 
points.
Figure 2.5
1989 Presidential Election’s First Round - % of valid votes
Source: Own calculations based on data of the Brazil’s Superior Electoral Tribunal.
Figure 2.6
1989 Presidential Election’s Second Round - % of valid votes
 
Source: Own calculations based on data of the Brazil’s Superior Electoral Tribunal.
Fernando Collor (PRN-PST-PSL)
Lula da Silva (PT-PSB-PCdoB)
Leonel Brizola (PDT)
Mário Covas (PSDB)
Paulo Maluf (PDS)
Other
14,35%
8,97%
11,67%
16,73%
17,41%
30,88%
Fernando Collor (PRN-PST-PSL)
Lula da Silva (PT-PSB-PCdoB)
46,97% 53,03%
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The answer for the question why Fernando Collor was able to win the 1989 
elections is difficult to answer. Several authors have written on this subject presenting 
several hypothesis, from ideological determinants to the role of media, specially Globo 
Television and the periodical Veja.230  The idea is that economic and political interests 
influenced the coverage of the elections, clearly favouring Collor. One of the most deep 
analysis on this subject is from a journalist, Mário Sergio Conti. His book “Notícias do 
Planalto” covers the process of decision making by the big media players like newspapers, 
periodicals, and television, together with the bonds the journalists establishes with 
politicians.231 As Conti was Veja’s chief-editor between 1991 and 1997, it is clear that he 
had privileged information and a vision from inside, which cannot be neglected. 
Nevertheless, his book is not an academic work and as such lacks objectivity.
In the academic field, Venício Artur de Lima of the University of Brasilia 
constructed a model based on communication theories emphasising media’s influence on 
people’s cognition in the short and long run.232 Accordingly to him, Collor’s victory may 
be explained by political representation scenario constructed by the Brazilian television 
before 1989.233  The author defends the idea that Collor could have won the elections in 
June of 1989, when election polls gave him 43% of voting intentions before the free 
political programs on the television.234 The free political programs would have helped Lula 
and Brizola to increase their voting share.235
Another work on the same line is Carlos Aguiar’s article about the Brazilian 
political elites’s imaginary and its expression on newspapers. Aguiar develops his idea on 
the basis that the Brazilian media is extremely conservative, privileging a determined set of 
political values and macroeconomic policy. One concrete example wold be the press, 
where journalists and representatives of the ‘elites’ frequently  used the image of a socialist/
communist conspiracy to turn Brazil into a communist country, in the case the left - Brizola 
or Lula - won the elections. As a result, the political debate would have turned in a battle 
between “good” and “evil.”236 Following the same line, Anderson dos Santos discussed the 
role of the periodical ‘Veja’ in shaping Collor’s image. His hypothesis is that ‘Veja’ was 
one of the most important factors explaining Collor’s election. In the same article, he also 
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discusses the role of the same periodical shaping public opinion during Collor’s 
impeachment in 1992.237
Other authors, mostly political scientists, explained Collor’s election as a result of 
Sarney’s bad macroeconomic performance and his inability  to deal with the needs of the 
poorest social fabrics. Another factor often cited is the economic crisis and the high 
inflation rates of the second half of the 1980’s. Accordingly  to these authors, poor 
economic performance allied with high inflation would have debased Sarney’s popularity 
as reducing trust in the coalition PMDB/PFL and in professional politicians.238  Other 
works stressed the fragility  of the Brazilian party system as the main factor explaining 
Collor’s election.239 Some also emphasised Collor’s political marketing strategy, presenting 
himself as a competent administrator, ready to moralise the Brazilian political system and 
provide adequate macroeconomic policies.240
Nevertheless, one of the most comprehensive studies about the 1989 Presidential 
election is Andre Singer’s PhD thesis, in which he analyses the ideological patterns of 1989 
and 1994’s presidential elections.241  Using University  of São Paulo and Datafolha’s 
Cultura Política/90 database,242 Singer was able to test six hypotheses explaining electoral 
behaviour in the 1989’s elections: first, that Collor election was the result of protest 
vote; second, that the output of the 1989’s elections could be explained as opposition to the 
government; third, that the rejection to politicians was the main explanatory  variable; 
fourth, that the rhetoric of reducing State intervention played a decisive role; fifth, that 
Collor was elected because he presented himself as a leader able to solve Brazilian 
economic and social problems; and sixth, that Collor was elected because of electoral 
ideological alignment.243
As the University of São Paulo and the State University of Campinas made 
available several political databases, including the surveilling conducted by Datafolha and 
Ibope, it  was possible to reproduce Singer’s statistical treatment of data, while presenting 
some new calculations and some modifications. Thus, it was possible to re-test Singer’s 
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hypotheses, besides making additional analysis. To test the hypothesis of protest vote, 
Singer cited Guilhon Albuquerque’s research to detect if the main motivation for voting 
was the expectations of results, opposition or identification.244  Also using the survey 
Cultura Política/90, this dissertation’s author was able to cross the electors’ choice with 
four possibilities: his/her choice was based on the idea that this candidate a) was able to 
implement the measures Brazil needs (basically, to implement correct macroeconomic 
policies to end inflation); b) would fight Brazil’s enemies; c) represented people like me; d) 
was able to defeat other candidate. 
Table 2.1
Motivation for Voting on the First Round - %
Promised to 
implement 
the measures 
Brazil needs
He’ll fight 
Brazil’s 
enemies
Because he 
was the best 
candidate 
representing 
people like 
me
To defeat the 
other 
candidate
Total
Fernando Collor de Melo 45,97 6,16 43,60 4,27 100
Leonel Brizola 22,92 4,17 52,08 20,83 100
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 25,00 5,68 62,50 6,82 100
Mário Covas 18,79 4,24 48,48 28,48 100
Paulo Maluf 25,95 3,05 45,04 25,95 100
Outros 24,18 3,85 49,45 22,53 100
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de 
Estudos de Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/
busca.php, own calculations.
Albuquerque established a voter’s typology based on the idea of voting strategy, 
where the act of voting is determined by identification, opposition, or performance 
expectation. In this case, voting should be understood as a rational strategic act comprising 
three elements: the actor, the object of his/her action, and an obstacle between actor and 
object.245 As table 2.1 above shows, it is clear that Collor’s performance in the first round 
was associated with the idea that  he was able to implement the measures Brazil needed 
(45.97%), being able to end inflation and consolidate a new economic model and new 
macroeconomic policies. Also, with the feeling of identification between the electors and 
the candidate (43.60%). Tactical vote is more significant to explain the option for Brizola, 
Covas, and Maluf, while the option for Lula was based on self-identification.
On the second round, the option for Collor’s structure continued to be practically 
the same, although in Lula’s case there were some small changes. Notwithstanding that 
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identification (because he was the best  candidate representing people like me) was the 
main determinant of choosing Lula, his share of tactical vote increased almost 131%, at the 
same time the factor “implementing the measures Brazil needs” faced an absolute 
reduction in the same magnitude. This can be explained by the fact  that Lula economic 
program was associated with national-developmentalism, thus indirectly with Sarney’s 
macroeconomic policies.
Table 2.2
Motivation for Voting on the Second Round - %
Promised to 
implement the 
measures 
Brazil needs
He’ll fight 
Brazil’s 
enemies
Because he 
was the best 
candidate 
representing 
people like me
To defeat the 
other candidate Total
Lula 16,36 4,98 62,93 15,73 100,00
Collor 41,96 5,14 41,77 11,13 100,00
Total 32,25 5,08 49,79 12,88 100,00
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de 
Estudos de Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/
busca.php, own calculations.
The analysis of the data presented above indicates that Collor choice was mainly 
determined by  electors’ future expectations. More, that these expectations were associated 
with the idea of change. In this way, Singer’s conclusion that  Collor choice did not result 
from protest or tactic voting, but on the belief that he was able to make the reforms the 
electors were expecting or believed to be necessary is correct.246  In this sense, voting in 
1989 was more about the future than about the past, again meaning a break with national-
developmentalism as economic model.
The second hypothesis, that voting was determined by opposition to the 
government, must be understood in a specific way. The idea was opposition specifically  to 
Sarney’s government and not to the established status quo. As Singer mention, Collor’s 
campaign was very aggressive against the current government. To verify this hypothesis, 
Singer crossed the evaluation of Sarney’s government with voting choice in both first and 
second round.
Table 2.3
Sarney’s Evaluation and Candidate Choice in the 1989 Elections’ First Round - %
Excellent Good Average Bad Terrible
Fernando Collor de Melo 37,50 50,00 32,56 41,44 39,98
Leonel Brizola 12,50 4,43 12,97 10,77 12,62
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 18,75 19,62 20,89 17,68 20,42
Mário Covas 18,75 6,33 11,24 12,43 9,16
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Excellent Good Average Bad Terrible
Paulo Maluf 6,25 6,33 9,08 8,01 7,67
Other 6,25 13,29 13,26 9,67 10,15
Total 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de 
Estudos de Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/
busca.php, own calculations.
The table above reproduces Singer’s data with slight modifications taking in 
consideration a more formal statistic methodology. Nevertheless, the results are practically 
the same. The table above shows that Sarney’s evaluation was not determinant in choosing 
any candidate. However, although some positive association between evaluating Sarney’s 
government as excellent or good could be inferred, it is not significant  when making an 
analysis in absolute terms.
Table 2.4
Voting in the 1989 Elections’ First Round versus Sarney’s Evaluation - %
Excellent Good Average Bad Terrible Total
Fernando Collor de Melo 0,77 10,08 28,83 19,13 41,20 100,00
Leonel Brizola 0,83 2,92 37,50 16,25 42,50 100,00
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 0,74 7,60 35,54 15,69 40,44 100,00
Mário Covas 1,43 4,76 37,14 21,43 35,24 100,00
Paulo Maluf 0,61 6,06 38,18 17,58 37,58 100,00
Other 0,40 8,40 38,80 15,20 37,20 100,00
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de 
Estudos de Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/
busca.php, own calculations.
 Analysing the table 2.4 above is possible to agree with Singer, although it is also 
possible to reach a broader set of conclusions. First, that the total number of electors 
positively evaluating Sarney was irrelevant. Second, that there was a generalised rejection 
to Sarney’s government, independently  of the elector’s choice. Anyway, in the second 
round (see table 2.5 and 2.6 below) the results were similar. As a result, “rejection of 
Sarney” is not a valid presupposition explaining Collor’s victory. Although the table 2.5 
shows that people who voted for Collor evaluated Sarney better than those who voted for 
Lula, table 2.6 shows that Sarney’s evaluation was extremely negative overall.
Table 2.5
Sarney’s Evaluation and Candidate Choice in the 1989 Elections’ Second Round - %
Very Good Good Regular Bad Terrible
Lula 28,57 23,18 38,72 39,48 38,27
Collor 71,43 76,82 61,28 60,52 61,73
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Cultura Política/90, In: Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública - CESOP - 
UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php, own calculations.
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Table 2.6
Voting in the 1989 Elections’ Second Round versus Sarney’s evalutation - %
Very Good Good Regular Bad Terrible Total
Lula 0,54 4,76 34,56 18,64 41,50 100,00
Collor 0,81 9,43 32,68 17,07 40,00 100,00
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro  de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php, own calculations.
The third hypothesis is that Collor’s election was the result of a general rejection of 
politicians, instead of specific rejecting Sarney.247  The idea is that Collor established a 
“political electoral firm” instead of a political party. As a result, he was able to present 
himself apart the political class, being able to turn into a symbol of the popular hostility 
against politicians in general. To measure the variable “rejection of politicians” as 
predictive of electoral output, Singer analysed the results of the following Cultura Política/
90’s question: in a general manner, the Brazilian politicians worry a) about  their own 
interests or b) about the country’s interests (table 2.7). As shown in table 2.7, Collor 
electors were the only  group to believe that politicians worry about people’s interests more 
than his/her own interests. However, as calculated by  this dissertation's author on table 2.8, 
it is clear that, in a general manner, the electors were convinced that all politicians care 
about personal interests. However, Collor still had a significant better performance.
Table 2.7
Voting in the First Round and Politicians’ Evaluation - %
Which interests politicians care?
Candidate Own Interests People’s Interests
Fernando Collor de Melo 37 50
Leonel Brizola 12 10
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 20 17
Mário Covas 11 6
Paulo Maluf 8 7
Other candidates 13 11
Total 100 100
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
Table 2.8
Politicians’ Evaluation and Voting in the First Round - %
Which interests politicians care?
Candidate Own Interests People’s Interests Total
Fernando Collor de Melo 86 14 100
Leonel Brizola 91 9 100
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 91 9 100
Mário Covas 93,97 6,03 100
Paulo Maluf 91,14 8,86 100
Other candidates 90,61 9,39 100
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Which interests politicians care?
Candidate Own Interests People’s Interests Total
Total 89,42 10,58 100
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
In the first round there was an unexpected connection between those answering that 
politicians care about people’s interests and voting for Collor. The candidate associated to 
rejection of politicians was Mário Covas.248  If explicative to voters’ behaviour, the 
rejection of politicians would have helped Covas to win the election, what did not happen. 
Following these results, Singer concludes that voting for Collor is associated to accepting 
instead of rejecting the political establishment. Also, as shown on table 2.8., the rejection 
to politicians was generalised. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Collor’s voters 
were the ones mostly believing in politicians. Although not empirically demonstrable, a 
possible explanation is the fact Collor presented himself as a capable administrator, able to 
solve the national problems by  adopting the correct economic measures and 
macroeconomic policy. As Collor was indeed a politician, it is possible that  some of his 
electors hoped he was caring for their interests.
Data of the second round on table 2.9 and table 2.10 shows a similar pattern. There 
was a generalised hostility to politicians in general. When controlled by income, the 
association between a positive opinion about politicians and voting for Collor occurs 
mostly  among low income electors. A possible explanation for this behaviour is the 
occurrence of “deference habits” among low income electors. The hypothesis is that very 
low income electors, usually  marginalised from the political process systematically 
approve the government and its institutions.249
Table 2.9
Politicians’ Evaluation and Voting in the Second Round - %
Own Interests People’s Interests
Lula 39 23
Collor 61 77
Total 100 100
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
Table 2.10
Voting in the Second Round and Politicians’ Evaluation - %
Own Interests People’s Interests Total
Lula 93,4 6,6 100,0
Collor 86,7 13,3 100,0
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
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249 Ibid, pp. 71-73.
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
The fourth hypothesis - reducing state intervention or “state versus market” - was 
present in many  public debates. Also, several publications started promoting an open 
campaign against the state and in favour of the market, helped by Rede Globo, Brazil’s 
most powerful television.250  As Singer mentions, some authors understood the general 
rejection to politicians as a form of opposition to the state. As a result, voting in the right 
was interpreted as a the desire to control public power by reducing the state, which was 
considered to be a permanent source of corruption.251  As the question about state 
intervention was present only in the survey Cultura Política/89 and not in the Cultura 
Política/90, there are only data for the first round.
People interviewed for the survey  Cultura Política/89 were asked, regarding the 
state’s role in the economy, what would be better. The possible answers were a) only 
private enterprises coordinating the economy, including basic and social services like 
education, health, and housing, b) the government should coordinate only  basic and social 
services, or c) it  is necessary total government coordination and planning, meaning 
controlling basic services, foreign trade, heavy industries, etc. The results - not presented 
by Singer - are presented below on the figure 2.7. The total majority preferred total 
government coordination and planning (42.93%).
Figure 2.7
Elector’s Preference Regarding State Economic Intervention
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/89, Banco de Dados do Centro de 
Estudos de Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/
busca.php, own calculations.
Singer crossed these answers with the ones about voting in the first round. Also, to 
classify  the candidates in a political left-right  scale, Singer used the survey Cultura 
Política/89’s answers regarding the electors’ own classification of political parties in the 
Private enterprises coordinating the economy
Government coordinating basic and social services
Total government coordination and planning
Other
Don’t know
12,74%
5,16%
42,93%
25,33%
13,84%
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Congresso Brasileiro de Ciências de Comunicação, 2-6 September, Caxias do Sul, RS.
251  Singer, A. (2002). Esquerda e Direita no Eleitorado Brasileiro: a Identificação Ideológica nas Disputas 
Presidenciais de 1989 and 1994. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, pp. 74.
spectrum left-right.252  As this survey  was also available, it  was possible to reproduce 
Singer’s calculations.
Table 2.11
 Position of Brazilian Political Parties on a Left-Right Scale based on electors’ opinion
Left PT - PDT - PCB - PC do B - PSB
Center PMDB - PTB - PSDB - PL
Right PDS - PFL - PRN - PSD
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/89, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
Although Singer did not present the data on the position of political parties’ 
preference for state intervention, it was possible to cross both variables. Surprisingly, state 
intervention was more connected with “right” (56.07%) than with “left” (49.13%). A 
possible explanation is that during the right-wing Brazilian military dictatorship, there was 
a high level of state intervention in the economy, and macroeconomic policy was used as 
instrument of economic development. As a result, the idea of state intervention possibly 
became connected with right-wing politics.
Table 2.12
 Position of Brazilian Political Parties on a Left-Right Scale Based on Electors’ 
Opinion and State Intervention
Private enterprises 
coordinating the 
economy
Government 
coordinating basic 
and social services
Total government 
coordination and 
planning
Total
Left 12,11 38,75 49,13 100%
Center 15,38 53,85 30,77 100%
Right 18,93 25,00 56,07 100%
Total 16,46 32,61 50,93 100%
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/89, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
The next step was to classify  the candidates accordingly to their party. The result 
was: Left - Lula (PT), Leonel Brizola (PDT) e Roberto Freire (PCB); Centre - Mário Covas 
(PSDB), Ulysses Guimarães (PMDB), Guilherme Afif (PL) and Affonso Camargo (PTB); 
Right - Fernando Collor (PRN), Paulo Maluf (PDS) and Aureliano Chaves (PFL).
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Table 2.13
 Voting Intention and State Intervention - %
Private 
enterprises 
coordinating 
the economy
Government 
coordinating basic 
and social services
Total 
government 
coordination 
and planning
Total
Fernando Collor de Melo 17,60 22,53 59,87 100,00
Leonel Brizola 14,57 33,67 51,76 100,00
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 6,78 45,76 47,46 100,00
Mário Covas 17,95 58,97 23,08 100,00
Paulo Maluf 23,81 36,90 39,29 100,00
Other 14,29 52,10 33,61 100,00
Total 16,46 32,61 50,93 100,00
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
As shown in table 2.13 above, since the idea of state intervention was connected 
with right-wing politics, it  is no surprise that Collor and Maluf’s electors also supported 
government coordination and planning. In Collor’s case, it  counted for practically 60% of 
the voters. Electors voting for centre politicians like Mário Covas coherently supported the 
state coordination of basic and social services. Nevertheless, accordingly to Singer, state 
intervention was not a relevant issue determining voting behaviour in 1989.253
The fifth hypothesis, strong leadership, is based on the idea the Brazilian political 
culture favours strong political leadership (Collor) instead of Lula’s participative 
democracy. As Singer points out, some authors suggested that  the electors were influenced 
rather by imaginary appeals than by the candidatures’ rational meaning. This is explained 
by the campaign’s tense political environment resulting from the economic crisis.
Starting from this presupposition, there were three candidates able to influence 
popular imaginary. Leonel Brizola would represent the saviour fighting the kingdom of 
darkness; Lula would represent the working class’ revolutionary  redemption; Collor would 
represent the solitary hero fighting against the temple of doom.254  In other words, Lula 
would represent  the collective hope, while Collor was an individual leader. Another point 
to be considered is the hierarchal structure of the Brazilian society. There is a natural 
superiority of higher over lower classes, still the result of the colonial social stratification. 
As Lula’s is from a very low social stratus of the Brazilian society, it was not admissible 
that he could be a better president than Collor, who had his origins within the sugar’s elite.
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254 Ibid., pp. 77.
Table 2.14
 Leadership and Voting - %
A leader able to 
solve problems
Popular 
Participation Both Total
Lula 30,69 59,03 10,28 100
Collor 41,47 47,99 10,54 100
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculatio2ns.
To test  this hypothesis, Singer again used the survey Cultura Política/90. One 
question asked the respondents what would be better to solve Brazil’s problems: a) a leader 
able to solve problems, b) popular participation, or c) both. Singer crossed the answers for 
this question with the respondents’ electoral choice. The objective was to measure the 
degree of association between the options for leadership or democratic participation and 
voting. In both rounds the association among the variables was weak.255 Nevertheless, as 
shown in table 2.14, the option for Lula was more connected with the idea of popular 
democracy  although in both cases popular participation was more important than 
individual leadership.256
The sixth and last hypothesis is that voting behaviour in 1989 was the result of 
ideological alignment. As Singer points out, several authors tried to test this hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, electors’ ideological alignment following a left-right scale was only tested 
once by Singer in a previous paper.257 Using again data form the survey Cultura Política/
90, Singer tested the electors’ own location in a left-right scale. The result was that there 
was a significant association between voting behaviour and the electors’ location choice 
already in the first round. However, in the second round this association became 
substantially stronger.258
Singer’s conclusion is that self-positioning in the left was associated with voting for 
left-wing candidates, the same applying for those voters self-positioning in the centre and 
in the right. If observed at an individual level, to be self-positioned in the left was 
associated to voting for Lula and Brizola, rejecting Covas, Collor, and Maluf. To be self-
positioned as centre was associated with voting for Covas and Brizola, while rejecting 
Collor and Lula. Finally, self-positioning in the centre meant rejecting Collor and Lula, but 
voting for Covas and Brizola. Finally, self-positioning in the right meant voting for Collor, 
while rejecting Lula, Brizola, and Covas, but not Maluf.259
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258 Ibid., pp. 81.
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Table 2.15
Candidate’s Ideological self-position versus voters’ self-positioning in the Left-Right 
Scale - %
Candidates’ Position Voters’ Self-Positioning
Left Centre Right
Left 65,63 33,49 20,37
Center 7,29 25,20 15,74
Right 27,08 41,31 63,89
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
The table 2.15, recalculated by this dissertation’s author, shows that  the electors’ 
choice in the left-right  scale was not as clearly  reflected in the voting pattern as Singer 
claimed. First, 27,1% of the electors self-positioning as left voted for the right, while . 
Second, practically 33,5 % of the electors self-positioning as centre voted for the left, 
while almost 41,5% voted for the right. Only in the case of those self-positioning in the 
right there was a clear connection between the variables.260
A deeper analysis shows that Singer ignored some important aspects of voting and 
self-positioning in the left-right scale. As shown on table 2.16, Fernando Collor had the 
majority  of centre and right-wing votes, while being the second most voted by left-wing 
electors beating Brizola and Freire, traditional left-wing politicians. Specifically  about the 
centre, Collor was the most voted candidate (30.57%), with practically  the sum of both 
Covas and Lula (34.19%).
Table 2.16
Voting in the First Round X Self-Positioning in the Left-Right Scale - %
Candidate Left Center Right
Aureliano Chaves 0,00 0,93 0,00
Fernando Collor de Mello 24,31 30,57 54,26
Guilherme Afif Domingos 2,43 6,65 4,63
Leonel Brizola 19,10 14,35 5,56
Luis Inacio Lula da Silva 41,32 17,62 14,44
Mario Covas 3,82 16,57 5,19
Paulo Maluf 2,78 9,57 9,26
Roberto Freire 5,21 1,52 0,37
Ronaldo Caiado 0,00 0,23 0,37
Ulysses Guimaraes 1,04 1,98 5,93
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disseration as:
Left+2=Left
3+4+5= Centre
6+Right= Right.
The candidates were grouped in the same way.
Candidate Left Center Right
Other 0,69 0,12 0,19
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
Nevertheless, in the second round the ideological a possible division became 
clearer. As shown on table 2.17 below, although it was to expect that the distribution of 
electors’ ideological preferences should guarantee an easy  victory  for Collor, the division 
among the electors of the centre resulted in an equilibrium between Collor and Lula. This 
is the result of Covas’ electors choosing Lula, following his party guidance. This division 
that resulted in centrist electors voting for both Lula and Collor explains the former good 
perform and the latter difficult to win in the second round, although the right had clear 
supremacy over the left.261
Table 2.17
Voting in the Second Round X Self-Positioning in the Left-Right Scale - %
Left Centre Right
Lula 67,49 41,83 20,23
Collor 32,51 58,17 79,77
Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de 
Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/busca.php,  own 
calculations.
Thus, accordingly to Singer, electors’ ideological self-positioning is the best 
predictor for voting in the 1989 elections’ second round. Left-wing electors voted for left-
wing candidates, the same applying for centrist and right-wing electors. As a result, to 
know an individual’s party  preference would be very effective in predicting voting, thus 
party and voting choices would follow an ideological criteria.262
Although Singer’s hypothesis is statistically demonstrable, there are some 
problems. First, as figure 2.8 shows, almost 54% of the electors identified themselves as 
centrist, while only  29,4% as right-wing and 16,7% as left-wing. As a result, it would be to 
expect that  Covas would have won the election already in the first round. Nevertheless, 
Collor won both first and second round. More, if voting was determined ideologically, Lula 
would not even go to the second round. As a result, although Singer’s hypothesis is 
statistically demonstrable, it lacks logical consistency to be accepted.
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Figure 2.8
Elector’s Self-Positioning in a Left-Right Scale - %
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the survey Cultura Política/90, In: Banco de Dados do Centro de 
Estudos de Opinião Pública - CESOP - UNICAMP. Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br/site/htm/
busca.php, own calculations.
Brazilian electors at that time had no understanding about the meaning of left-wing, 
right-wing, or centrist politics. As shown in the figure 2.9, around 43% of the Brazilian 
electors do not know the meaning of being right or left-wing. The ones claiming to know 
defined being right-wing to be equal to support the government /status quo (19.3%), to be 
correct/better (11.4%), to defend business interests (4.9%). The same applies to left-wing 
politics. To be left-wing was understood as being against the government/status quo by 
19.7% of the respondents, while 9.6% considered it wrong/bad, and 7.5% equalised it with 
communism/marxism. Thus, it is not correct to claim that  ideology  was determinant for 
voting. At the same time, this means that there was no connection between ideological self-
positioning as left or right-wing, and the preference for determined macroeconomic 
policies.
Figure 2.9
Elector’s Understanding of the meaning of being Right or Left-Wing - %
Left
Center
Right
29,4%
53,8%
16,7%
7,7%
2,6%
3,6%
4,0%
4,3%
4,9%
11,4%
19,3%
42,3%
RightDon’t know
It is to support the government/status quo
It is correct/better
It is to defend business interests
It is to defend people’s rights/interests
The elite has the power
It is the lack of economic liberty
It is political freedom
Other answers
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Rather, the answer for voting behaviour in the 1989’s elections can be found in the 
candidates’ association with changing the Brazilian political and economic model, and its 
macroeconomic policies. Thus, it results from the influence of multiple variables. Collor’s 
good performance in the Presidential election’s two turns can be explained mostly  by the 
conjunction of several factors. First, the public dissatisfaction over the political order 
established by the federal government during the period between 1985 and 1989. Second, 
the level of corruption and the crisis of governance that resulted from the constitutional 
reform, including poor economic regulation. Third, the macroeconomic stabilisation plans’ 
inability to deal with the economic crisis and the inflationary process. Fourth, the 
incapacity of the state to compensate or attenuate the deterioration of living standards.263 
In his Inaugural Speech, Collor was clear about his intentions to establish a new 
economic model, based on monetarist principles rather than based on keynesian 
macroeconomic policies:
My government’s immediate objective, (...),  my first year’s target number one is 
not to contain inflation: it’s to liquidate it. I’ll concentrate all the energies of the 
executive power,  I’ll ask the Congress for all support to definitely eradicate from 
the Brazilian economy the weed that is inflation, our old indulgence with the 
furious (monetary) emission and the public deficit. My term will put everything 
on the victory against this social cancer, this intolerable obstacle to retaking our 
economic and human development.  I’ll make the monetary and financial 
stabilisation the absolute priority of this government’s first steps.
9,3%
2,8%
3,1%
4,5%
7,5%
9,6%
19,7%
43,5%
Left Don’t know
It is to be against the government/status quo
It is wrong/bad
It is communism/marxism
It is to defend people’s rights/interests
It is the lack of economic liberty
It is weaker/inexperient
Other answers
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“Neopopulism and its Limits in Collor’s Brazil”. Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 
177-192 .
(...) during the combat of the campaign, I could deeply realise how the Brazilian 
people want to eliminate the carnival of public expenses, monetary emission and 
prices.264
His strategy during the electoral campaign was to present himself as a new element, 
someone outside the traditional political establishment, thus able to solve Brazil’s 
economic, thus social, problems by implementing a new model of development. In spite of 
being himself a member of Alagoas’ sugar oligarchy, he presented himself as an 
independent maverick, apart the conservative parties and politicians. During the 1989’s 
political campaign, he presented himself as the protector of the politically and 
economically  marginalised to whom he started to refer as ‘descamisados,’ an obvious 
reference to Perón’s appeals to the Argentinian working class.265  Also, it was extremely 
difficult for both the Right and Left to attack him, without giving the perception of 
supporting the political, economic, and social models in force, amply repudiated by the 
population. 
With a typical populist discourse, (Collor) attacked both the Left and the Right, 
accusing the Workers’ Party of inciting invading land and armed conflict,  at the 
same time he denounced the political oligarchy and the Brazilian economic elite. 
He also supported ecological questions, an item that was not part of the right-
wing political agenda. As a result, it is possible to affirm that he was able to 
exasperate the Right and to perplex the Left.266
Starting from the popular opinion that the Brazilian political class is corrupt and 
just want to satisfy private needs, he centred his attacks against the state bureaucracy and 
the political class. Campaigning against the “maharajas” since his term as Alagoas’ 
governor,267 Collor was able to please both the lowest social stratum and economic elite 
promising the reform of the public administration apparatus as part of his macroeconomic 
plan of stabilisation.268
The transformation of the social and economic order was considered a moral 
problem resulting from the actions of the privileged political class and economic elite, 
instead of the output of the Brazilian political history. In this way Collor was able to 
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265 Ibid.
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indignada e a esquerda perplexa.” From Schneider, B.  R. (1991). “Brazil under Collor: Anatomy of a Crisis”. 
World Policy Journal, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 321-347 , pp. 334.
267  The term “maharaja” was used to characterise civil servants who did not work and/or whose wages were 
much higher than the average.
268 Oliveira, F. (1992). Collor: a Falsificação da Ira. Rio de Janeiro: Imago Editora.
present himself as a messiah who would not permit the state bureaucracy  and the 
politicians to continue working against public interest. More, this discourse was aligned 
with Neoliberal ideology, which was increasingly determining economicpolicy  in place of 
developmentalism/Keynesianism. As Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was publicly against 
neoliberalisation and globalisation, he was considered to be conniving with inflation and 
corruption. Collor made his alignment with the neoliberal discourse clear in his inaugural 
speech:
I believe that it is the responsibility of private initiative - and not of the state - to 
create wellness and stimulate the economy. The state must be responsible for 
planning development without statism while assuring justice in an ample and 
substantive mean. The state must be apt, permanently apt to guarantee some vital 
goods to the poorer.  It must guarantee housing, food, health, education, and 
public transport for those who need these goods and services to achieve or 
maintain a dignified existence in the context of equal opportunities - as justice 
must be understood as the social dynamic based on freedom from all for all.269
Specifically on the necessity of liberalising the Brazilian economy as part of his 
macroeconomic policies, he also affirmed:
(I have) the conviction that a market economy is definitely a superior form for 
generating wealth, for intensive and sustainable development.  That’s why I’m 
convinced that, in the international plan, the most efficient and competitive 
economies are the opened ones, as they offer a high living standard to their 
citizens,  with better wealth distribution. By the way, we will not have any 
colonial prejudice against foreign capital.
In resume, this plan of economic modernisation by privatising and liberalising 
the economy is the hope to complete the political liberty retaken by the 
democratic transition with the most ample and effective economic freedom.270
Collor’s proposals were resumed in the same speech, when he reaffirmed his 
candidate’s proposals and the directions of his national reconstruction plan, his moral 
crusade, where he clearly linked political ideals and morality to his macroeconomic 
policies:
It is my obligation to present you my candidate’s proposals and elected 
President’s profession of faith, my national reconstruction plan’s directions. (...) 
They are: democracy and citizenship; inflation as main enemy; state reform and 
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269  Free translation from: “Creio que compete primordialmente à livre iniciativa - não ao Estado - criar 
riqueza e dinamizar a economia. Ao Estado corresponde planejar sem dirigismo o desenvolvimento e 
assegurar a justiça, no sentido amplo e substantivo do termo. O Estado deve ser apto, permanentemente apto 
a garantir o acesso das pessoas de baixa renda a determinados bens vitais. Deve prover o acesso à moradia, à 
alimentação, à saúde, à educação e ao transporte coletivo a quantos deles dependam para alcançar ou manter 
uma existência digna, num contexto de iguais oportunidades - pois outra coisa não é a justiça, entendida 
como dinâmica social da liberdade de todos para todos.” From http://www.collor.com, access in 18 April 
2002.
270 Free translation from: “a convicção de que a economia de mercado é forma comprovadamente superior de 
geração de riqueza, de desenvolvimento intensivo e sustentado. Daí a certeza de que no plano internacional, 
são as economias abertas as mais eficientes e competitivas, além de oferecerem bom nível de vida aos seus 
cidadãos, com melhor distribuição de renda. Não abrigamos, a propósito, nenhum preconceito colonial ante o 
capital estrangeiro. Em síntese,  essa proposta de modernização econômica pela privatização e abertura é a 
esperança de completar a liberdade política,  reconquistada com a transição democrática, com a mais ampla e 
efetiva liberdade econômica.” From http://www.collor.com, access in 18 April 2002.
economic modernisation; the ecology; the social debt’s challenge; and finally, 
Brazil’s position in the contemporary world.271
Accordingly to Fernando Collor, he was the only person capable of undertaking 
such moral crusade renovating the national political and economic order, as he was not 
aligned with any  political faction or committed with business interests. Although he was in 
reality  committed with business interests, during the campaign he was able to aggregate the 
lowest social classes’ frustration with the Brazilian social and economic situation, making 
itself an icon.272
His image was constructed to disconnect his persona from his aristocratic origins. 
As he was born in one of the poorest Brazilian states, as he was fighting against the 
political and economic establishment, his political journey  became associated with the life 
of millions of migrants who looked for a better life in the Southern big economic 
centres.273 Also, to connect his image with such ideas as innovation and independence, he 
usually  presented himself as an excessively  elegant, arrogant, and reckless young man, 
making his image to be synonymous with the idea of modernity.274
Using the media, manly  the Rede Globo de Televisão and the periodical Veja, Collor 
used his personal activities to show he was a venturous leader. His appearances on 
television and on the press driving jet-skies and potent motorcycles, and performing sports 
tried to unite his personal image to the popular imaginary. As a result, Brazilians were able 
to identify themselves through cultural codes characteristic to television and sports 
symbolism.275  The strategy of uniting his apparent independence from the traditional 
political class with a moralising and populist  rhetoric, promising a new political, economic, 
and social order, restoring macroeconomic order and the economic agents’ confidence, 
resulted in a great appeal to public opinion. Insisting in the bankruptcy of the state, thus 
pleasing the lowest social stratum, at the same time supporting transitioning the economy 
to a neoliberal model as modernisation strategy.
On the other hand, Lula’s macroeconomic policies reflected developmentalist  ideas 
based on nationalist ideals. Basically, Lula program was based on a plan of long term 
economic development focusing on four points. First, macroeconomic management based 
on a) controlling inflation by  regressive indexation and fiscal and monetary policies; b) 
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271  Free translation from: “É meu dever apresentar-lhes,  resumindo minhas propostas de candidato e a 
profissão de fé de presidente eleito, as diretrizes do meu projeto de reconstrução nacional. (...) São eles: a 
democracia e cidadania; a inflação como inimigo maior; a reforma do Estado e a modernização econômica; a 
preocupação ecológica; o desafio da dívida social; e finalmente, a posição do Brasil no mundo 
contemporâneo.” From http://www.collor.com, access in 18 April 2002.
272 Diniz, E. (1990). O Plano Collor: Implicações Éticas e Políticas.  Iuperj, Grupo de Conjuntura 28,; Lessa, 
C., & Earp, F. S. (1999). O Insustentável Abandono do Longo Prazo. In J. P. d. A. Magalhães (Ed.), Vinte 
Anos de Política Econômica. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto; Oliveira, F. (1992). Collor: a Falsificação da Ira. 
Rio de Janeiro: Imago Editora.
273 Panizza, F. (2000). “Neopopulism and its Limits in Collor’s Brazil”. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 177-192 .
274 Oliveira, F. (1992). Collor: a Falsificação da Ira. Rio de Janeiro: Imago Editora.
275 Panizza, F. (2000). “Neopopulism and its Limits in Collor’s Brazil”. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 177-192 .
unilaterally  breaking the agreements with the IMF and suspending the payments on the 
external debt; c) a financial reform, mainly  by  elongating the domestic debt’s profile and 
only issuing medium and long-term bonds. Second, policies to promote wealth distribution 
by a) increasing purchasing power by doubling the real minimum wage already in the first 
year of Lula’s term; b) encouraging the production of staple goods and controlling supply; 
c) increasing the resources for social policies; d) supporting small producers and strategic 
activities promoting spatial decentralisation; e) reforming the fiscal system, including 
increasing taxes on capital gains, high income, and fortunes. Third, strategic investments to 
support a long-term expansive economic cycle by a) establishing a plan of strategic 
investments for the 1990’s; b) increasing and modernising the productive structure; c) 
investing in science and technology. Fourth, supporting state efficiency by a) reforming the 
direct administration; b) democratising the management and restructuring state-owned 
companies, besides establishing a realistic tariff policy; c) generalising the practice of 
planning, maintaining state control over corporate and financial sectors; d) implementing 
rigorous practices of inspection of tax collection and combating tax evasion; e) review of 
the whole system of incentives and subsidies resulting in private appropriation of public 
resources.276
Land reform was considered one of the most important issues. Lula’s idea was to 
amend the article 185 of the Federal Constitution, establishing a concrete concept of 
productive land permitting confiscating and distributing non-productivity properties. By 
the external side, the idea was to continue the previous policies pursued by  the military 
regime and José Sarney, establishing a Latin American bloc to negotiate the external debt 
with developed countries.
While Lula’s program was a continuation of the national developmentalist  policies 
with few modifications, Collor’s proposals were aligned with the Washington Consensus’ 
conclusions, reflecting the political economic ideology  in vogue.277  In other words, 
Collor’s proposals basically  reflected the Chicago School of Economics’ neoclassical 
101
276 Partido dos Trabalhadores. (1989). Programa de Governo de 1989.  São Paulo: Partido dos Trabalhadores/
Fundação Perseu Abramo..
277  The term Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson in 1989, reflecting a set of policies 
aiming to promote development in Latin America. His original 10 points were: 1) keep budget deficits small; 
2) shift public expenditure priorities from non-merit subsidies to expenditures that are pro-growth and pro-
poor, like spending on basic health, education, and infrastructure; 3) construct a tax system that combines a 
broad tax base with moderate marginal tax rates; 4) liberalise interest rates (meaning that while independent 
central banks should fix the base rate, commercial lenders should be free to set whatever the market can bear 
on top of base rate); 5) maintain a competitive exchange rate via an “intermediate” regime, between fixed and 
free- floating; 6) liberalise trade; 7) liberalise inward foreign direct investment, but without pursuing 
comprehensive capital account liberalisation; 8) privatise state enterprises,  with the exception of some sectors 
as, for example,  public transport or water supply; 9) ease sectoral barriers to entry and exit; 10) provide the 
informal sector with the ability to gain property rights at acceptable cost. (see Williamson, J.  (1990). What 
Washington Means by Policy Reform. In J. Williamson (Ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much has 
Happened? Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. This set of policies was radicalised 
and detached from its original origin by people championing Neoliberal ideology, being applied to all 
developing countries, including those in transition from socialism. In the 1990’s,  the ten points were 
transformed by politicians into a simplistic fundamentalist set of economic policies based on ‘stabilise, 
deregulate,  open up, and privatise’. see Wade,  R. H. Washington Consensus. In W. A. Darity Jr.  (Ed.), 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (pp. 38-40). Detroit: Macmillan.
monetarist theoretical framework, mostly  based upon the ideas of Ludwig von Mises, 
Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler. As Rede Globo’s owner 
Roberto Marinho pointed out, the rivalry between Collor and Lula reflected the opposition 
between the modern and the archaic and not an ideological dispute between left and 
right,278 although Lula and his adherents considered it an expression of class struggle. In 
other words, the battle between Collor and Lula was the expression of the struggle between 
two different economic models and macroeconomic policies, where one is the new and the 
other the archaic.
Table 2.18
Collor and Lula’s Macroeconomic Policy and the 1989’s Elections
Item Collor Lula
Inflation No freezing prices. Focus on budget deficit.
Freezing prices only if 
extremely necessary. 
Negotiation with business and 
unions to enforce a monthly 
prices and wages’ reducer. 
State-Owned Enterprises Strong privatisation.
Restructuring state-owned 
companies, and establishing a 
realistic tariff policy
Industrial Policy
End of subsidies and incentives, 
together with import 
liberalisation.
Import restrictions for strategic 
sectors. Opening the market for 
foreign banks. Control of staple 
goods’ prices.
Internal Debt Elongate the debt profile. Elongate the debt profile.
External Debt
Negotiate each item separately, 
showing that some sectors are 
able to borrow.
Suspension of payments and 
starting new negotiations after 
auditing the debt.
Land Reform Stimulation of cooperatives. Land confiscation and distribution.
Diplomacy
Creation of the Latin American 
Common Market. Strengthening 
economic laces with the EU, 
USA, and Japan.
Establishing a Latin American 
bloc to negotiate the external 
debt with developed countries
Wages Total indexation. After controlling inflation, indexation.
Source: Own elaboration.
Thus, Collor’s victory  should be understood as the result  of two variables. First, the 
breakdown of national-developmentalism as economic model. Although several 
developmentalist  authors had alerted that opening and liberalising the economy should 
follow the initial period of economic protectionism, the government ignored such advices. 
As a result, the model of development and state intervention was in crisis. Lula represented 
this model. Second, since the 1970’s the economic mainstream were shifting from 
Keynesian-based economic policies to Neoclassical monetarist economics. It was to expect 
that the new mainstream would determine what was acceptable in terms of economic 
policy. Lula’s program was against this new mainstream, while Collor’s proposals were 
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278 O Estado de São Paulo, 23 nov. 1989, p. 4. 
aligned with it. By a small margin, the society  chose to end 60 years of national 
developmentalism, giving place to a new economic ideology. In this sense, the election of 
Fernando Collor symbolises the political determination of a new set of macroeconomic 
policies, following the establishment of a new economic ideology.
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3 . A M O D E L O F I D E O L O G I C A L C O N V E R G E N C E A N D 
MACROECONOMIC POLICY
After taking office, Fernando Collor implemented several measures to align the 
Brazilian macroeconomic policy  with the Washington Consensus’ prescriptions. If from the 
1930’s until the 1989’s development was presupposed to be led by the state, after Fernando 
Collor’s election there were severe changes. First, import substitution was substituted by 
trade liberalisation. Second, by  opening the capital and financial accounts, in other words 
freeing the international movement of capital, including the so called ‘hot-money.’279 
Third, by establishing a program of privatisation aiming to end the state’s direct 
coordination and planning of the economy. The former economic minister Marcílio 
Marques Moreira explained the connection of Collor’s ideas with neoliberal ideology and 
the Washington Consensus:
In January 1990 the elected President, Fernando Collor, made a trip to the United 
States. He went with a very concrete agenda,  including very diversified 
meetings: he met President Bush and Nicholas Brady, at that time Secretary of 
Treasury,  but also with Michel Candessus, Managing Director of the IMF, and 
with Enrique Iglesias of the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). (...) I 
went with Collor to see Bush and the talks were very good. The themes 
discussed were the same Collor would approach in his inauguration speech: trade 
liberalisation, economic liberalisation, negotiating the external debt. (...) 
President Collor was fully aware of the multilateral agencies recipes for Latin 
America, which became known as Washington Consensus. I was present in the 
seminary in which the Washington Consensus’ ideas were established. It was a 
seminary about the economic reforms for Latin America, organised bi the 
Institute for International Economics between 6 and 7 November 1989. I have 
the book with the seminary’s proceedings, published in 1990. Who presented the 
Consensus’ ten points was John Williamson, and I’ve attended to this seminar. 
Eliana Cardoso and Daniel Dantas, both from Brazil, presented papers.280
These measures were not something really  new. Instead they reflected the same 
recommendations gave by multilateral agencies to Latin America during the 1980’s. 
Unilateral trade liberalisation for US products and services, for example, was a 
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279 Hot money refers to high volatile short-term speculative capital fluxes.
280 Free translation from: “Em janeiro de 1990 o presidente eleito, Fernando Collor de Mello,  fez uma viagem 
aos Estados Unidos. Ele foi com um programa totalmente fechado que incluía contatos bastante 
diversificados: esteve não só com o presidente Bush e com Nicholas Brady, então secretário do Tesouro, mas 
também com Michel Camdessus, diretor-gerente do Fundo Monetário e com Enrique Iglesias,  presidente do 
BID. (...) Fui com o presidente ao Bush e a conversa foi muito boa. Os temas foram aqueles que iriam 
compor a pauta do que seria o discurso de posse: abertura comercial, abertura da economia, negociação da 
dívida externa. (...) O presidente Collor tinha plena consciência do receituário das agências multilaterais para 
a América Latina que ficou conhecido como Consenso de Washington. Eu tinha estado no seminário em que 
se cristalizou a idéia do Consenso de Washington. Foi um seminário sobre as reformas econômicas para a 
América Latina,  organizado pelo Institute for International Economics em 6 e 7 de novembro de 1989. Tenho 
o livro com os anais do seminário, publicado em 1990. Quem expôs os dez pontos do Consenso foi John 
Williamson, e assisti a essa conferência. Do Brasil apresentaram papers Eliana Cardoso e Daniel Dantas”. 
Moreira, M. M. (2001). Diplomacia,  Política e Finanças:de JK a Collor, 40 Anos de História por um de seus 
Protagonistas. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, pp. 225-31.
precondition for IMF and the World Bank lending money  to the region.281 Also, monetary 
stabilisation was considered to be an end in itself, together with reducing social expenses 
to consolidate the government’s budget. Also, it was considered of extreme importance to 
reduce the taxes on the wealthy and mitigate the power of workers’ unions by increasing 
unemployment. Only following this recommendations Brazil could start growing and 
developing again.282
This formulation of a new economic model to substitute national-developmentalism 
occurred in a context of ideological, thus also political and economic, change. The main 
victim - also on a global level - was the state, which was considered irrational, corrupt, 
ineffective, incompetent, and spendthrift. As a result, Collor’s policies were aimed to 
consolidate the democratic transition and the recently  gained political liberty with 
economic liberalism, at the same time stabilising the economy.
3.1 The New Macroeconomic Model: Economic (Neo)Liberalism
The first half of the 1980’s was marked by high rates of inflation. Although during 
Ernesto Geisel’s term it was relatively  stable, around 40% a year. Between 1980 and 1982 
it surpassed 100% a year, reaching 220% a year between 1983 and 1985. During the period 
between February 1986 and January  1991, several economic plans tried to stabilise the 
economy: in February 1986 there was the Cruzado Plan, in June 1987 there was the 
Bresser Plan, in January 1989 the Verao Plan. Fernando Collor tried two times to stabilise 
the economy, but the result was the same achieved by its predecessors: inflation was put 
down for some months just to come back more intense. Basically, all plans tried to initially 
synchronise wage and income’s purchasing power eliminating indexation after some time 
by decrees (before the 1988’s Constitution) or ‘provisory measures.’283
These plans mainly failed first because of ignoring the internal demand’s variables, 
at the same time artificially maintaining economic variables indexed. This was done by 
temporarily freezing prices, devaluating the exchange rate, prohibiting short-term 
indexation, and maintaining the real interest rate aligned with the plan’s provisions. As 
prices, income, and profits were not really  aligned, when indexation was eliminated prices 
automatically went up  to recompose profits. As a result, workers also pressured for wage 
increases. On the other hand, with the end of inflation, general purchasing power increases 
resulting in stronger demand pressures. Thus, Fernando Collor’s biggest challenge was to 
deal with a yearly inflation of around 1780%, while changing the development paradigm. 
In March 15, 1990, his first day in office, Fernando Collor promulgated several provisory 
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281  Batista Jr., J. P.  (1994). O Consenso de Washington: a Visão Neoliberal dos Problemas Latino-
Americanos. São Paulo: Pedex, Cadernos da Dívida Externa no. 6.
282  Anderson, P. (1996). Balanço do Neoliberalismo. In E.  Sader (Ed.), Pós-Neoliberalismo - as Políticas 
Sociais e o Estado Democrático. São Paulo: Paz e Terra.
283  Translation of ‘medida provisória.’  In the Brazilian constitutional law is a personal act of the President 
with force of law, without the participation of the legislative power, which will discuss and approve it (or not) 
a posteriori. Its justification is based on the concepts of ‘urgency’ and ‘relevance.’ 
measures to reach his objectives. To deal with inflation and to stabilise the economy, he 
promulgated the provisory measure no. 168 which became known as “Collor Plan.”
Table 3.1
Collor Plan Liquidity Block Measures, Emergency Measure 168, March 15, 1990
Blocking most  of financial actives with the exception of paper money in circulation. The amount 
of blocked “Cruzados-Novos” is to be retained at  the Brazilian Central Bank for 18 months, 
being remunerate by 6 percent annual interest plus full inflation. Starting from the 19th month, 
the money would be freed in 12 month payments.
Financial actives would be converted au pair to “Cruzeiros” (Cr$), after extraordinarily paying 
8% of Tax on Financial Operations in the case of non-monetary actives, operations in the stock 
market, and gold. Bonds and short-term deposits of financial institutions were exempted. 
The conversion to “Cruzeiros” was to be made in the same moment the blocked actives were 
freed. There were some specific rules:
- Paper money: immediate conversion, no blocking;
- Short-term deposits and ordinary savings accounts were permitted to be converted and 
withdrawn until the limit  of 50 thousand cruzados (approximately US$ 1,350.00 in 1990 or US$ 
2,300.00 in 2010);
- Short  term investments and overnight deposits could be converted and withdrawn until a limit 
of 25 thousand cruzeiros or 20% of the total, the highest one;
- Other financial actives, including private enterprises’ deposits, could be converted until the 
limit of 20 per cent of the total.
All limits were to be calculated by investor and/or financial institution. Bonds and deposits of the 
financial institutions’ active followed the same rules.
Long-term deposits and debentures were to be converted by occasion of their maturity. 
Investment  funds followed the same rules, with the exception that conversion was dependent  on 
the availability of liquidity in cruzeiros. Shares not being converted were to remain being 
denominated as “Cruzados Novos” until maturity. Bonds which maturity was longer than 18 
months were to be denominated in “Cruzados Novos”.
The blocked “Cruzados Novos” could be used for 60 days (until May 18, 1990) to pay taxes and 
pension contributions; for 180 days they could be transferred among individuals and firms to 
settle debts from before March 15, 1990.
Resources from the national, state, and municipal level were not blocked.
Source: Own elaboration, based on the Emergency Measure 168, available in http://www6.senado.gov.br/
legislacao/ListaPublicacoes.action?id=133851&tipoDocumento=MPV&tipoTexto=PUB, access in January 
21, 2011.
As can be seeen on table 3.1 above, the five fundamental points were a fiscal 
adjustment to guarantee an operational surplus of 2% of the GDP, a monetary  reform to 
give back to the state the control of the monetary  base, an income policy determining the 
price system a priori at the same time eliminating any sort of indexation, and an industrial 
and commercial policy liberalising finance and trade.
The fiscal adjustment had three main points. First, a tributary  reform reducing the 
term of tax collection and the indexation of tributes, increasing taxation and/or tax rates (in 
the case of agricultural rent and exports), the suspension of all incentives, including those 
to the Northern and Northeastern regions, with the exception of the Free Economic Zone of 
Manaus’s. It  also increased the taxation on financial operations, including operation in the 
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stock market. This would be equivalent  to 6 per cent of GDP. Second, a patrimonial reform 
by selling state owned actives by establishing a privatisation program. Third, an 
administrative reform, reorganising the State administrative apparatus and reducing 
bureaucracy.
The monetary reform was the most controversial issue. First, the Brazilian currency 
was changed from ‘cruzado’ to ‘cruzeiro,’ to erase the economic agents’ inflationary 
memory connected with the old currency. Second, prices and wages were converted 
following a rate of one cruzado to one cruzeiro. Deposits and investments followed 
specific rules. First, all ordinary deposits and savings were frozen in cruzados. It was 
permitted to convert  and withdraw 50 thousand cruzados (approximately US$ 1,350.00 in 
1990 or US$ 2,300.00 in 2010). The rest was to remain frozen for 18 months remunerated 
by 6 percent annual interest plus full inflation. After this period, all money could be 
converted and withdrawn. Short term investments and overnight deposits could be 
converted and withdrawn until a limit of 25 thousand cruzeiros or 20% of the total, the 
highest one. Private enterprises could convert and withdraw 20 percent of their deposits 
and investments. The exchange policy  remained the same, with the difference that the 
exchange rate started to be determined by the market  instead of unilaterally by the Central 
Bank.284 The monetary adjustment was equivalent to 10% of GDP and reduced liquidity  to 
20 percent of the prior period.
The income policy  was mainly based on freezing prices and wages. Prices were 
frozen by  their value in March 12, 1990. It  was permitted to practice lower prices but 
increases should be authorised by the government. In the first date of every month the 
government would make public an index of inflation expectation to readjust prices. Wages 
were first readjusted in 72.28% in March. After that, they were readjusted following an 
index of inflation calculated a priori. In the case inflation was higher than the inflation 
index, the workers were expected to freely  negotiate with their employers. In case of 
conceding wage increases, the latter were forbidden to transmit the difference to prices.
However, the most important change was related to the model of development. 
Since the 1930’s Brazil’s development was based on developmentalism, where the state 
has a direct role in inducting development.285 Fernando Collor considered this model partly 
responsible for the national economic problems. Thus, a new industrial and commercial 
policy was established to modernise the economy. The main objective was to change the 
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284  There were three exchange rates in Brazil.  The ‘commercial,’  used for international trade and financial 
transactions; the ‘touristic,’ used for air-tickets, hotel reservation abroad, and international operations using 
credit cards; and the ‘parallel’ or black-market. Although since 2005 the Brazilian exchange market became 
unified, private agents still use different rates for specific operations.
285  For a discussion on developmentalism and its problems see Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2008). 
Macroeconomics of Stagnation and New Developmentalism in Latin America. In M. Forstater, & L. R. Wray 
(Eds.), Keynes for the Twenty-First Century: the Continuing Relevance of the General Theory. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
focus from expanding productive capacity to increasing competitiveness.286  The main 
measures were directing incentives to the production of goods to be exported, increasing 
the support to technologically capacitating the national industry, and a specific strategy to 
developing high technology infant industries.287
The national economy was to be exposed to international competition also by 
reforming the commercial legislation in force. The import policy’s reform included 
abolishing tax exception and special tax regimes for some imports, introducing import 
tariffs as basic instrument of protection instead of quantitative restrictions, the progressive 
reduction of import  tariffs an their dispersion, the establishment of mechanisms to protect 
the national economy from the excessive penetration of imports, and mechanisms to 
minimise the structural adjustment costs of the most affected sectors.288
The general directives of the system of protection, stimulus, and regulation of 
industry and foreign trade were established by  the provisory measures 158 (later Law 
8032/90) and 161 (later Law 8034/90) and by  the regulation MEPF 56. The main objective 
was to dismantle the system of protection and incentives in force for decades. The Law 
8032/90 revoked the exemption and reduction of import tariffs and Imposto sobre Produtos 
Industrializados - IPI on imported goods, mainly informatics, imported goods by 
international trade agreements, and capital goods acquired for the industrialisation of 
Zones of Exporting Processing.289 Finally, it established zero tax on imports of goods not 
produced in Brazil. The regulation MEPF 56 revoked the lists of products prohibited to 
importing (Annex C), the requirement for private companies to present programs of 
imports, and the previous agreement of federal agencies to import, with exception of 
informatics. Also, the law 8034/90 changed the legislation on income tax applying to 
juridical personas.
Specific measures were adopted to reduce non-tariff barriers. First, all non-tariff 
barriers without explicit legal provision were, with the exception of informatics, which was 
regulated only in 1991 with the new Law of Informatics. Second, in August 1990, the 
minimum requirements for financing imports were abolished. Third, the indexes of 
nationalisation for credits from the National Bank of Economic and Social Development 
applying to capital goods were reduced. Fourth, a considerable part of the legislation 
establishing the administrative procedures affecting cost formation (incentives and 
subsidies) or entry  conditions (protection mechanisms) for informatics was removed. 
Import tariffs were reformed following a schedule of gradual reductions (table 3.2) until 
1994 (table 3.3). Still, several legal proceedings deepened the process of commercial 
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286 Guimarães, E. A. (1996).  A experiência recente da política industrial no Brasil: uma avaliação. Brasilia: 
IPEA, Texto para Discussão no. 409; Lyra, F. T. d.  (1996). A política industrial brasileira: mudanças e 
perspectivas. Brasilia: IPEA, Texto para Discussão no. 413.
287 Guimarães, E. A. (1996).  A experiência recente da política industrial no Brasil: uma avaliação. Brasilia: 
IPEA, Texto para Discussão no. 409.
288 Ibid.
289 Tax on industrialised products.
liberalisation. The concept of ‘nationally produced capital goods’ was changed, reducing 
the level of nationalisation to 70% and later to 60%. Table 3.2 shows the nominal import 
tariffs’ evolution between July 1988 and October 1992, when Fernando Collor was 
impeached.
Table 3.2
Nominal Import Tariffs’ Evolution between 1988 and 1992
Period Simple Mean Weighted Mean
July 1988 38,5 34,7
September 1989 31,6 27,4
September 1989 30,0 25,4
February 1991 23,3 19,8
January 1992 19,2 16,4
October 1992 15,4 13,3
Source: Kume, H. (1996). A Política de Importação no Plano Real e a Estrutura  de Proteção Efetiva. Brasília:  IPEA, 
Texto para Discussão no. 423. 
By promoting commercial deregulation the objective was to stimulate the presence 
of imported goods in the national market  pressuring the national industry to be more 
competitive. Also, to help fighting inflation with the cheaper imported goods, at the same 
time avoiding demand pressures. The biggest challenge was to protect the international 
reserves and to maintain the external accounts in equilibrium.290 This happened until 1995, 
when the Real Plan used imports to curb inflation, as shown on table 3.4 below.
Table 3.4
Brazil’s Trade Balance 1988 - 1995, US$ million
Year Imports Exports Result
1988 14.605 33.789 19.184
1989 18.263 34.383 16.120
1990 20.661 31.414 10.753
1991 21.041 31.620 10.579
1992 20.054 35.793 15.239
1993 25.480 38.597 13.117
1994 32.701 43.554 10.843
1995 49.859 46.506 -3.353
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Central Bank of Brazil.
Financial liberalisation and the return of the Brazilian economy to the international 
capital market occurred concomitantly  to the the commercial liberalisation. Basically, it 
was the result of a strong process of financial deregulation freeing international movement 
of capital notably after Marcílio Marques Moreira took office as minister of economics. 
This process was part of a broader adjustment by highly indebted underdeveloped 
countries to get access to the international financial market and to voluntary  foreign 
investments inside a conflictual relationship with external creditors.291
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The main instruments of financial liberalisation were: a) the elimination of the taxes 
(40% - 60%) on dividends exceeding 12% of the capital (Law 8383/91); b) the elimination 
of the 8% taxation at source on liquid profits (Law 8383/91); c) the elimination of the 
prohibition on paying royalties and technical assistance from subsidiaries to main 
companies (Law 8383/91); d) the end of the temporary prohibition on dividends’ 
remittance before the updating of the Central Bank of Brazil’s records (Circular Letter 
BACEN 2165/91); e) the permission to financial revenues to be registered as foreign 
capital (Circular Letter BACEN 2266/92); f) the reduction of the required minimum period 
for resources from the external public debt’s bonds spent in privatisation auctions to stay in 
the country from 12 to six years; g) the permission to transnational companies to register as 
capital acquired technology (copyright, permission to use brands, etc) as inflation 
correction of reinvested profits; h) the permission to foreign investment in real estate.
In the same way as with the process of commercial liberalisation, financial 
deregulation was based on neoliberal ideology, as recommended by multilateral agencies. 
Since the external debt crisis in the ending of 1982, foreign investment in Brazil was 
mainly from debt negotiations with international creditors, including the IMF. 
Nevertheless, as a result of financial liberalisation, in 1990 the influx of foreign investment 
significantly increased to US$ 911 million, from which US$ 631 million in commercial 
paper, US$ 258 million as intracompany investment, and US$ 22 million from government 
bonds (in 2010 values, respectively US$ 1,560.11, US$ 1,080.60, US$ 441.83, and US$ 
37.68 million).292 Nevertheless, should be noted that foreign interest rates were lower than 
the Brazilian rates, mainly in relation to the exchange and to the real interest rate.293 As a 
result, part of these investments was of highly volatile speculative capital. In other words, 
financial liberalisation was financed by increasing public debt, weakening the monetary, 
fiscal, and exchange policies’ effectiveness.
Another important point of Collor’s program of economic reform was to change the 
model of state administration, including its role on promoting economic development. The 
main objective was to adapt the Brazilian economy to the Washington Consensus’ 
directives. Thus, besides the process of commercial and financial liberalisation, the 
acceleration of the National Program of Privatisation - PND was fundamental. The main 
idea was to reduce public debt, induce private investment, modernise the Brazilian 
industrial sector, and incentive the democratisation of capital property. Nevertheless, the 
main PND’s role was to reduce public debt.
Privatisation was considered a key element of stabilisation because of four points. 
First, because it permits the entrance of private players in sectors with high barriers to 
entry because of very  high initial investment requirements, like infra-structure, 
petrochemical, and siderurgy. Second, it is possible to buy a company  by low prices and 
with low good financing opportunities. Third, because such firms already have an 
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established market share, guaranteeing demand. Fourth, companies being privatised 
usually were sanitised, in other words, the state had absorbed their debts.
Table 3.5
Phases of the Brazilian Program of Privatisation
Phase Period President Main Sectors Number of Companies
Value (*) 
US$ 
million
Comments
First Phase (re-
privatization) 1981-1989
General João 
Figueiredo 
and José 
Sarney
Many 39 735
Provaitisation of 
companies, which 
were absorved by the 
government because 
of bankruptcy
Second Phase 1990-1992 Fernando Collor
Siderurgy 
Petrochemicals 
Fertilizers
18 5.189,9 Privatisation as neoliberal policy
Third Phase 1993-1994 Itamar Franco
Siderurgy 
Petrochemicals 
Fertilizers
15 6.503,0
Privatisation as 
neoliberal policy, but 
in less scale
Fourth Phase 1995-1996
Fernando 
Henrique 
Cardoso
Chemicals 
Railways 
Electricity
Servicess
19 6.377,0
Monstly 
concessionof public 
services, specially 
infra-structure
Fourth Phase
(cont.) 1997-
Fernando 
Henrique 
Cardoso
Mining
Ports 13
10.694,0 
(**)
Vale do Rio Doce 
and Eletrobrás’ 
privatisation
Source: Own elaboration,  based on data of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development.
(*) Revenues plus transferred debt. The revenues from concession are not included.
(**) Until December 31, 1999.
As can be seen on table 3.5 above, the debate on privatisation was present in Brazil 
since the beginning of the 1980’s, thus still during the military  regime, and may  be divided 
in four main phases. The first  phase begun during General Joao Figueiredo’s government. 
At this time the objective was not to implement an effective program of privatisation, but 
rather to transfer back to the private sector the companies nationalised because of financial 
problems. The main objective was to avoid intensifying the present of the state in the 
productive sector. During this period, 39 small companies were privatised by a total of US$ 
735 million.
The second phase started in the beginning of the 1990’s, after the law 8031/90 
created the National Program of Privatisation, as part of Collor’s strategy  of economic 
stabilisation and modernisation. Thus, privatisation was connected with commercial and 
financial liberalisation, and the administrative reform of the state, reflecting the changes 
the Brazilian model of economic development was passing through. During this phase, the 
companies included in the National Program of Privatisation were mostly  those of the 
sectors before considered strategic, as petrochemicals, siderurgy, and fertilisers. It were 
included 68 companies, from which 18 were of strategic sectors. The projected revenue 
would be US$ 5,000.0 million. From 1993, this process was intensified until 1995, when 
the privatisation of siderurgy was complete. As matter of comparison, the result of 
Usiminas’ privatisation was more than double of all the 1980’s privatisations.
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Although privatising was connected with modernising and increasing 
competitiveness, in reality the main focus was promoting fiscal adjustment by debt 
reduction. Thus, the basket of privatisation money was very ample, including privatisation 
certificates, government’s internal debt bonds, agrarian debt bonds, external debt bonds, 
Siderbras’ debentures, among other. As a result, the total of rotten assets used was 
equivalent to 87.7% of total revenue. Adding the amount of transferred debt, rotten assets 
were 90.3% of the total. Deducing only  what was invested on the four metallurgical 
companies before privatisation from the total really collected, privatisation resulted in 
losses of around US$ 10,249.5 million to the national treasury.
3.2 Old Political Determinants of New Macroeconomic Policies
Although Fernando Collor was elected with considerable electoral support, he 
formed a minority government. The literature points three main points to explain: a) 
Collor’s personal negative, irresponsible, and/or centralising characteristics resulting in 
ignoring the National Congress; b) the party system’s fragility that made impossible to 
establish a solid majority in the Congress, as also impeded the establishment of a big 
centre-left party  as well; c) the Brazilian plebiscitary presidentialism compromises the 
creation of coalitions, at the same time it jeopardises the relationship between executive 
and legislative.294
Fernando Collor was convinced that neoliberal macroeconomic policies were the 
best to stabilise the economy and promote economic growth and development. 
Nevertheless, to be able to implement these policies, he had to deal with the National 
Congress elected in 1986. As a result, the 1990’s National Congress was not homogenous. 
Although the left got 20% of the seats, the centre got 41% and the right got 39%. Taking in 
consideration that the PMDB, the party with most seats, was not inclined to support full 
market liberalisation, but rather to defend the status quo, Collor had to be very careful 
when negotiating the reforms.
Thus, taking in consideration the context of the presidential elections, it is possible 
to conclude that forming a minority  government was ideal for Collor. There are four 
variables to be considered, to help understanding this rationale: a) the dynamics of the 
post-military party structure, principally  the decline of PMDB; b) the new presidential 
legislative instruments introduced with the 1988’s Constitution; c) the economic crisis and 
the inflationary  boom; d) the temporal gap between Collor’s inauguration in March 1990 
and the legislative elections in October 1990. In other words, Collor’s government’s 
political sustainability was based on exploring unilateral advantages as strategy of 
dominance.
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Table 3.7
Collor’s Ministries
Ministry Minister Party
Agriculture Joaquim Domingos Roriz PTN
Economy Zélia M. Cardoso de Mello -
Infra-Structure Ozires Silva -
Education and Culture Carlos Alberto Chiarelli PFL
Health Alceni Guerra PFL
Labour and Social Care Antonio Rogério Magri -
Social Action Margarida Maria Maia Procópio -
Justice José Bernardo Cabral PRN
Foreign Affairs José Francisco Rezek -
Source: Own elaboration, based on several editions of the hebdomadary Veja digital archive available at 
http://veja.abril.com.br/acervodigital.
The analysis of the table 3.7 above shows that, with the exception of Collor’s own 
PRN, the only  parties getting a ministry  were the PFL, one of the heirs of the militaries’ 
official party  (PDS), and the small PTN. Thus, Collor hoped to negotiate with the PMDB, 
the biggest party in the congress, at the same time composing with the right-wing parties 
that supported him in the second round. Also, he was counting on the efficacy of provisory 
measures to avoid problems with the opposiiton. 
In Brazil, provisory measures have force of law immediately after its promulgation, 
and usually the legislative ends passing them later. As provisory  measures change the 
status quo immediately, the legislative does not analyse the prior status quo (SQ) and the 
one resulting from the provisory measure’s promulgation (SQmp). Rather, it  decides 
between SQmp and the expected output  of rejecting the provisory measure being discussed 
(MPrej). The legislator’s preference system can be simplified as SQ > SQmp > MPrej, > 
being equal to “preferred to.”295 Thus, provisory measures result in legislative cooperation 
and even in a situation of minority support the executive is able to pass their bills.
By the side of the newly  elected government, any agreement with the PMDB would 
mean to jeopardise the principles of the economic plan. Not only it  was Sarney’s party, but 
was also deeply connected with the system of political patronage of Brazilian politics and 
the biggest political party. At the same time, several PMDB’s congressmen were quite left-
wing, what could have reduced party discipline or resulted in very strong pressures to soft 
the plan even before its becoming public. In the case this group of left-wing congressmen 
left the PMDB, Collor’s support in the Brazilian congress would be very thin, even 
considering the discipline of both PRN and PFL.
The challenge was to pass all emergency measures implementing the new 
macroeconomic policies intact in a congress dominated by the PMDB. Being Sarney’s 
party, its name was associated with the fight for democracy and the ending of the military 
regime. This popularity  resulted in the party being extremely popular. In the 1986 
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elections, the party  elected 22 from the 23 state governors, the exception being the state of 
Sergipe which elected PFL’s Antônio Carlos Valadares. As shown on figure 3.1 below, in 
the National Congress, 260 of the 487 elected congressmen (53.4%) and 38 of the 49 
elected senators (77.6%) were elected by the PMDB.
Figure 3.1
Party Composition of the Brazilian Congress by Ideological Orientation in 1987 
(Red=Left, Green=Centre, Blue=Right)
Source: Own calculations and elaboration based on data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal.
Notwithstanding the possible problems, Collor’s government succeed and the 
congress approved the economic plan. None of the 22 provisory measures was rejected, 
with 19 being approved and transformed in law before the constitutional limit of 30 days, 
and 2 being substituted by new provisory measures for being unconstitutional. Only  one 
was re-edited, loosing its power in the ending of its second edition. In spite of that, as the 
PMDB was able to be reporting all emergency measures, the government was forced to 
negotiate and to make concessions in the form of some amendments.
The PMDB explicitly  supported 13 of the 16 emergency measures voted on 
nominal ballots, with the exception of the MPs 161 and 168. The votes controlled by its 
leadership were more than enough to assure passing the previously agreed emergency 
measures. Even taking in consideration that, in the case of some specific bills, the PMDB’s 
left-wing could not follow the leadership’s orientation, it was small enough to not affect 
voting outcome. As a result, the government always had a considerable margin for 
approving all emergency measures.296
However, an important question remains: why did the PMDB voted for Collor’s 
changes if it  was part of the opposition? The question relies on several factors. First, the 
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party  was passing through an internal crisis. had being loosing popular support  after the 
disaster of Sarney’s government. Having elected 260 congressmen in 1987, after three 
years the PMDB had lost 103 (39.6%) of them, with more than a half (54) switching to the 
newly founded PSDB. In the 1989’s Presidential elections, PMDB’s candidate Ulysses 
Guimarães got only 4% of votes, mainly as a rejection of the party’s social and economic 
program. The process of loosing popular support would continue through the year. This 
trend can be illustrated by the results of the elections for governor. As figure 3.2 shows, the 
PMDB lost its political hegemony after 1990.
Figure 3.2 
Governors Elected by Party - 1987 and 1990
Source: Own calculations and elaboration based on data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal.
Because of Collor’s popularity, in 1990 PMDB’s campaign strategy  was to make 
what was called “responsible opposition” to Collor. In other words, to wait for the edition 
of the first emergency measures, analysing a posteriori the merits of each one. Because of 
Collor’s strong criticism to Sarney, it was natural that the PMDB would be part of the 
opposition. In this sense, voluntarily starting supporting the government was considered to 
admit the political defeat  and the party’s debacle. However, it was understood that there 
were limits to rising legislative barriers to the first government democratically  elected in 
almost 25 years. Also, the political characteristics of the new government have been made 
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explicit  already  during the campaign. Thus, to be opposition was considered the rational 
thing to be done, at the same time trying to push the government’s agenda to the left by 
backstage negotiations.
Also, the terms of what would later be called Collor Plan have been presented to the 
PMDB’s economic team even before Collor’s inauguration. The conclusion was that they 
were not compatible with the party’s ideology. Knowing that the idea of blocking financial 
actives had its origins in the academic field and was naturally  “imposed” to the main 
presidential candidates, the PMDB was counting with the possibility of immediate and 
strong popular rejection to the economic shock.297 The party’s strategy was to capitalise 
this rejection - in case it  would happened - or to the plan’s failure in the short run. 
However, although facing political decline, the PMDB still was the most powerful party  in 
the national congress with 108 (21.5%) chairs.
Being a centrist party or, in other words, a catch-all party, it  just could not be 
ignored by any government, right-wing or left-wing. The combination of the fact that to 
directly  collide with the party  would turn Brazil ungovernable with the PMDB’s fear to be 
responsible for ruining the plan resulted in an equilibrium with considerable level of 
elasticity from both parts. This was a risky  situation to the government, which was afraid 
of the plan becoming too disfigured, as the coalition supporting the government was a 
minority group.
Although relatively small, this group was known as “assault troop” because it was 
extremely active. Led by PRN’s Renan Calheiros and PFL’s leader Ricardo Fiúza, its main 
objective was to avoid interference from the opposition, assuring Collor Plan’s integrity. 
Also, to guarantee the victory of the government’s coalition when voting the emergency 
measures and to deal with the high volume of amendments and detachments.298
In a general manner, this number was high, reflecting the congressmen’s will to 
change the plan. The fourth column from the left shows the number of accepted 
amendments. It is to be noted the difference between the number of amendments presented 
by congressmen and the number of amendments that were really  incorporated into the 
initial proposal reformulating it. In this case, the filter was the PMDB, who forced Collor 
to make concessions to avoid turning the turbulent voting process into chaos, as illustrated 
on table 3.8 below.299
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Table 3.8
Presented, Incorporated, and Voted Amendments and Highlights, Collor Plan I, 
March 1990
PM Subject
Number of 
Proposed 
Amendments
Number of 
Accepted 
Amendments
Number of 
Proposed 
Detachments
Number of 
Accepted 
Detachments
148
Alienation of 
State Owned 
Real Estate
10 1 10 0
149 Idem 208 22 60 4
150 Ministries 260 87 133 4
151
Extinction of 
Public 
Organisms
517 241 356 13
152
Private 
Pension 
System
14 4 1 0
153 Economic Power Abuse 481 Revoked Revoked Revoked
154 Prices and Wages 181
No 
Information 350 0
155 Privatisation 227 56 423 4
156 Fiscal Crimes 33 Revoked Revoked Revoked
157 Privatisation 45 1 39 0
158
Industrial 
Products Tax 
Exception/
Reduction
39 20 46 6
159
Norms of 
Conduct (Civil 
Servants)
82 46 27 3
160
Financial 
Operation Tax 
Changes
140 43 44 1
161 Tributation 44 2 13 2
162 Tributation 0 0 0 0
163 Civil Servants Dismissal 7 1 0 0
164 Tributation 0 0 0 0
165 Tributation 25 5 0 0
166
Income 
Administratio
n
6 No Information 3 0
167 Rural Income Tax 30 21 3 1
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PM Subject
Number of 
Proposed 
Amendments
Number of 
Accepted 
Amendments
Number of 
Proposed 
Detachments
Number of 
Accepted 
Detachments
168
Currency 
change to 
“Cruzeiros.” 
Freezing 
Financial 
Actives
914 No Information
No 
Information 0
169 Public Debt 16 No Information 0 0
Source: Diary of the National Congress and CEBRAP’s datubase, in Figueiredo, A. C.,  & Limongi, F. (1999). 
Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, pp. 174.
The fifth column of the table 3.8 above shows the number of proposed 
detachments, selected for voting separately.300  They should be understood as a second 
chance for congressmen to champion their private interests. As there were practically no 
restrictions for presenting detachments, voting was very turbulent and the number of 
detachments was considerably high. Also, usually  there were a tactical agreement among 
parties’ leaders to withdraw most detachments voting only few. In Collor Plan’s case, the 
left-wing parties were left  away of these agreements, resulting in very turbulent debates 
and ballots. Nevertheless, the sixth column shows that detaching was not very effective, as 
detachments were voted merely as formality. Only  those supported by the parties’ leaders 
were really taken in consideration.301
The role of the PMDB’s leader in the national congress, Ibsen Pinheiro, was also 
very important. He explicitly declared his vote for the government, in the cases agreed 
between the government and the party. His influence was fundamental for directing the 
voting of several congressmen. At the same time, in spite of some PMDB’s members, 
mainly from the party’s left wing, were voting contrarily to the leadership  indication, they 
never represented a serious threat. Thus, even with a minority  coalition in the congress, as 
the government was able to get the PMDB’s support to specific measures, the left-wing 
opposition became powerless.302
Although it appears to be a simple process, where the government accepted some 
minor changes while the PMDB agreed to not jeopardise the plan, in reality the process 
was quite turbulent. While all was decided in the cabinets among party  leaders and 
government emissaries, the PMDB’s public discourse was of trying to soft the plan’s 
though points like freezing the money on deposit accounts. Nevertheless, these 
modifications were presented as amendments, thus giving Fernando Collor the opportunity 
to veto them. The rationale was to present the party as the protector of the poor targeting 
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the elections of October 1990. Nevertheless, the government was able to assure a 
significant margin of votes, guaranteeing victory, as shown on table 3.9 below.
Table 3.9
Share of Votes aligned with the Recommendations of Parties’ Leadership, 
Accordingly to the Government’s Proposition, MP’s Collor Plan I, March 1990
PDS PFL PMDB PSDB
Total*Emergency 
Measure For Against For Against For Against For Against
1- MP 148 95.5 - 100.0 - 94.2 - 91.7 - 96.4
2- MP 159 100 - 97.6 - 91.6 - 86.8 - 94.6
3- MP 149 100 - 94.1 - 80.0 - - 98.0 90.7
4- MP 161 95.8 - 92.3 - - 74.1 54.0 - 82.3
5- MP 161 100 - 97.7 - 80.4 - - 98.0 92.4
6- MP 150 100 - 95.6 - 84.1 - 67.3 - 88.2
7- MP 151 95.6 - 91.8 - 79.8 - - 85.1 87.2
8- MP 151 100.0 - 95.4 - 82.6 - - 86.1 90.9
9- MP 151 100.0 - 97.6 - 85.2 - 82.0 - 91.4
10- MP 154 100.0 - 95.2 - 79.5 - - 82.8 88.4
11- MP 154 100.0 - 99.0 - 90.0 - 75.9 - 92.2
12- MP 155 100.0 - 97.6 - 82.8 - 70.0 - 88.1
13- MP 155 100.0 - 98.6 - 93.3 - 87.2 - 95.5
14- MP 157 100.0 - 98.4 - 81.5 - - 94.92 92.4
15- MP 168 100.0 - 97.6 - - 66.1 - 100.0 88.4
16- MP 168 100.0 - 97.3 - 62.01 - - 92.31 95.5
Source: National Congress Diary. Legislative Database,  CEBRAP. Adapted from Figueiredo, A. C., & 
Limongi, F. (1999). Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional.  Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, p. 
176.
* Average of all parties’ proportional nominal discipline.
1 Party’s leadership freed congressmen.
The government’s tactic was to gain the support of parties’ leaders in closed-door 
negotiations in the very  last moment. Then, the leaders reported the to the plenary, in a 
very instructive way, what was the parties’ orientation to their congressmen, who were 
waiting to vote. The leaders and the congressmen which were not involved in these 
negotiations took notice of the agreements only when the voting process started. These 
agreements worked very well regarding Collor Plan’s marginal points, which did not 
represent a serious threat to the opposition. The first serious discussion occurred when 
voting the emergency measure 161, which changed the legislation on legal personalities’ 
taxes. The controversy  was regarding cutting incentives to the Northern and Northeastern 
regions, the poorest in Brazil. In this case, no political group, including the government’s 
base, had interest to go for nominal voting. Thus, voting was symbolic. From this time, 
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how the Congress would vote became subject to the strategy of both government and 
opposition to maximise their interests.303
The emergency measure 161 was defeated by symbolic voting. The government 
counteracted using an inverted strategy: the government leader Renan Calheiros proposed 
a detachment eliminating all modifications proposed by the opposition. In other words, the 
text of the emergency  measure would stay as originally intended by the government. At the 
same time, Calheiros asked the detachments to be subject to nominal voting. The result 
was favourable to the government by a vote of 246 for and 186 against. In this case, the 
government fraction’ s discipline reached 92.3%.304 Thus, even those originally against the 
emergency measure 161 in the end voted with the government. The conclusion is that the 
control of the leaders over the voting process limited the space available for party 
indiscipline.305
The opposition, specially  the left-wing parties, also start doing the same, after 
realising the strategy  worked. In this case, left-wing parties would ask for nominal voting 
and, as usual, it would loose. However, following the internal norms of the Brazilian 
National Congress, after one case of nominal voting follows a period of one hour when 
only symbolic voting is permitted. Thus, in case of doubt after symbolic voting during this 
period, party  leaders have to openly indicate their party’s vote, and the result  is determined 
by the sum of chairs controlled by each party. In this case, the centre-left coalition was able 
to usually  beat the government. The voting method passed to be part of the presidential 
political calculus, as it  was fundamental to co-opt undisciplined congressmen or to 
guarantee the discipline of the big parties.306 This voting method became fundamental to 
approve the core of the economic plan: the emergency measure 168. 
The emergency measure 168 was not only  Collor Plan’s core, but also the most 
polemic of all emergency measures. Although there were several backstage negotiations 
between the government and the opposition, a substantial number of PMDB’s congressmen 
also presented a full alternative to the emergency measure 168 known as ‘Plano 
Osmundo’ (Osmundo Plan), a reference to its author, Osmundo Rebouças. Its main points 
were a) to exclude pension funds and insurance companies from having their financial 
actives blocked; b) to increase the limits people could withdraw from current, savings, and 
overnight accounts Cr$ 600,000.00 (US$ 16,200.00 in 1990 or US$ 30,100.00 in january/
2015) in trimestral payments of Cr$ 200,000.00; c) emergency cases were to be discussed 
by the Brazilian Central Bank’s board of directors. The main objective was to limit the 
government’s arbitrary influence by the emergency measure 168.307
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In spite of the left-wing parties’ negative attitude, taking in consideration the 
orientation from party leaders, the Plano Osmundo was virtually  approved by  the congress. 
Although the government was forcing passing the emergency measures through leadership 
agreements, in this moment, the leader of the government Renan Calheiros asked for open 
voting to verify the disposition of congressmen to follow the party  leaders’ orientation. The 
objective was to force those congressmen supporting the PMDB’s plan, who were feeling 
comfortable under the protection of party leadership, to change sides.
The general sentiment among the congressmen was that the proportion of financial 
actives to be freed by Plano Osmundo would result in extremely high inflationary 
pressures invalidating Collor Plan’s core point. Thus, the congressmen were afraid to be 
personally accountable for permitting inflation to come back. The result was 248 votes 
against and 202 votes for the Plano Osmundo. The PMDB’s congressmen were among the 
most undisciplined: although 78 congressmen followed the party’s leadership, 40 voted 
with the government. Taking in consideration the discipline of the right-wing parties, those 
40 votes were sufficient to guarantee the government’s victory.308
Although his first measures had a wide support among the population, the media, 
and the business people, “Collor’s reluctance to give prominent congressmen powerful and 
lucrative posts in the share-out of bureaucratic power when he took office helped fuel the 
resentment among those whose support he would need to court.”309  After 100 days in 
office, Collor was becoming increasingly isolated. Inflation and unemployment were 
increasing, while wages were declining. Also, several strikes, specially in the public sector, 
were under way.
Nevertheless, after passing the emergency measure establishing the Collor Plan, the 
government believed it had the support of the majority of the congress. As the discussions 
turned to other points of the Collor Plan, the government started asking for nominal voting 
all times. The opposition, led by the PMDB, answered asking for symbolic voting. As last 
resource, the PMDB started accusing the government of trading individual votes for 
political favours and offices and posts in its administrative apparatus. The government 
coalition answered leaving the plenary each time, to obstruct the voting process by  lack of 
quorum. As a result, many emergency measures lost their validity, making the government 
to reedit them. In this case, the government will prevailed.310
Gradually, the political conditions permitting to pass the emergency measures 
promulgated during Collor’s inauguration ceased to exist, and Collor’s failures became 
part of the opposition discourse aiming the October 1990 elections. Collor’s frequent 
exercise of veto, blocking parliamentary action, turned the Brazilian congress to be 
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unwilling to abdicate its legislative power to support the government’s emergency decrees. 
As a result, the relationship between the government and the Congress turns to be 
increasingly  conflictive, as no political power was able to establish dominance. Passing 
complementary  points to the plan, like technical corrections turned to be a very long 
process. Some of them would pass only after several months of long debates, in October. 
The relatively simple process of approving the first emergency measures gave place to a 
complex process marked by partial victories and many conflicts.311
Figure 3.3
Party Composition of the Brazilian Congress by Ideological Orientation - 1991-1994 
(Red=Left, Green=Centre, Blue=Right)
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal.
As demonstrated on figure 3.3, in October, 1990 a new congress was elected. Only 
40% of the federal deputies were reelected. In contrast to 1987, the PMDB elected only 
30% of state governors, and 21.5% of all congressmen. Although a relatively good 
performance in absolute terms, in comparison with previous years, the party  was suffering 
from its internal contradictions allied with the fact it was connected with political and 
economic models considered preterit. Although still the biggest party in the Brazilian 
national congress, with many of its members migrating to other parties, the PMDB lost 
much of its influence, forcing the party to pass through a process of internal change.
Fernando Collor also had problems. His economic plan was a fiasco. After only 
three months, inflation was already  nearly  10% a month. In six months, the accumulated 
inflation between March and October 1990 was 115.42%. In December 1990, it would be 
194.65%. Taking in consideration the first three months of 1990, the ones before the Collor 
Plan, 1990 yearly inflation reached 1,476.71%. To deal with economic instability, Collor 
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Janeiro: Editora FGV, p. 191.
issued the second Collor Plan in January  31, 1991, one day  before the new Congress was 
seated. On March 14, 1991, he launched his National Reconstruction Plan, a package of 
constitutional amendments and new legislation to implement a broad fiscal reform. 
However, the it was not well received by  the Congress and it  became stuck. Collor’s 
continued defeats finally made him to understand his poor political support.312
To change the situation, Collor substituted some of his friends and collaborators, 
especially those holding visible positions, for nominees of supporting parties. The first to 
go was the minister of justice Bernardo Cabral, followed by the minister of economics and 
her team who were blamed by the economic disaster. This inaugurated the second phase of 
Collor’s term, called by  him ‘soft.’ The demise of two emergency plans and the continuos 
poor state of the Brazilian economy helped to put Collor’s popularity in decline. In August 
1991, Collor tried to revive Sarney’s defunct idea of making a political pact, exchanging 
reforms by rolling over state and municipal debts. With inflation reaching 20% a month in 
October 1991, opinion polls showed that over 90% of those interviewed were dissatisfied 
with Collor’s administration.313
Collor’s popularity  was also demised by the several scandals involving government 
officials. First, there was the love affair between the economic minister Zélia Cardoso de 
Mello and the minister of justice Bernardo Cabral who was married. Later, in September 
1991, the first lady Rosane Collor was charged with diverting charity funds to her family 
business and to electoral campaigns. There were also scandals involving purchases of the 
Ministry of Health’s central drugstore, the leaking of confidential information on Brazil’s 
operations in the international coffee market by  some high level officials of the Economic 
Ministry, the former minister of labour and social security Rogério Magri, once a labour 
union leader, being accused of receiving US$ 30,000.00 (approximately US$ 79,500.00 in 
2012) in bribes, the case of the secretary of strategic affairs Pedro Paulo Leoni Ramos 
using his appointees in Petrobrás for dark deals, which resulted in its own congressional 
inquiry. However, one of the most shocking revelation to the public opinion was that the 
President, his campaign treasurer Paulo César Farias, the minister of economics, and 
others, had cleared their bank accounts shortly before the announcing the first Collor 
Plan.314
With the government almost collapsing because of the economic crisis, scandals, 
and being blocked by  the Congress, Collor tried to make a new political agreement by 
promoting minor changes in his cabinet in mid-January 1992 followed by a major one two 
months later, including increasing the number of ministries, which had been reduced from 
23 to 12 at the start of his government, to 16. He also tried to replace his more independent 
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approach with a more traditional one, in other words, ceding to old patrimonialist practices 
of “it is in giving that we receive.” 
The attacks on the government became more virulent. Collor tried to set peace with 
the Congress with a new political coordinator, Ricardo Fiúza, a professional politician and 
an expert in patronage-clientelistic practices.315  Collor tried to reestablish favourable 
conditions to govern, including gaining the cooperation of the Congress. In other words, he 
adopted the same clientelist forms of political intermediation and government’s patronage 
he had condemned and tried to change. Because of the economic fiasco that  reduced his 
popular support, of the enemies he had made, and of the interests he displaced, including 
those of militaries and civil servants who had been experiencing a decline in their living 
standards as a result of the government’s policy of indexing wages below inflation, it was 
already too late.316
Fernando Collor would not end his term. He is the only Brazilian president to face a 
process of impeachment ever. In May  1992, his younger brother, Pedro Collor, in a series 
of interviews to Veja magazine denounced Collor’s connections with his former campaign 
treasurer Paulo César Farias in a web of underworld bribery, extortion, influence-peddling, 
and several other illegal activities. In spite of early  skepticism, Pedro Collor’s interviews 
resulted in several investigations into Farias’ business and the government ordered by the 
president himself. Although Collor was hoping for lack of proof, evidence appeared in 
stages and put together.
A congressional inquiry  was initiated and after 932 days of presidency, a little over 
half of his five-year term, Collor was suspended from the presidency for 180 days. On 
October 2 he was replaced by  his vice president, Itamar Franco. The Senate made a quick 
investigation and following popular pressures voted for Collor impeachment. Collor 
resigned during the beginning of the trial, in December 29, 1992, hoping to maintain his 
political rights. The Senate voting 73 to 8 decided to proceed with the impeachment 
process. The result was the one expected: Collor was impeached by  76 to 3 votes in 
December 30, 1992. Itamar Franco became the new president. Even taking in consideration 
that Itamar Franco historically  had supported national developmentalism, he did not 
change the premises of the economic model in force and its macroeconomic policies.
Although in the United States the ideology  determining the interconnection 
between economics and politics had started changing already in the ending of the 1960’s, 
in Brazil it started only almost thirty years later, after Collor election. The acceptance of 
the relationship among the ideas of interventionist state, development, inflation, and 
economic stability  started to change the ideological paradigm defining what is and what is 
not acceptable in terms of economic policy, conditioning political agents’ political and 
ideological understanding about economics to a specific view.
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The economic debacle during Sarney’s government has a fundamental role to 
explaining Collor’s victory and the ideological change that took place in the 1990’s Brazil. 
The idea that the state is structurally ineffective and corrupt  in contrast to an idealised 
perfect liberalism guided by market forces started to determine Brazilian macroeconomic 
and development policy. The role of the state in promoting development completely 
changed from active to passive. In ten years after Collor’s impeachment, most of the state-
owned companies had been privatised, the programs of credit for development, including 
to agriculture, had been terminated or reduced, the control of foreign financial capitals 
ended, as many other mechanisms of economic protection. The national-developmentalism 
from the 1950’s, which had determined the economic policies until Collor’s election, was 
dead.
3.3 Electors and Converging Preferences for Macroeconomic Policy
Twelve years after Collor being elected, the Workers’ Party (PT) won the Brazilian 
presidential elections and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became the 35th President of Brazil in 
2002. Without the intention to oversimplify the political process that resulted in Lula’s 
victory, Lula’s rhetoric experienced a deep change in relation to 1989, from a considerably 
radical left-wing political program to a moderate one. Thus, although in 2002 the 
opposition was still trying to show Lula as a radical who would jeopardise inflation control 
because of populist policies, the privatisations would be reverted, the agreements with the 
International Monetary  Fund would be ignored, just to cite the main points. In the very 
ending of the campaign, Lula’s main adversary, José Serra, turned its campaign to 
nationalist terms, using the national colours to represent himself, while representing Lula 
and his coalition with red flags. A well known soap opera actress, Regina Duarte, even 
recorded an add affirming that she was afraid of Lula and his leftist past.
In the 1989 elections, one of Collor’s main arguments was that a left-wing 
government would increase the level of state’s intervention in the economy and would 
make the agrarian reform. In 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso used the argument that 
with Lula’s election inflation would come back, besides a governability  crisis because of 
Lula’s PT sectarianism. In 1998 and 2002, a crashing stock market and a extremely volatile 
exchange rate as consequence of foreign capital leaving the country were used to threaten 
electors. The argument was that foreign investors were taking out their money because of 
being afraid of Lula, thus his popularity in opinion polls would explain the fall in the stock 
markets and the exchange rate’s volatility.
Lula’s counterattacked very politely, using logic argumentation and denying any 
kind of radicalism. His strategy was to present himself as an agent for change, however 
without the extremist leftist rhetoric of the previous campaigns. In his “Carta para o Povo 
Brasileiro,” Lula made clear he would maintain the basic premises of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso’s economic policies. In addition, that he would not revert any privatisation, that 
budget deficits were unacceptable, low inflation was to be the main mandate of the 
125
Brazilian Central Bank, that the currency  should be devaluated. He also made clear that 
any social policy  was to be subordinate to the country’s economic conditions.317 He also 
invited José de Alencar, a well known businessman from the conservative right-wing 
Liberal Party (PL), to be his vice-president. 
Lula’s newly appointed ministers of Agriculture and of Development, Industry, and 
Trade had supported his opponent, José Serra. The same applied to the main team of the 
Ministry of Economics. The new governor of the Central Bank of Brazil, Henrique 
Meirelles, was a congressman elected by José Serra’s party (PDSB), who maintained the 
same board of directors than before. Also, the secretary of the Treasury and the secretary of 
the National Revenue worked in the previous government. The Economic Ministry state 
secretary, although member of Lula’s PT, was one of the very  conservative “Política 
Econômica e Reformas Estruturais” plan’s authors. The Ministry of Planning, Budget, and 
Administration was totally renewed, but its policies and objectives remained the same.318
Thus, Lula clearly continued his predecessor’s economic policies, the same the PT 
used to condemn as neoliberal radicalism just some years before. Comparing with the 1989 
campaign’s proposals, Lula’s rhetoric assumed much of what is used to be called economic 
Neoliberalism based on the Washington Consensus. In other words, Lula’s party  converged 
to the set  of macroeconomic policies commonly accepted as the correct one. In the 
Brazilian case, Lula’s PT is only one example. The objective in this chapter is to 
investigate from both the population and political parties’ perspective the existence, the 
behaviour, and the correlation between ideology  and preference for macroeconomic policy 
between 1989 and 2009. 
To determine the variables of investigation, some presuppositions were made. First, 
macroeconomic policy is the result  of politics, thus it  is decided at the political level and is 
often limited by the interests of specific groups or individuals. Second, the understanding 
about economics by politicians lacks sophistication, resulting many times in implementing 
inadequate economic policies, just because these policies are the most popular. Third, the 
definition between left and right follows the notion of fairness. “Left” emphasise fairness 
in terms of outcomes while “right” emphasise fairness in therms of process and stability of 
use of traditional processes.319 In other words, “left” presupposes the preference for more 
state intervention in the economy, mostly through macroeconomic policies to reduce 
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market imperfections, while “right” presupposes less state interference, thus more liberal 
macroeconomic policies.
Fourth, the left-right spatial division is connected with particular beliefs and issues 
that are changing over time. It has also a transcultural character meaning that a similar 
understanding of left and right imagery and its connection with politics is commonly 
shared. Thus, although left and right may be useful to characterise political positions and 
preference for economic models and policy, the actual meaning of the extremes of Left and 
Right are culturally and time-bound specific.320
Fifth, ideological convergence among political parties is a supra-ideological process 
determined by the occurrence of economic crisis that changes and determines what is and 
what is not acceptable in terms of macroeconomic policy. As a result, the causality  being 
left-wing as tantamount for supporting state intervention in the economy and Keynesian 
like economic policies, and being right-wing as tantamount to non-state economic 
intervention and economic, political and social freedom,321  can be or can not be true 
depending on the historical period, as discussed before.
Sixth, the process of ideological convergence in peripheral countries follows 
Ignácio Rangel’s idea of duality. Ignácio Rangel (1914-1994) was probably the most 
original thinker of the Brazilian economic development. Only Celso Furtado has a 
comparable contribution upon the analysis of the dynamics of development. Although his 
bachelor was in law, he was an autodidact in economics always researching the process of 
social and economic transformation of the concrete world, profoundly engaged with 
questions of national development. His economic thought was formed at the nationalist 
school of the Superior Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB) and at the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s (ECLAC) structuralist  school. He was 
also profoundly influenced by Keynes, Schumpeter, and Marx, integrating these authors’ 
thought in a very  personal way. As Rangel made his career at the Brazilian Development 
Bank (BNDE), his thought was independent from the academic politics and discipline. 
This explains why he was so original and creative, besides his own personal talent. 
Although he is unknown at the international level, at least one of his contributions has 
universal value: the principle of endogenous money. Also, very characteristic of Rangel 
was his courage and venture to affirm and to analytically sustain his innovative approach.
Rangel’s idea of duality  is based upon the notion of concurrent but simultaneous 
modes of production interacting through history. In his classic article “A História da 
Dualidade Brasileira” (The History  of the Brazilian Duality), Rangel analysis the specific 
contradiction that resulted in contemporary Brazil. It is a dialectic explanation, not only of 
the dynamics of economic development, but  also of other spheres of social reality, that 
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results from a historic-structural reality. The duality is a complex mode of production that 
combines elements of different fundamental modes of production. In other words, it  deals 
with the specificity of Brazil being at the same time a capitalist and a pre-capitalist society. 
Although the representation of the duality seems to be simple, it  must not be considered a 
mechanical scheme. Rather, it synthesises the evolution of the interaction between the 
internal and the core mode of socioeconomic production. This duality may  be schematised 
as follows:
Figure 3.4
Ignácio Rangel’s Duality
As figure 3.4 demonstrates, the main pole represents the internal economy itself. Its 
internal side reflects the internal relations of production; its external side reflects the 
internal socioeconomic-political model in force. The secondary pole’s internal side reflects 
the internal emerging relations of production; its external side represents the most 
advanced mode of production, reflecting the central countries' economic, social, and 
political structure. These relations are always more advanced than those observed 
internally, stressing the main pole’s subordinate and peripheral character. This structure is 
always changing, as the development of the productive forces changes the structure of the 
economic model. Nevertheless, as usually occurs in peripheral and underdeveloped 
countries, this development is often late in comparison with the core. As a result, these 
countries experience a partial and subordinated process of development, forcing them to 
reproducing - instead of overcoming - the duality. The reproduction of the duality  follows 
certain laws: 
a) when the preconditions for changing from the current stage of development for a 
superior one are established - when new economic and social forces develop and start 
conflicting with the established socioeconomic model - only  one pole changes. The other 
maintain its structure;
b) the external and the internal pole change by turns;
c) the change occurs from the external to the internal side. In other words, the 
socioeconomic model already present in the external side is adopted by the internal side;
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d) as a result, the external side of the changing pole also changes, adopting 
institutions characteristic to a more advanced socioeconomic model. A new dialectic union 
with the new internal side is established;
e) this kind of duality is only present  in peripheral countries. It results from the 
changes experienced by the systemic core toward which the periphery gravitates;
The application of this process to the Brazilian economic history may be seen in the 
figure below:
Figure 3.5
Ignácio Rangel’s Duality Applied to Brazil
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Source: Own adaptation based on Rangel, I. (1981). “A História da Dualidade Brasileira”. Revista de 
Economia Política, vol.  1, no.  4, pp. 5-34 and Bresser-Pereira, L. C., & Rêgo, J.  M. (1993). “Um Mestre da 
Economia Brasileira: Ignácio Rangel”. Revista de Economia Política, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 98-118.
Figure 3.5 shows that although the economic structure of the Brazilian duality is 
determined by four distinct socioeconomic models, its political structure results from the 
alliance of only  two social classes. The structure of this implicit political alliance is 
determined by the duality’s structure, and follows its changes. The main pole is governed 
by one class only, which is the political expression of the dominant socioeconomic model. 
Rangel calls it ‘major partner.’ The secondary pole’s external side is foreign. It influences 
internal affairs through one of the internal dominant classes. Nevertheless, its internal side 
represents an emerging internal dominant class called ‘minor partner.’ It  is dialectally 
united with the major partner, as their interests are different, forming a ‘dual class.’
When there are internal advances following Schumpeter’s process of creative 
destruction, the differences between both classes turn to be contradictory and antagonistic. 
As the pre-conditions for the transformation of the social and economic relations of 
production are mature, the dual class experience a rupture. By  one side, there is a 
progressive dissidence supporting the interests of the external side; On the other hand, 
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there is a retrograde and reactionary faction defending the status quo in force. After a 
political battle, there is the establishment of a new political pact. The most radical elements 
are excluded, and there is a new composition of the ‘dual class.’ A new pole and a new 
regime are established. 
Brazil’s dualities begun with the Republic in 1889 and went until 1930, when 
Getúlio Vargas took power by revolution. By the political side, the first duality  was 
characterised by the understanding of the conservative agrarian oligarchy about political 
and economic liberalism, meaning political rights to few and state intervention to support 
coffee price in the international market.322 The second duality can be politically divided in 
two periods: 1930 - 1945 and 1945 - 1964. The first was dictatorial and the second can be 
considered democratic, both being based on nationalism and populism mixing elements 
traditionally  associated with both right-wing and left-wing politics.323  Nevertheless, in 
terms of macroeconomic policy, the entire period was of non-liberal economic policies 
based on National Developmentalism, usually considered left-wing economic policies.
The third duality started with the 1964’s military cup. It  was supported by the most 
conservative sectors of the Brazilian society, principally the middle class, the Catholic 
Church, and the United States.324 Although the Brazilian military regime was extremely 
conservative and right-wing, its macroeconomic policies were a continuation of Vargas’ 
National Developmentalism. The fourth duality  started in 1990 after Fernando Collor’s 
election and, by  the political side, it is the reinvention of the same conservatism of 1964 
with modern elements; by the economic side it is neoliberal populism.325
Taking in consideration the transformation pattern of politics and economics in the 
most advanced countries, it  is possible to conclude that Brazil’s four dualities are the 
internal expression of the ideological changes in the form of economic and political 
ideologies occurring in the outside space. The Republic was founded based on Liberalism, 
both on politics and economics, the same ideology in force, for example, in the United 
States; the economic policies of the following period were based on National 
Developmentalism, at the same time Keynesian economic policies were politically 
acceptable; although the third duality  marks a change in political terms from left-wing to 
conservative right-wing politics, the economic policy remained the same because of 
political inertia and, of course, because of the army’s nationalist  character; finally, the 
fourth duality represents a re-orientation in both political and economic terms to what was 
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happening in the centre. By the political side, it represents the consolidation of democracy 
after the military  dictatorship; by the economic side, it is the end of National 
Developmentalism and the beginning of Neoliberal Populism, the understanding of the 
Brazilian political class about Neoliberalism. Thus, the dual character of the ideological 
and political dualities is the transformation of the newly established external ideology by 
internal forces into a specific version.
To analyse the Brazilian case, data was selected from two sources: from the 
elector’s perspective, the database of the University  of Campinas’ Centre of Studies of 
Public Opinion, an interdisciplinary initiative combining the academic and scientific area 
with private institutes of public opinion research, as IBOPE an DATAFOLHA.326 Its main 
objective is to recover and make available to researchers the public opinion surveys 
covering politics, society, culture, behaviour, among others. Its database has more than 
2300 surveys covering the period 1968 - 2007. From the politicians’ and political parties’ 
perspective, the source was the IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey (Pesquisa Legislativa 
IUPERJ - Oxford in portuguese or PLIO). This is a longitudinal project initiated in 1990, 
covering all elected legislatures since the military dictatorship, and seeking their views on 
ideology, legislative activity, institutional design, social policy, state reform, and foreign 
policy, among other issues. Between 1990 and 2009 more than 800 different congressmen 
have answered the survey.327
The first step  was to select from CESOP’s database the surveys containing 
questions on self-positioning following a left-right Likert Scale in which there were also 
questions regarding individual preferences for macroeconomic policies, including the level 
of state intervention in the economy, and individual preferences regarding political parties. 
The second was to select the variables of both CESOP’s and PLIO’s surveys and to prepare 
them for statistical analysis. First, basic statistical analysis was made, to determine the 
distribution of the variables. Then cross tabulations between the variables were made to 
check the logic consistence between them and to visualise their relationship. Finally, a 
simple model based on logistic regression for ordinal variables was established to test the 
relevance of the relationship between the variables, with self-positioning following a left-
right Likert Scale as independent variable and the preference regarding state intervention 
as dependent variable. The hypothesis to be tested by regressions is that self-positioning in 
the left-right spatial scale has no or little influence in choosing the level of state 
intervention, thus the politically  acceptable macroeconomic policies are determined by  a 
supra-ideological process of convergence by politicians to a specific ideology that has its 
own macroeconomic policies determined ex-ante.
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3.4 Electors, Ideological Convergence, and Preference for Macroeconomic Policy
In 1989, 2083 electors were asked about their preferences regarding state 
intervention and their ideological position in the left-right scale. The question about state 
intervention was “In your opinion, which would be the best to Brazil.” The possible 
answers were “the government should let private companies control the entire economy, 
including basic services as education, health, and housing;” “the government should 
control only these basic services, leaving the rest under private control;” “the government 
should control the entire economy, including basic services, international trade, the 
commanding height, etc.”
Table 3.8
Preference for State Economic Intervention and Personal Positioning in the Left- 
Right Scale in 1989 - Electors
Left Centre-Left Centre Centre-Right Right
Total 
Average
State
Intermediary
Private sector
Total
48,9% 31,6% 42,1% 61,2% 61,9% 50,7%
34,6% 49,7% 40,7% 22,9% 18,2% 31,4%
16,5% 18,7% 17,2% 15,9% 19,9% 17,8%
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Source: Own calculations based on Intenção de Voto para Presidente VI, CEDEC I-1989, DAT/
BR89.SET-00186. In: Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública – CESOP-UNICAMP. 
Available in: http://www.cesop.unicamp.br.
As shown on table 3.8 above, in 1989, the preference for total state intervention 
was much stronger among centre-right and right-wing electors than among left-wing 
electors, although the latter also preferred the state controlling the economy. The 
preference for the state controlling only basic services, thus leaving the rest under private 
control, was stronger among centre-left and centrist electors, and the second choice for 
left-wing. Nevertheless, the strongest support for private control of the economy was also 
among right-wing electors. Overall, independently of the left-right positioning, 50.7% 
preferred full state control of the economy, while 31.4% were for an intermediary 
positioning and only 17.8% supported the full control of the economy by the private sector.
The results of ordinal regression analysis confirmed that both variables are 
correlated. The model fit’s p  level (Sig.) is less than 0.05, thus the model gives better 
predictions than if just guessing on the marginal probabilities of the outcome category.328 
However, although the two variables are correlated, the three other tests show that the 
model’s explanatory  power is not good enough. First, the goodness-of-fit, which contains 
the Pearson’s chi-square for the model, is not statistically  significant. As this test’s null 
hypothesis is that the fit is good, if p-level is large, usually if p>0.05, than the hypothesis is 
not rejected. However, if p<0.05, the model does not fit well. In this regression, the 
Pearson’s chi-square significance is less than 0.05, thus the model does not fit well. 
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328 The tables with the outputs of each regression for each case are in the annexes.
The second test is the pseudo R-square statistics. Although the statistics’ software 
presented three alternatives, on this dissertation Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-square was taken 
in consideration. Accordingly to the results, although the model is significant, its 
explanatory  power is just 3.2%. In other words, the self-placement in the left-right scale 
explains only 3.2% of the probability of choosing more or less state. Finally, the test of 
parallel lines. This test shows the proportional odds assumption, as its null hypothesis is 
that the slope coefficients in the model are the same across response categories, thus lines 
should be parallel. If the null hypothesis is rejected based on significance of the chi-square 
statistic, the conclusion is that the coefficients are not the same across the levels of 
outcome. Thus, to not reject the null-hypothesis it is expected a P-level > 0.05, while -2 
Log Likelihood between the null hypothesis should be the smaller the best fit. In this 
model, we reject the hypothesis, as p<0.05 and -2 Log Likelihood is almost 100%. 
The explanation for this pattern can be found in the 20 years of military dictatorship 
between 1964 and 1984. Politically, the Brazilian military regime can be considered 
extremely conservative and nationalist, although in terms of international politics aligned 
with the United States. As a result, and taking in consideration the Cold War, the militaries 
considered communists and socialists a threat  for national security. The political police and 
even the army often arrested, tortured, and killed members of left-wing organisations. At 
the same time, the economic policies of this period were clearly  based on national-
developmentalist  strategies of development, which are considered to be left-wing or 
Keynesian. Thus, state intervention was associated with the militaries and with right-wing 
conservative policies.
The next year a similar question was present in a survey was in 1993. In this year 
the question was ‘Now I am going to read some statements and I would like to know your 
opinion: the government should intervene more in the economy to make the country to 
grow. The possible answers were: “I very much agree;” “I agree a little;” “I disagree a 
little;” and “I very much disagree.” This variables were recoded to “state;” “more the 
state;” “more the private sector,” “the private sector. The survey  was conducted between 
March 27-28, 1993 and 2499 electors were interviewed.
Thus, as demonstrated in table 3.9 below, even taken in consideration that 1993 was 
the third year of economic (neo)liberalisation in Brazil, a strong state intervening in the 
economy to promote economic development was still the first choice among right-wing 
and centre-right electors. It is not a surprise that the same applies to left-wing and centre-
left electors. The lowest support  for state intervention was among centrist electors. 
Nevertheless, with the exception of the latter, in all cases more than 50% of the 
interviewed electors preferred a strong state in economic matters. Curiously, the second 
choice for all, with the exception of centre-right electors, was total private economic 
control of the economy.
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Table 3.9
Preference for State Intervention in the Economy and Personal Positioning in the 
Left- Right Scale in 1993 - Electors
Left Centre-Left Centre
Centre-
Right Right Total
State 62,9% 52,1% 47,4% 63,8% 68,3% 58,5%
More the State 12,9% 16,4% 19,2% 15,6% 13,9% 16,0%
More the 
Private Sector 4,3% 10,0% 7,2% 5,2% 3,6% 6,1%
Private Sector 19,9% 21,4% 26,2% 15,3% 14,2% 19,4%
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Source: Own calculations based on Avaliação Itamar Franco (6 meses),  DAT/BR93.MAR322186. In: Banco 
de Dados do Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública – CESOP-UNICAMP. Available in: http://
www.cesop.unicamp.br.
Again, regression analysis showed that both variables are correlated. The model 
fit’s p level (Sig.) is less than 0.05, showing that the model gives better predictions than if 
just guessing on the marginal probabilities of the outcome category. With the exception of 
pseudo R-square statistics, all other tests showed the model had a good fit. First, the 
goodness-of-fit, which contains the Pearson’s chi-square for the model, is not statistically 
significant. As this test’s null hypothesis is that the fit is good, if p-level is large, usually  if 
p>0.05, than the hypothesis is not rejected. However, if p<0.05, the model does not  fit 
well. In this regression, the Pearson’s chi-square significance is equal to 0.197, thus the 
model fits well.
The test of parallel lines shows that chi-square is relatively low and p-level is equal 
to 0.218. In this case, the slope coefficients in the model are similar, resulting in parallel 
lines. However, although the tests show that the model has a good fit, Negelkmerke’s 
pseudo R-square shows that its explanatory power is of just 2.8%, making the model to be 
rejected. A further investigation running a linear regression model (results not showed) 
showed that  the variables have strong collinearity with an Eigenvalue’s index equal to 
1000.
Table 3.10
Elector’s Preference for State intervention in Specific Sectors Accordingly to Left-
Right Self-Positioning in 2002
Left Centre-Left Centre
Centre-
Right Right
Total 
Average
Education
Health
Pension and Social System
Judicial System
Public Transport
Water Service
75,3% 69,3% 78,2% 83,3% 80,4% 78,3%
79,1% 76,1% 77,0% 85,3% 82,5% 80,6%
76,6% 69,3% 73,3% 84,3% 84,1% 79,3%
81,6% 79,5% 82,4% 91,2% 85,7% 84,4%
60,1% 50,0% 43,0% 52,0% 60,5% 55,2%
75,9% 68,2% 72,1% 81,4% 74,5% 74,5%
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Left Centre-Left Centre
Centre-
Right Right
Total 
Average
Mobile Telecommunications
Electricity
Banks
Automotive Industry
34,4% 25,3% 29,1% 34,0% 39,6% 34,7%
76,6% 70,5% 65,5% 82,4% 72,7% 72,9%
53,2% 46,6% 41,2% 47,1% 60,5% 52,7%
30,4% 20,5% 25,5% 19,6% 37,9% 30,4%
Source: Own calculations based on Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro 2002, CESOP-FGV/BRASIL02.DEZ-01838 
In: Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública – CESOP-UNICAMP. Available in: http://
www.cesop.unicamp.br.
Only almost 10 years after the question about the role of the state in promoting 
economic development was included in a survey, this time in the Estudo Eleitoral 
Brasileiro 2002 (Brazilian Electoral Study 2002) - EEB/2002. There were included 20 
questions not simply about the role of the state in the economy, but about national-
developmentalist  principles. As shown on table 3.10 above, Twelve years after Fernando 
Collor initiated the process of neoliberalisation in Brazil, with the exception of electricity, 
the strongest support for state economic intervention comes from right-wing and centre-
right electors. Centre and centre-left  electors are the ones supporting less state intervention. 
Another interesting conclusion is that the sectors with strongest support for state 
intervention are those which traditionally were controlled by the state during the Keynesian 
years or, in the Brazilian case, during the national-developmentalist period. Thus, it is no 
surprise that mobile telecommunications, banks, the automotive sector, and public 
transport have the weakest support for state intervention, the contrary being true to 
education, health, the pension system, the judicial system, water service, electricity and, in 
a less scale, banks.
Table 3.11
Elector’s Preference for Specific Policies Accordingly to Left-Right Self-Positioning in 
2002
Left Centre-Left Centre
Centre-
Right Right
Total 
Average
Price Control (Basic 
Services)
Control of Private 
Enterprise
Help Private 
Companies with 
Financial Problems
Wage Control
General Price 
Control
Import Restriction
Restrict Foreign 
Workers
Profit Remittance 
Abroad
69,0% 59,1% 60,6% 61,8% 71,9% 66,9%
29,7% 22,7% 18,2% 22,5% 39,8% 30,3%
56,3% 39,8% 43,0% 47,1% 66,3% 55,4%
34,8% 27,3% 30,3% 32,4% 53,8% 41,0%
62,0% 42,0% 53,9% 55,9% 66,3% 59,7%
50,0% 29,5% 45,5% 51,0% 55,2% 49,4%
27,2% 22,7% 26,7% 24,5% 32,6% 28,7%
15,8% 9,1% 14,5% 11,8% 19,4% 16,0%
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Left Centre-Left Centre
Centre-
Right Right
Total 
Average
FDI Facilitation 59,5% 47,7% 49,1% 55,9% 54,1% 53,7%
Source: Own calculations based on Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro 2002, CESOP-FGV/BRASIL02.DEZ-01838 
In: Banco de Dados do Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública – CESOP-UNICAMP. Available in: http://
www.cesop.unicamp.br.
The analysis of the table 3.11 bove shows that the strongest support for policies 
characteristic to National Developmentalism comes from right-wing electors, and just than 
by left-wing. One explanation could be that electors do not know the meaning of being 
left-wing or right-wing. This hypothesis could be tested, since the Brazilian Electoral Stud 
of 2002 included one question regarding the understanding of the left-right scale by the 
respondents. From the valid answers, 48.9% understood it, in contrast to 51.1% who did 
not understand it. However, 45.1% of the respondents did not answer to the question, 
resulting that only  26.9% of the sample understood the meaning of left or right. In other 
words, it is possible to conclude that 73.1% of the respondents or did not understand the 
meaning of left and right or were unsure enough to give a definitive answer.329 
This explains the results of the regressions. All of them had a bad fit, thus the 
relationship  between being left or right-wing is not statistically  significant. The ones with 
p-level < 0.05, thus in principle statistically  significant, did not  pass in the tests of 
goodness-to-fit and/or parallel lines. All regressions Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-square were 
very low. The ordinal regressions which were statistically significant and passed in one or 
more of the tests were run again as linear regressions to test  the presence of collinearity 
between the variables. In all cases, the eigenvalue index was equal to 1.000. Although 
collinearity  can appear in the case the variables are very correlated, another kind is when a 
regression’s variables add up to something that is very  close to a constant. As the majority 
of the respondents in all cases supported state economic intervention independently of their 
self-positioning in the left-right scale, it is the case.
Another question when analysing the surveys was about the electors’ perception 
about the Brazilian political parties in the left-right space. Some of the surveys asked the 
respondents to classify the Brazilian political parties in a Likert left-right scale. This 
question was asked in the years 1990, 1993, 2002, and 2006. Although Brazilian electors’ 
own understanding about the meaning of “left” and “right” is fuzzy, political parties 
explicitly position themselves as left, right, or any intermediary position between, and this 
position is reflected by the media. Thus, although electors may be unsure about 
themselves, they are aware of the parties’ self-positioning in the left-right scale.
One of the presuppositions in this chapter is that the left-right scale moves through 
time or, in other words, that what was considered to be right-wing macroeconomic policies, 
for example, 50 years ago, now are considered to be centre or even left-centre. This means 
that the ideological change is not occurring merely  inside the parties, but rather that there is 
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329 Data in the appendix.
a general movement from the outside changing the definitions of left and right and, in 
consequence, changing the economic policies the political parties identify themselves. 
Thus, the change is dual: first  there is an ideological change in the outside moving the 
entire left-right scale; an internal movement of adaptation follows the new ideological 
configuration in force, making political parties to move to the left or to the right in the 
moving scale.
Figure 3.6
Elector’s Perception of Political Parties Positioning in a Left - Right Scale, 1990 - 
2006
Source: Own calculations, based on the CESOP database.
The Figure 3.6 above shows these movements: left-wing parties moved to the right 
while right-wing parties moved to the left. In 1990, the PT was the most  left-wing of the 
parties analysed. In 1993 it  moved to the right and, in 2002 and 2006, it is practically in the 
same position the PSDB was in 1990 and 1993. Among electors, this positioning is 
considerably consistent. The standard error of the average, measured by  the whiskers in the 
figure 3.7, is considerably short in PDT’s case (the second most left-wing party). It also 
pended to the right, staying in the same position than PT in 2006 and PSDB in 1990 and 
1993. Although in 1990 electors were unsure how to position it, as the long whisker shows, 
the move to the right was consistently perceived by electors in the following years.
The PSDB, traditionally a centre-left social-democrat party, strongly moved to the 
right, achieving a position in the right of PTB in 1990 and PFL in 2006. The electors 
considered PMDB remaining consistent with its centrist position, changing a little to the 
left, and meeting both PSDB and PFL. As shown by the whiskers, in 1990 the PTB was the 
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party  with the most intense crisis of identity, ranging from centre-left to centre-right. 
Nevertheless, following the movement of other right-wing parties, between 1990 and 2006 
it changed to the left. The PFL also strongly moved to the left, meeting the PSDB and the 
PMDB. In the next section, instead of electors, the answers of the Brazilian National 
Congress’ deputies are analysed.
3.5 Macroeconomic Policy and Ideological Convergence at the Political Level
Taking in consideration the parties’ positions in 1990, it is possible to apprehend 
two simultaneous movements, one from left-wing and other from right-wing parties. In the 
first case, left-wing parties moved to the right. This is not to say they abandoned leftist 
ideals, but rather assumed a more right-wing political agenda to achieve their objectives, 
mainly assuming the right-wing idea that the state has a diminutive role in guaranteeing 
full-employment, while the ‘market,’ specially  the financial sector, assures a Pareto’s 
optimal resource distribution. At the same time, although right-wing parties did not change 
their political agenda, they  moved to the left, as the left-right scale itself moved to the 
right. In other words, a political agenda that would be considered to be extremely right-
wing during the 1950’s nowadays is considered to be centrist or centrist-right.
Ideology  was defined in the beginning of this work as the combined systemic ways 
in which social and political dominance is established and sustained through subliminal 
means, and which is manifested through material actions. As a result, the process of 
ideological change occurs without the actors involved acknowledging it. In this sense, it  is 
possible to conclude that the change experienced by left-wing parties is really ideologic, as 
it is the result of subliminal internal structural changes; On the other hand, right-wing 
parties became more centrist because their political and economic ideology  turned to be 
mainstream.
Table 3.12
Congressmen’s Preference for State Economic Intervention Accordingly to Party 
Membership in 1990 - Politicians
PMD
B PFL PDS PSDB PRN PDT PTB PT PL PSB
State 1,9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16,7% 0% 33,3% 0% 0%
Most the 
State 15,4% 2,8% 0% 26,1% 50,0% 41,7% 20,0% 66,7% 0% 50,0%
Equilibrium 55,8% 25,0% 15,4% 52,2% 50,0% 25,0% 20,0% 0% 28,6% 50,0%
Market 26,9% 72,2% 84,6% 21,7% 0% 16,7% 60,0% 0% 71,4% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Own calculations based on IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey 1990.
As table 3.12 shows, in 1990, the Brazilian parties’ preference for state intervention 
was well divided, following the idea of left-wing parties supporting more state intervention 
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and right-wing parties supporting less state intervention. The PT, the PTB, and the PSB’s 
congressmen were the strongest supporters of state intervention in the economy, although 
in both cases the strongest support was not for absolute state control, but for more state 
than market controlling the economy. Congressmen of centrist parties like the PMDB and 
the PSDB supported the equilibrium between state and market, with the latter being for 
more state intervention than the latter. Right-wing conservative parties’ congressmen, like 
the PFL, the PDS, the PL, and the PTB, were for more market than state. Surprisingly, 
Fernando Collor PRN’s congressmen were more aligned with the left-wing PSB than with 
right-wing parties like PFL and PDS, showing its lack of a solid ideological base.
Taking in consideration the congressmen’s positions in 1990 (see table 3.13), it  is 
possible to apprehend that there were already a clear relationship between self-positioning 
in the left-right scale and the preference for more or less state intervention. Only left-wing 
and centre-left congressmen supported full state control of the economy. At the same time, 
none of left-wing congressmen supported pure market  economics although 22.9% of 
centre-left did. The strongest  support for pure market  control was among centre-right 
congressmen (60%). Half of right wing congressmen supported full economic liberalism, 
what is less than among centrist congressmen (58.1%). The explanation is that right-wing 
congressmen were still connected with the national-developmentalist ideas of the military 
regime.
Table 3.13
Congressmen’s Preference for State Intervention and and Personal Positioning in the 
Left- Right Scale in 1990 - Politicians
Left Centre-Left Centre
Centre-
Right Right Total
State 38,5% 4,2% 0% 0% 0% 5,2%
Most the State 46,2% 29,2% 4,8% 0% 0% 17,0%
Equilibrium 15,4% 43,8% 37,1% 40,0% 50,0% 37,8%
Market 0% 22,9% 58,1% 60,0% 50,0% 40,0%
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Source: Own calculations based on the IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey 1990.
The ordinal regression’s results show that both variables are correlated. The model 
fit’s p level (Sig.) is less than 0.05, showing that the model gives better predictions than if 
just guessing on the marginal probabilities of the outcome category. First, the goodness-of-
fit, which contains the Pearson’s chi-square for the model, is not statistically significant. As 
this test’s null hypothesis is that the fit is good, if p-level is large, usually if p>0.05, than 
the hypothesis is not rejected. However, if p<0.05, the model does not fit well. In this 
regression, the Pearson’s chi-square significance is equal to 0.197, thus the model fits very 
well. This is reflected by  the pseudo R-square statistics of 0.379, meaning that 37.9% of 
the model’s variance is explained by  congressmen self-positioning in the left-right Likert 
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Scale. The test of parallel lines shows that chi-square is low (4.383) and p-level is equal to 
0.821. In this case, the slope coefficients in the model are similar, resulting in parallel lines, 
thus the model fits well.
The next year Brazilian congressmen were asked about their preference regarding 
the degree of state intervention in the economy was 1997. Notwithstanding Collor’s 
impeachment, between 1990 and 1997 his political project of opening and liberalising the 
Brazilian economy was continued and deepened. Although Collor’s vice-president Itamar 
Franco supported an economic model more aligned with national-developmentalist 
principles, including relaxing the monetary policy. Nevertheless, during his presidency the 
basic pillars of economic reform based on the Washington Consensus’ principles were 
maintained, including the National Program of (Programa Nacional de Desestatização - 
PND) and the process of commercial liberalisation.
When Fernando Henrique Cardoso became his Minister of Economics in 1993, 
inflation was considered Brazil’s most urgent economic problem reaching approximately 
2490% that year. In February 1994 Cardoso’s implemented a successful stabilisation plan, 
called Real Plan (Plano Real), combining heterodox economic policies ex-ante to deal with 
inertial inflation and Orthodox Neoclassical Monetarism ex-post to keep inflation low. 
Being elected president in 1994, Cardoso deepened Fernando Collor’s policies and the 
process of economic liberalisation, with considerable political support.
Table 3.14
Congressmen’s Preference for State Economic Intervention Accordingly to Party 
Membership in 1997
PMDB PFL
PDS/
PPB/
PPR
PSDB PPS PDT PTB PT PL PSB
State 3,1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Most the 
State 12,5% 2,9% 0% 7,4% 0% 0% 0% 26,7% 0% 0%
Equilibriu
m 40,6% 26,5% 4,0% 29,6% 100% 37,5% 37,5% 73,3% 0% 100%
Market 43,8% 70,6% 96,0% 63,0% 0% 62,5% 62,5% 0% 100% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Own calculations based on IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey 1997.
Thus, as shown on table 3,14 above, in comparison to 1990, all parties moved away 
from state intervention in direction to free-market. Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s party 
PSDB, initially a social democratic party, Lula da Silva’s PT, and PDT experienced the 
most radical changes. In 1997 the majority (63%) of the PSDB’s congressmen were 
supporting total market liberalism in contrast to 21.7% in 1990. At the same time, none of 
PT’s congressmen were supporting full state control of the economy, in contrast to 33,3% 
in 1990; 73.3% were for equilibrium (0% in 1990) and the support for an economic model 
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with more state than market felt from 66.7% in 1990 to 26.7% in 1997. The PMDB also 
shifted to the right with 43.8% of its congressmen supporting total market liberalism in 
contrast to 26.9% in 1990, while 40.6% supported the equilibrium between state and 
market. The PSB also shifted to from partially  supporting ‘most  the state’ to entirely 
supporting the equilibrium between market and state. Even the PPS, the former Brazilian 
Communist Party that was aligned with the Soviet Union for several years, supported some 
form of equilibrium instead of full state control of the economy, as it would be to expect 
from radical left-wing parties.
In comparison to the congressmen’s positions observed in 1990, the table 3.15 
below shows that the preference for more or less state intervention in the economy was 
also well distributed, with left-wing parties supporting more state intervention and right-
wing parties supporting a more liberal market-based economic system. What changed was 
that left-wing, centre-left, and centrist  parties moved to the right of the Reinert scale, 
showing a tendency to abandon supporting state economic intervention. Centre-right 
congressmen became more inclined to supporting a liberal market economic system, at the 
same time right-wing politicians broke with the policies of the military regime, thus with 
national-developmentalism, fully supporting a free market model.
Table 3.15
Congressmen’s Preference for State Economic Intervention Accordingly to Party 
Membership in 1997 - Politicians
Left Centre-Left Centre
Centre-
Right Right Total
State 5,9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5,2%
Most the State 29,4% 12,2% 0% 0% 0% 17,0%
Equilibrium 47,1% 53,7% 21,1% 35,7% 0% 37,8%
Market 17,6% 34,1% 78,9% 64,3% 100% 40,0%
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Source: Own calculations based on the IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey 1997.
The regression analysis showed that both variables are correlated. The model fit’s p 
level (Sig.) is equal to 0.000, showing that  the model gives better predictions than if just 
guessing on the marginal probabilities of the outcome category. First, the Pearson’s chi-
square for goodness-of-fit is not statistically significant. As this test’s null hypothesis is 
that the fit  is good, if p-level is large, usually if p>0.05, than the hypothesis is not rejected. 
However, if p<0.05, the model does not fit well. In this regression, the Pearson’s chi-square 
significance is equal to 0.961, thus the model fits very  well. This is reflected by the pseudo 
R-square statistics of 0.375, meaning that 37.5% of the model’s variance is explained by 
congressmen self-positioning in the left-right  Likert Scale. The test of parallel lines shows 
that chi-square is low (3.942) and the p-level is equal to 0.862. In this case, the slope 
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coefficients in the model are similar, what results in parallel lines. In other words, the 
model fits well and is valid.
The next IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey’s round was in 2001, one year before 
the 2002’s Presidential elections. Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s popularity was in decline: 
in May 2011, an opinion poll conducted by the Sensus Institute showed that Cardoso’s 
positive evaluation felt from 29.7% to 22.1% while the negative evaluation increased from 
27.9% to 37.1%.330 This can be explained by several factors. First, the energetic crisis that 
started after the combination of several failures switching-off Itaipu Hydroelectric 
Powerplant’s main generator, leaving 21 states without electricity for several hours. As the 
system collapsed, several structural failures were discovered, resulting in a program of 
electrical energy  rationing for several months, resulting in a general popular dissatisfaction 
with the government, including with the energetic sector’s privatisation and chosen 
regulatory model. Second, there were several accusations of corruption involving 11 
ministers, 194 congressmen, 33 senators, and Cardoso himself.331
Table 3.16
Congressmen’s Preference for State Economic Intervention Accordingly to Party 
Membership in 2001 - Politicians
PMDB PFL
PDS/
PPB/
PPR
PSDB PPS PDT PTB PT PL PSB
State 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8,3% 0% 0%
Most the 
State 7,1% 3,6% 25,0% 4,0% 100% 40% 16,7% 50,0% 0% 0%
Equilibrium 57,1% 28,6% 33,3% 44,0% 0% 40% 33,3% 33,3% 100% 50%
Market 35,7% 67,9% 41,7% 52,0% 0% 20% 50% 8,3% 0% 50%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Own calculations based on IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey 2001.
Table 3.16 shows that, in comparison to 1997, there was a dual movement. First, 
after the apex of supporting market in 1997, in 2001 the majority of the political parties 
had retreated in direction to a more centrist position. Although this rebound can be 
explained as the result of Cardoso’s falling popularity, a second explanation is a feature of 
the Brazilian political environment known literally as the ‘abashed right.’ It  means that 
conservatives do not want to be identified as right-wing. Pierucci in 1987 was the first to 
identify such behaviour, stating that “(...) for politicians depending on winning votes, a 
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rational-cost benefit analysis suggests that it is not very  clever to confess being on the 
right. Even worst is to confess being on the extreme right.”332
Leôncio Martins Rodrigues in his 1987’s book on the Constituent Assembly 
detailed this phenomenon. Asking 428 congressmen to classify  themselves on a left-right 
five-point Likert Scale, none of them has chosen “radical right.” At the same time, only 6% 
classified themselves as moderate or centre-right. The rest classified themselves as centre 
(37%), centre-left (52%), and radical left (5%). Rodrigues’ conclusion was that  judging by 
the self-definition of politicians, Brazil is a country without a right.333 As Timothy Power 
pointed out, “(...) a voter in Brasília tried to explain the direita envergonhada to me by 
remarking of the candidates: “If they  do not say what party  they are, they’re ususally 
PFL.””334
Nevertheless, although both explanations certainly  have some degree of validity in 
determining the observed counter-movement, what changed was the notion of supporting 
free market economic policies as tantamount to right-wing politics. In other words, what 
changed was the entire notion of which degree of state intervention is associated with left-
wing or right-wing ideological positions. This conclusion is valid because as table 3.17 
below shows, contrary  to the non-left-wing parties, left-wing parties, like the PT and the 
PSB, had moved to the right, supporting more market than in 1997. This was the first time 
members of both parties explicitly supported total free market as economic model, 
reflecting not only a process of internal ideological change, but that the policies associate 
with “being left-wing” had also shifted to the right, as expressed on Lula da Silva’s Carta 
ao Povo Brasileiro.
Table 3.17
Congressmen’s Preference for State Economic Intervention Accordingly to Party 
Membership in 2001 - Politicians
Left Centre-Left Centre
Centre-
Right Right Total
State 20,0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2,1%
Most the State 50,0% 19,0% 11,1% 16,7% 0% 16,5%
Equilibrium 20,0% 57,1% 50,0% 0% 66,7% 46,4%
Market 10,0% 23,8% 38,9% 83,3% 33,3% 35,1%
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Source: Own calculations based on the IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey 2001.
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 The ordinal regression for 2001 data confirmed that both variables are correlated. 
The model fit’s p  level (Sig.) is equal to 0.000, showing that the model gives better 
predictions than if just guessing on the marginal probabilities of the outcome category. The 
Pearson’s chi-square for goodness-of-fit is not  statistically significant. As this test’s null 
hypothesis is that the fit is good, if p-level is large, usually if p>0.05, than the hypothesis is 
not rejected. However, if p<0.05, the model does not fit well. In this regression, the 
Pearson’s chi-square significance is equal to 0.156, thus the model fits well. The pseudo R-
square statistics is 0.23, meaning that 23% of the model’s variance is explained by 
congressmen self-positioning in the left-right  Likert Scale. The test of parallel lines shows 
that the chi-square is low (9.348) while the p-level is equal to 0.314. In this case, the slope 
coefficients in the model are similar, resulting in parallel lines. In other words, the model 
fits well and is valid and the hypothesis is accepted.
The IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey was run two times more, one in 2005 and 
another in 2009. The results of the regressions in both cases did not show anything new, 
but the consolidation of the trends discussed above.335 Specifically in 2009, there is a small 
tendency of parties going in direction to the state, but this is rather the result of the 
international economic crisis than a reversion of the process of ideological convergence for 
a common set  of economic and political ideologies. The tables and the results of the 
regressions are available as annexes.
Although the ideological choice seems to be better defined inside the parties than 
among electors, the process of convergence to a specific economic model and its 
macroeconomic policies expressed as political ideology  was clear in both cases: political 
parties moved to the right in the period analysed, accordingly to the perceptions of both 
electors and politicians. It is interesting to note that in the very beginning of the process of 
transition, the majority  of the politicians supported state intervention in the economy 
independently of their ideological self-positioning as left  or right-wing. This can be 
explained as the result of the influence of national-developmentalist ideology upon 
political actors. Among left-wing individuals, the idea of the state promoting social justice 
to correct capitalism’s structural problems or even to establish a socialist or communist 
state was still vivid. On the other hand, the national-developmentalist ideals expressed by a 
strong state promoting development was associated to the economic model implemented 
during the years of military dictatorship (1964-1984), which was clearly right-wing.
Thus, in the Brazilian case, the idea of a strong state regulating the economic and 
social policies was common for left and right-wing electors and politicians until the middle 
1980’s. However, in the ending of the 1980’s and beginning of the 1990’s, it was clear that 
among politicians, the option for more or less state was very well correlated with being left 
or right-wing oriented. This correlation reached its apex in 1997, when Cardoso and his 
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neoliberal policies’ popularity reached their highest point, reflecting the Real Plan’s 
success in dealing with inflation and stabilising the Brazilian economy.
Figure 3.7
Political Parties Self-Positioning in a Left - Right Scale, 1990 - 2009
Source: Own calculations based on the IUPERJ - Oxford Legislative Survey 1990, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009.
As also shown on figure 3.7 above, with Cardoso’s popularity declining in the 
following years, the phenomenon known as “ashamed right” regained place. As a result, 
there was a rebound of those parties that had significantly moved to the right in direction to 
the left. The surprise was that traditionally  left-wing parties like Lula da Silva’s PT moved 
to the right, with some of their congressmen even supporting free market. This can be 
understood as the result of, first, a process internal ideological change and, second, that the 
policies associate with “being left-wing” had also shifted to the right, meaning that the left 
had assumed right-wing policies as their own, resulting in ideological convergence. In this 
sense, it is true that, at least in Brazil there is no Left.
This dissertation presents the hypothesis that macroeconomic policy is determined 
at the political level, following ideological changes as the output of long-wave business 
cycles. As a result, what  is acceptable in terms of macroeconomic policy  is already 
determined ex-ante at the ideological level, leaving few space for manoeuvre. Another 
contribution is developing the hypothesis that macroeconomic policies themselves are 
subject to change in the left-right space of the ideological spectrum. What were 
conservative right-wing policies 50 years ago are now regarded as centrist policies. It also 
develops the idea that there is a process of ideological change following economic crises, 
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supporting the median voter theorem’s explanation of the process of party convergence. 
Also, to deny the idea of pure voters’ rationality based on an one-dimension field. The 
finds in this dissertation show that  voters’ decision is based on each individual’s subjective 
idea of what is the best for the society as determinant of what is the best for himself/
herself. It  proposes that individuals are more like Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith 
supposed. Individuals understand they  are part of the society, thus they base their decisions 
on what they believe is the best for the society and not only in their immediate personal 
gains, as proposed by Neoliberal theory.
Several macroeconomic approaches/schools of thought exist. Their objective is to 
explain the dynamics of macroeconomics, as discussed above, but they also reflect a moral 
and ideological pattern, implicitly  providing guidelines for political conduct. As theory, 
they  are limited to the boundaries of the academia, without influencing the real world. 
When politicians choose one of these schools of thought as the theoretical base for 
macroeconomic policies to be implemented in the real world, what was macroeconomic 
theory  turns to be macroeconomic policy, therefore turning to be ideology. The result  is 
dual. On one hand, the school of thought giving the theoretical base for the macroeconomic 
policy in force turns to be the academic mainstream. It then determines the research agenda 
at the academia, at  the same providing clear boundaries for what is and what is not 
acceptable as macroeconomic policy. On the other, as it is determined at the political 
sphere, it turns to be an ideology  in itself, because its transmutation into macroeconomic 
policy makes it as the main instrument for obtaining and maintaining power.
With the boundaries of macroeconomic policy being determined, both economic 
and political institutions and structures adapt to the new economic ideology. This is not to 
say that the process is smooth, as there are many  actors involved and they can influence - 
but not change - the core macroeconomic ideology  in force, aiming to adjust it to their 
needs. The interaction between macroeconomic policy, economic institutions and 
structures, and political institutions and structures then determines the macroeconomic 
performance. In the case the latter fulfil the electors’ expectations on macroeconomic 
performance, there is no need to change the current macroeconomic policy, thus political 
ideology is also unchanged. Political business cycles resulting from electoral use of 
macroeconomic policy  as described before can occur, resulting in inflation. However, the 
boundaries of what is and what is not accepted in macroeconomic terms remain 
unchanged. As a result, political ideology also remains unchanged. A model of business 
cycle, macroeconomic policy, and ideology can be schematised as:
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Figure 3.8
Macroeconomic Policy, Politics, and Ideology
However, as history has shown, sometimes depressions occur. They reflect the 
collapse of the macroeconomic ideology in force to maintain the social and economic 
structure’s level of reproduction. In this case, macroeconomic failure expressed by low 
levels of GDP growth and investment, high unemployment and debt and, in some cases, 
inflation - not necessarily all at the same time. As a result, politicians are unable to create 
inflation to temporary boost the level of economic activity aiming to win coming elections 
within the established macroeconomic ideology.
Electors are rational and look to the past and the present to form expectations about 
the future. Their utility changes accordingly to their perceptions about the sustainability of 
the macroeconomic ideology in force, and their expectations about the future. The first is 
determined by  real income, the level of social protection, and corruption. The second is 
determined dually. First, by the electors’ memory  and its duration. People look to the past 
as a way to get  information, although memory  is both selective and limited. Thus, these 
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two variables change perceptions and expectations. Second, there is the role of the media. 
Ordinary people have limited knowledge of both what is happening at the political level 
and about economics. The media provides information and analysis, shaping the electors’ 
expectations about the sustainability of the current macroeconomic ideology and the future. 
As politicians become convinced the macroeconomic ideology in force cannot 
provide the instruments to make the social and economic system to start growing and 
developing again, they start looking for alternatives to avoid loosing power in coming 
elections. At this moment, a new macroeconomic ideology and a new academic 
macroeconomic mainstream are established. However, as discussed above, each 
macroeconomic theory reflects a specific moral and ideological structure, implicitly 
providing guidelines for political conduct. As a result, to adopt a macroeconomic theory as 
base for establishing a new macroeconomic ideology, the political sphere must also change 
the political ideology  in force. Thus, the new political ideology is shaped accordingly  to 
the new macroeconomic mainstream’s moral and ideological structure, which reflecting 
Downs’ theory of the medium voter and the process of party  convergence discussed above, 
will be the new ideological “centre;” the “old” centre will be the new left or right.
148
4. IDEOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
IN LATVIA
Before applying the model developed in this dissertation to Latvia, it  is necessary  to 
stress once more that macroeconomic policy is a political choice. In other words, the 
macroeconomic policies one country adopts is the result of the political struggle among 
political parties to get or to stay in power. It is also limited or, at least, strongly influenced 
by what is internationally considered to be the economic mainstream. This was not the case 
when Latvia was definitely annexed by the Soviet Union in 1944, beginning a long period 
of deep economic integration into the Soviet economy. Rather, there was no political 
struggle to define the economic model to be adopted. It was simply  vertically imposed 
from Moscow.336 
During the period of the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s policy was much determined 
by the fear of foreign intervention. Its main objectives were to contain Germany, to repel 
Japan, to increase its influence in Spain, and to establish closer ties with the United States. 
The fundamental concern was protecting the borders. Thus, albeit the nazi-Soviet pact was 
signed to contain a belligerent Germany, it  also gave the possibility for the USSR to 
increase its influence area until the Baltic Countries, Ukraine, and Belarus.337  After the 
Conference of Yalta, this international political-geographical division became consolidated 
in such a way that Latvia became part  of the Soviet Union. Its political, economic, and 
social structure were totally changed to the Soviet model.
Following the political and economic isolation from the West, the Soviet economy 
experienced a process of autonomous development. This not only made the country to be 
immune to the Great Slump, but resulted in increasing isolation after the World War II. 
This contradicted the Bolsheviks’ hope of a wave of revolutions in the more developed 
industrial countries, that would result in further integration instead of isolation.338  The 
result was the establishment of a specific model of economic development based on state 
planing, focused on the inside. The core of the Soviet economic system consisted of six 
points:339
1) State ownership or control of most productive enterprises;
2) central planning of production and allocation of goods and services at State 
determined prices;
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3) a subsidiary  role for money, banking and public finance with primacy assigned to 
production targets in physical units;
4) price control and supply restrictions on domestic trade, except for foods 
produced on the collective farmers' private plots;
5) limited freedom for workers to choose their jobs and;
6) state monopoly over foreign trade and transactions.
The model allowed the Soviet economic structure to change between 1917 and 
1985 from an economy with 82% of rural population and most of the GDP originating in 
agriculture, to one that was 78% urban, with 40-45% of the GNP originating in 
manufacturing and related sectors. However, although its progress was evident, the GNP's 
annual rate of growth that was 5.7% during the 1950's felt to 2.0% between 1980 and 1985. 
In the same way, the GNP per capita's annual rate of growth dropped from 3.9% during the 
1950's to 1.1% between 1980-85.340 Also, the overall productivity of the Soviet economy 
declined on average by 3.3% between 1950 and 1985, as a result of structural problems.
Table 4.1
USSR GNP’s annual rates of growth (%), 1950-85
1950-85 1950-60 1960-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85
Gross National Product 4.3 5.7 5.2 3.7 2.6 2.0
GNP per capita 3.2 3.9 3.9 2.7 1.8 1.1
GNP per employed 2.8 4.0 3.0 2.2 1.4 1.3
GNP per unit of capital -3.3 -3.5 2.6 -3.9 -3.9 -4.0
Source: Ofer, G. (1987). “Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985.” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXV, 
December, pp. 1778.
Although the objective of establishing key  industrial sectors was successful, there 
were many structural problems contributing to the USSR’s collapse. There are five main 
structural factors contributing to the collapse of the Soviet model. First, the 
industrialisation process leaned on the field workers. They  were more taxed, but had less 
social insurance. Second, the basic agricultural policy substituting the New Economic 
Policy  (NEP) resulted in forced collectivisation. Agricultural productivity felt  in such a 
way that the Soviet Union was forced to import grains during the 1970s. Third, the process 
of bureaucratisation, consequence of the model of centralised command, resulted in a 
situation where all effort to increase the efficiency and the flexibility  of administration and 
production resulted in the opposite.341 Fourth, the inflexibility  of a system drifted for the 
constant growth of the production of goods, without any internal mechanism foreseeing 
changes of production levels and quality  assurance. As a result, innovation in the 
productive process became virtually impossible. This situation was worsened because great 
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part of the resources for research and development were destined to the defence sector as 
direct consequence of the Cold war. A direct consequence was the reduction of the civilian 
sectors’ productivity development.342 Fifth, the Soviet planners’ spent vast sums retooling 
old plants and investing into Siberian development.343  The result was the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Latvia’s independence, and the beginning of its transition to a market 
economy.
4.1 Application of the “Model of Macroeconomic Policy, Politics, and Ideology” to 
Latvia
The sections below applies the model developed on this dissertation to Latvia. The 
section 4.1.1 analyses how neoliberalism turned to be macroeconomic policy, and the 
process by which it became implemented by the countries of the former Warsaw Pact in the 
beginning of the 1990s. Section 4.1.2 analyses the extent by which it influenced political 
ideology, as expressed by  the economic program of the political parties elected to the 5th, 
6th, 7th, and 8th Saeima. The transformative effect of neoliberal economic ideology  on 
economic and political institutions and structures is analysed in section 4.1.3. Finally, the 
concrete output expressed as macroeconomic performance and the prospects of change are 
discussed in section 4.1.4.
4.1.1 Neoliberal Chicago Monetarism as Macroeconomic Policy after the USSR 
(Macroeconomic Theory)
Latvia became independent in 1991, when Neoliberalism was established as the 
mainstream economic ideology substituting Keynesianism. Thus, neoliberal ideology 
based on the Washington Consensus’ conclusions became the guide for economic reforms. 
More specifically, the process of transition from a centralised administrated economic 
system towards a market economy in Latvia followed what became known as Shock 
Therapy. The countries which adopted this model were Albania (July  1992), Bulgaria 
(February 1991), Czechoslovakia (January 1991), Estonia (September 1992), Latvia (June 
1993), and Russia (February 1992).344
The entire model is based on the neoclassical marginalist economic theory thus, in 
the absence of obstacles for the free action of the market, productive and allocative Pareto 
efficiency is a natural outcome. It has three primary elements:345
i. The speed to implement the reforms;
ii. A political structure consonant with the model;
iii. An ideological structure consonant with the model.
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As it is based on neoclassical marginalist  economic theory, shock therapy 
presupposes that self-interest in a free competitive capitalist system is reinforced by 
political freedom, at the same time neoclassical economic ideology is the instrument to 
make it real. The expected result  would be growth, full employment, low inflation, and 
stability. In resume, “the shock therapy model is a neoclassical model of transition 
advocating the immediate implementation of the necessary  reforms to establish a free 
market process.”346 It has seven secondary instruments:347
i. Price liberalisation-stabilisation;
ii. Privatisation;
iii. Institutional structure;
iv. Monetary policy;
v. Fiscal policy;
vi. International trade and foreign aid;
vii. Social policy.
Since the secondary  instruments are based on neoliberal logic, as economic policy 
they  mean immediate price liberalisation, minimum state intervention, an institutional 
structure as a product of market forces, an independent central bank, a neutral tax system 
and balanced budget, free international trade, a fully  convertible currency, and a safety  net. 
Thus, implementing such model is not only  an economic challenge but also a political 
challenge.348 The task was facilitated by  the “glamorisation of markets and privatisation by 
right wing think tanks dispersing advice at odds with the real experiences of western 
markets.”349  Also, by the IMF, the World Bank, and several organisations related to the 
United Nations. Together with the American administration and the countries of the G7 
group, the belief in Neoliberalism as universal policy  to substitute statist models became 
not only a mantra but was imposed to transition countries.350
Governments and multilateral institutions were the ones transition countries were 
forced to turn for help, which was always dependent of fulfilling certain clauses of policy 
conditionality  based on shock therapy. Since very often these countries experienced 
macroeconomic chaos, lack of stability, and hyper inflation, there was no choice than to 
apply  these reforms. For example, Mira Muc, head of the Slovenian privatisation bureau, 
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declared in 1993 that  “we gave our word to the World Bank for privatising 400 firms in 12 
months (...) without that there are no credits. Another example was Poland. When its 
budgetary deficit surpassed the prescribed limit of 5%, the IMF suspended any credit to the 
country  until decreasing the deficit from 7.5 % to 5.5%.351 However, it  would be unfair to 
affirm that external actors unilaterally  imposed the reforms. Rather, the local political elite 
was extremely  receptive to them at the same time local economic experts were confused.352 
Latvia was no exception and shock therapy’s policies were implemented relatively 
smoothly  and were similar with Estonia and Lithuania, although slower and not so 
successful in rapidly turning towards Western markets.353
4.1.2 Neoliberalism Expressed as Politics: Political Parties’ Economic Platform from 
the 5th to the 8th Saeima (Politics)
Since economic policy  is defined and instrumentalised at the political level, it is 
necessary  to understand in what extent shock therapy’s economic ideology influenced the 
economic programmes of the political parties which gained seats in the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 
8th Saeima, or from Latvia’s independence until joining the European Union and NATO. 
The Parties’ economic platforms are presented starting from the more to the less 
Neoliberal. it  is not the intention here to present this division as a definitive classification. 
Rather, it is an arbitrary  tentative to group similar parties’ programs to make easier to 
understand the similarities and differences among parties and their economic platforms.354 
The table 4.2 below presents the political parties elected to the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th 
Saeima.
Table 4.2
Result of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Saeimas’ Elections
Name Number of Votes %
Number of 
Seats
5th Saeima (1993 - 1995)
Latvia’s Way 362,473 32.41 36
Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) 149,347 13.35 15
Harmony for Latvia - Rebirth of the National Economy 134,289 12.01 13
Farmers’ Union 119,116 10.65 12
Equal Rights 64,444 5.76 7
The Union for Fatherland and Freedom 59,855 5.35 6
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Name Number of Votes %
Number of 
Seats
The Christian Democrat Union 56,057 5.01 6
Democratic Center Party 53,303 4.77 5
6th Saeima (1995 - 1998)
Democratic Party Managers (Saimnieks) 144,758 15.51 18
Latvia’s Way 139,929 14.65 17
People’s Movement for Latvia (Siegerist) 142,234 14.90 16
The Union for Fatherland and Freedom 114050 11.92 14
Unity Party 68,305 7.15 8
Farmers’ Union 60,498 6.33 8
Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) 60,352 6.32 8
National Harmony Party 53,041 5.55 6
Latvia’s Socialist Party 53,325 5.58 5
7th Saeima (1998 - 2002)
People’s Party 203,585 21.19 24
Latvia’s Way 173,420 18.05 21
Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Conservative 
Party (TB/LNNK) 140,773 14.65 17
National Harmony Party 135,700 14.12 16
Latvia’s Social Democratic Alliance 123,085 12.81 14
New Party 70,214 7.31 8
8th Saeima (2002 - 2006)
New Era 237,452 23.9 26
For Human Rights in United Latvia 189,088 19.0 25
People’s Party 165,246 16.6 20
Union of Greens and Farmers 93,759 9.4 12
Latvia’s First Party 94,752 9.5 10
Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Conservative 
Party (TB/LNNK) 53,396 5.4 7
Source: Central Election Commission of Latvia.
Latvia’s Way (Latvijas Ceļš) had the most comprehensive, well-documented, and 
also Neoliberal economic platform. It was drafted by  the Economists’ Association 2010. 
The main objective is to integrate Latvia in the European Economic Area resulting in 
joining the European Union in the future.355  For achieving it, there are seven interrelated 
pillars:
i. to liquidate the Soviet institutions and their political logic’s implementation;
ii. to promote Latvia’s transition to a free-market economic system, stimulating its 
citizens’ private initiative and entrepreneurship;
iii. to establish a model of state regulation that provides to Latvia’s citizens a 
feeling of stability, resulting from stable and transparent property relations. Property 
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rights are to be guaranteed by the state, following the model used by democratic and 
developed countries;
iv. to invest in education;
v. to implement the national demographic program to avoid the numbers of 
Latvians to be reduced;
vi. to integrate Latvia in the European Economic Area with the objective if joining 
the European Union in the future;
vii. returning to Europe means to develop and to renew one compatible 
environment, economy, and way of life.
Liberal ideas are obvious in the program as the emphasis on individual and 
economic freedom, also meaning that individuals shall be responsible by themselves is 
evident. The party  was fully  committed to market-economic reforms based on 
Neoliberalism, although this is not stated clearly and the words “shock therapy” and 
“Neoliberalism” were not present in the economic program. First, since the party’s main 
objective was to make Latvia a member state of the European Union, it is clear that 
Latvia’s Way economic program was subordinated to promoting economic and social 
reforms in accordance to the European Union’s framework, which Neoliberal in its 
essence.356 
The monetary  policy’s main objective was to reduce inflation, keeping the 
expansion of the monetary base in accordance with the expansion of the economy, 
resulting in a tight monetary policy. This included the Bank of Latvia avoiding any 
interference in the market for credit. The party was against the devaluation of the lats, as it 
would only lower living standards, without increasing the external competitiveness of the 
industrial sector. In concrete terms, this meant an exchange-rate system similar to a 
currency board. The party  also supports the Bank of Latvia’s independence and its 
monetary and financial policy.
Fiscal policy was to follow the idea of austerity, thus of equilibrated budget. Also, 
the tax burden should be transferred from companies to consumption and to works, 
increasing Latvia’s competitiveness. A corporate income tax of 25%, one of the lowest in 
Europe and similar to Finland’s, was to be implemented, at  the same time dividends were 
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subject to a 10% tax. New regulations for amortisation were expected to result in new 
investments in manufacture. 
Since the state has no direct role in the economy, all State enterprises were to be 
privatised as soon as possible, including natural monopolies. All state companies, including 
the large ones, must be evaluated in the long-run perspective. If some company is near 
bankruptcy, in the absence of a potential buyer, it should be closed notwithstanding the 
social impact of workers being fired. Industrial development was expected to result from 
foreign direct  investment, but not in heavy industry. Rather, it should concentrate on 
sectors of low material and energetic intensity. The main economic sectors to be developed 
were banking and transit, a logic choice because of Latvia’s geographical position resulting 
in a natural advantage, and because of these sectors being easier to develop  than 
manufacturing. There should be free movement of capital and goods. 
Agriculture is to be exposed to external competition, without subsidies and tariffs 
protecting Latvian producers. This process was expected to occur in a slower pace in 
comparison with the industrial sector, but taking in consideration that free market is the 
norm, the objective was to fully  expose the sector to foreign competition, notwithstanding 
the fact that the sector is heavily subsided and protected in other countries. At the same 
time, it was foresaw a policy of minimum prices to be adjusted by  import  tariffs and 
quotas. Agrarian reforms was to continue, by privatising land and restructuring companies. 
The party merged with the Latvia’s First Party (Latvijas Pirmā partija) in 2007.
Latvia’s First Party was originally called New Party (Jaunā partija). It’s economic 
platform was simplistic if compared to Latvia’s Way program. Being called a “liberal 
theocracy” by political analysts,357 it  was based on supporting traditional values such as the 
family and the church, at the same time promising to support and to develop  many 
populistic goals. Its economic platform can be resumed as to support Latvia becoming a 
member of the European Union, to support  some strategic economic sectors such as 
transport and the wood-working industry, reducing taxes, and not privatising 
Latvenergo.358
The party  New Era (Jaunais laiks) is one of the newest  parties being analysed in 
this dissertation. It was established in 2002 under the leadership of the former Bank of 
Latvia governor Einars Repše’s leadership. Thus, it is not a surprise that  the party’s 
economic platform is similar to other parties’. In other words, the state shall not be 
involved in any kind of business activity. Instead, it is responsible for creating a favourable 
environment for business development. This is the key for economic development. Taxes 
must be reduced, at the same time effective mechanisms to increase tax collection shall be 
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established. Since the state shall not  directly intervene in the economy, the budget  must be 
equilibrated, also reducing inflation.359
The party considered the high priority  sectors of the national economy 
(tautsaimniecība) to be six: energy, transport, construction, agriculture, forrest, and 
tourism. Energy  encompass electricity, heating, gas distribution, and oil. The main 
objective was to produce all electricity necessary  for national needs in Latvia. Secondary 
objectives were to increase the share of renewable energy (specially wood and peat) for 
heating and electricity, to reduce heat loss from old houses increasing the energetic 
effectivity, to increase the production of biofuel and to stimulate its use in Latvia, to 
increase the security  of the distribution of energy. These objectives were to be achieved by 
directing funds from the European Union, changing the legislation - including measures to 
liberalise the energy market and to reduce taxes, joining the European net.360
The main challenge in relation to the transport sector was considered to guarantee 
the effective maintenance and development of the roads, to assure qualitative, stable, and 
accessible public transport. To increase transit services, including passenger and cargo by 
air and railway. The construction sector’s productivity  was to increase, as a result of 
simplifying administrative procedures, the transparency of the construction process, 
developing human resources, stimulating qualitative and energy-efficient constructions, 
and supporting research, development, innovative solutions.361
Regarding the agriculture sector, there were two main objectives. First, to achieve 
that the level of the European Union’s subsides were equal to old and new member-states. 
Second, to support small properties to become more competitive by stimulating them to 
collaborate with cooperatives. Secondary objectives were to increase the exports of 
agricultural goods, to provide education to farmers, and to improve the overall level of 
agricultural education in the country. Also, scientists should receive incentives to develop 
the sector, specially ecologically clean products. The program for the forrest  sector had the 
main objective of develop the production of high added-value products. Finally, tourism 
was to be developed on the base of Latvia’s national natural, cultural, and historical values 
by developing its infrastructure and Latvia’s identification as international touristic 
destination. In general, the development of the national economy was to be solely the result 
of private business. The role of the state was to be limited to creating favourable 
legislation, to establishing industrial clusters and technological incubators, and some 
financial mechanisms like export guarantees. Overall, the party’s economic platform was 
one of the most Neoliberal analysed in this dissertation.362
The Latvian National Independence Movement’s (LNNK) economic program was 
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based on three principles. First, no state interference in people’s personal concerns; second, 
individuals are to be responsible for their own welfare; third, individual private initiative is 
to determine economic and social development. Thus, the LNNK’s program is based on the 
notion that the state should establish minimalistic regulations and let market forces to act 
freely. The program had seven main pillars.363
i. to make logic economic reforms, resulting in financial stability for concluding the 
process of privatisation and land reform;
ii. to support a strict monetary  policy, the independence of the central bank, and a 
balanced (non-deficit) government budget. Also, to reinforce banking regulation and to 
implement a system of investment protection;
iii. to reform the tax system to stimulate manufacturing and eliminate tax 
avoidance. To reduce the tax burden and to balance municipal budgets;
iv. to create conditions for increasing transit business and exports, developing ports, 
collecting taxes, and fighting smuggling to supplement the budget;
v. to reform the pension system, increasing and differentiating pensions, at the same 
time establishing private pension funds. To remove the restrictions for working 
individuals to receive pensions;
vi. to make private health insurance compulsory;
vii. to direct state investments, including the state foreign credit guarantees to the 
national economy’s development, improvement of infrastructure, resources’ saving, and 
environmental projects;
viii. to support the establishment of strong small farms and agricultural companies, 
stimulating their cooperation. To protect the internal market by state purchases to 
regulate the internal price.
The first conclusion is that the Latvian National Independence Movement’s 
economic platform was basically a repetition of that of Latvia’s Way. Again, Neoliberal 
ideology was obviously the base for supporting the notion that the state has practically  no 
responsibility for their own welfare. It had the same objective of Latvia joining the 
European Union, one more factor determining the platform’s Neoliberal character. Thus, 
the party  supported the introduction of economic reforms in consonance with the European 
Union’s Neoliberal framework.
The tight monetary  policy should follow the principle of austerity to fight inflation. 
The government budget must  be balanced, meaning that deficits were unacceptable, at the 
same time the expansion of the monetary base was to follow the expansion of the economy. 
The national currency was to continue following the quasi currency board model. The 
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Bank of Latvia was to remain independent, determining the monetary policy without 
external interference.
Fiscal policy could be used to stimulate the development of specific economic 
sectors. As taxes were to be reduced, it would be necessary to improve the system of tax 
collection at the same time hardening punishment for those not paying taxes. Tariffs 
affecting external trade were also to be reduced, including agriculture. The burden of social 
security was to be redistributed between the employer and and the employee in an equal 
share (50% each).
The process of privatisation was to be concluded, although companies were to pass 
through a process of restructuring to increase their value. Latvia should develop  transit  and 
banking as key economic sectors, at the same time the manufacturing was to concentrate 
on high productivity goods. Special tax incentives were to be used to help. In the 
agriculture sector, land reform was to be concluded. The sector was to be supported by a 
policy of minimum prices, which the government was to regulate by purchasing and selling 
to influence the market, and by subsided credit for farmers.
The Union for Fatherland and Freedom’s (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai) economic platform 
was not much different from that of Latvia’s Way, although it embraced a milder form of 
Neoliberalism. The party  supported the idea that the role of the state is to be reduced to 
strategic planning and providing proper regulation for the market work smoothly. It was for 
privatisation, although some areas should remain state monopoly, and the process should 
take in consideration national interests. Additionally, land ownership  should to be limited 
to Latvians, foreign direct investments were to be directed towards projects of 
infrastructure.364  In 1997 the party merged with the Latvian National Independence 
Movement’s (LNNK) forming the party TB/LNNK. As a result, it incorporated the LNNK 
Neoliberal economic platform, which fully supported the Bank of Latvia’s monetary 
policy, the absence of state interventionism in the economy, and adapting the Latvian 
legislation to the European Union’s legal framework.365 
The People’s Movement for Latvia (Tautas kustība Latvijai), also known as 
Siegerist Party. Its 4,000 characters’ political platform for the 6th Saeima’s election 
presented many tasks to be done, such as to renew Latvia’s most important  manufacturing 
sectors and to increase exports, but it did not specifically stated how. It promised to end 
monopolies, to protect private property, and to support micro and small companies. Since 
the state is not to be directly involved in business activities, these objectives were to be 
achieved by a pro-business legislative framework. The party emphasised the need for 
Neoliberal reforms being made as quick as possible, however taking people into 
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consideration.366
The People’s Party (Tautas partija) characterised itself as a right-wing conservative 
party. Thus, it  is not  a surprise that its economic platform was very Neoliberal, to the point 
of applying market principles to the ethnic question. The party’s main focus was on 
protecting private property  rights, completing privatisation, and liberalising trade tariffs 
between the Baltic States. It  also supported Latvia joining the accession to the World Trade 
Organisation, fiscal austerity based on decreasing income tax for private business, trade, 
and financial international investments at the expense of social expenditure. It is also 
important to guarantee maximum freedom for entrepreneurs at  the same time decreasing 
state protectionism and interventionism. The party  supported Latvia joining the European 
Union as soon as possible.367
Specifically to social policy, the party strongly opposed expanding social expenses, 
the wages of civil-servants, and pensions. It believes that the role of the state is to be 
limited to helping individuals to succeed and take care of their families themselves, instead 
of providing social protection. One example was a pension law issued in 1999 by Andris 
Sķele cutting the pensions of working pensioners, with the objective to decrease budget 
expenditures. It is to believe that the law had popular support. The Social Democrats, the 
People’s Harmony Party, and For Fatherland and Freedom organised a referendum on this 
issue, but less than 50% of voters participated, thus invalidating it. The party was even in 
favour of applying Neoliberal ideology to ethnic politics. As a result, the integration of 
non-Latvians would have to follow the logic of market incentives. In resume, the idea was 
to establish a set of incentives, making easier to compete and succeed for the ones 
integrating, at the same time not  integrating would be against one’s self-interest. Overall, 
the party’s idea was that economic development would make ethnic differences to be 
irrelevant.368 
The fiscal policy should follow the logic of austerity. Thus, taking in consideration 
the existence of business cycles, during economic booms it would be necessary to have 
budget surpluses. The party was not satisfied with the Bank of Latvia’s monetary and 
supervisory policy, considering that too many mistakes were made supervising credit 
institutions. It was in favour of establishing a separate institution dedicated only  to 
supervise the financial market.369 Overall, the party was one of the most Neoliberal of all 
in Latvia. 
The Farmers’ Union (Zemnieku savienība) could be described as another Neoliberal 
party, if its economic platform did not foresee protection for the agriculture sector by 
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imposing import tariffs on imported products. The party  supported the privatisation of 
natural monopolies such as Latvenergo and Latvijas kuģniecība, as way of modernising 
their infrastructure. The exception were Latvijas pasts and the Latvia’s Railways’ rails. The 
party’s industrial policy  can be defined as minimalist, with state support not deforming 
market competition. In other words, the state should not reduce the risk of business 
activities, what is contradictory with its statement that the state must support exports, 
specially of agriculture products.
The main instruments were to provide education to businessmen, information about 
the tendencies of development in the world and recommendations for establishing new 
manufacturing sectors, to support scientific research and experimental work to increase 
competitiveness, to assist Latvian producers in the international arena, to establish a 
simplified credit and guarantee system, to use international and regional credit lines and 
funds, and to grant a tax exemption for infant companies with an annual income of less 
then Ls 3 000,00.The fiscal policy should have as main objective to avoid budget deficits. 
This was to be attained by the development of the national economy instead of increasing 
taxes and reducing social guarantees. The party considered that the Bank of Latvia’s 
monetary policy was correct. although it believed that the currency rate should be set in a 
more realistic level.370
The Democratic Centre Party (Demokrātiskā Centra Partija) was a parliamentary 
fraction within the Popular Front (Tautas Front) that merged with the Democratic Party 
Managers (Demokrātiskā partija Saimnieks) in 1994. Thus, only the Democratic Party 
Managers’ economic platform is being analysed in this dissertation. The first mention 
about the economy is that market relations must be an instrument to guarantee a decent 
living standard. Thus, the party was not against market-oriented reforms, but rather 
believed in a milder form of Neoliberalism. Its economic platform had seven pillars:371
i. The minimum wage must be determined to guarantee a decent living standard, 
being indexed to inflation;
ii. The state must protect workers in case of unemployment, with emphasis in re-
qualification training programs;
iii. The minimum pension is to be equivalent to the minimum wage. Working 
pensioners shall continue receiving pension;
iv. Latvia’s economic development is dependent of local industries, thus it is 
necessary to protect them from external competition;
v. Economic reforms, privatisation, and foreign investment must reflect Latvia’s 
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national interests. The main criteria are labour productivity, competitiveness, creation of 
new jobs;
vi. Latvia must develop the transit and tourism sectors;
vii. Latvia must to export to both Western and Eastern partners. There is no such 
thing as good or bad market for Latvian products and services;
viii. Tax reduction for companies.
The party’s economic policy focused mostly in a mix of social protection with state 
support for industrial development. Although the objective was to convert Latvia into a 
modern market economy, the process of economic reform, including privatisation should 
be pragmatic and not ideological, with national interests determining its pace. Although the 
party  defended the notion that state intervention is necessary  to guarantee economic 
development, its economic platform was in no way a radical alternative to Neoliberalism. 
Rather, it rejected Latvia Way’s extreme approach with the objective to safeguard national 
industry. Since it represented an alternative to Latvia Way within the same Neoliberal 
ideological boundaries, is no surprise that the party got most of the votes by occasion of 
the 6th Saeima’s elections in 1995.
During the 5th Saeima, the party Harmony  for Latvia - Rebirth of the National 
Economy (Saskaņa Latvijai - Atdzimšana Tautsaimniecībai) split resulting in two new 
parties. One was called Political Union of Economists (Tautsaimnieku politiska apvienība); 
the other took the name of National Harmony  Party (Tautas Saskaņas partija). By occasion 
of the 6th Saeima’s elections in 1995, the Political Union of Economists was unable to 
surpass the electoral 5% barrier required to be represented in the Latvia parliament. This 
can be explained by  the model developed in this dissertation. Since its economic platform 
was the opposite of the economic ideology in force, it  did not  have appeal for assuring 
enough votes, thus its economic platform was not analysed in this dissertation. On the 
other hand, the National Harmony Party  economic platform did not challenged the main 
pillars of economic reforms, being able to surpass the 5% electoral barrier. Its economic 
platform had seven pillars:372
i. to make the government, the municipalities, and the Bank of Latvia responsible 
for the development of the national economy by force of law;
ii. to use the Bank of Latvia’s foreign reserves that surpass the minimum 
requirements to guarantee the lats’ stability  to subside credit for developing the national 
economy; 
iii. to promote and develop local production by offering government’s contracts to 
domestic manufacturing and agricultural companies;
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iv. to guarantee purchases of Latvian agricultural products from individual and 
collective producers;
v. to control monopolistic prices, specially those related to primary commodities;
vi. to establish the Baltic Free Market Association;
vii. to carry out structural policies, encouraging those companies producing 
competitive export products using local raw materials, and create jobs in small towns 
with endemic unemployment.
Although the party supported non-Neoliberal ideas like to help local industry by 
offering preference in government contracts, the very core of its economic platform was 
basically  Neoliberal. First, it fully supported privatisation for making companies more 
efficient, instead of fulfilling the budget. It was also for the elimination of all bureaucratic 
and political barriers to entrepreneurship. The role of the state is only to establish general 
regulations, letting the market to act freely. The party also rejected state support to specific 
products or economic sectors. In 2010 the party merged with the Social Democratic Party 
and the New Centre forming the political alliance Harmony Centre (Saskaņas centrs). It  is 
interesting to note that its economic platform nowadays is more left-wing then before, as it 
is based on the idea of social justice. Nevertheless, it is a softened version of Neoliberalism 
with increased social protection and state support to specific economic sectors and new 
business basically by fiscal stimulus.373 
The Latvia’s Social Democratic Alliance (Latvijas sociāldemokrātu apvienība) 
supported Latvia joining the European Union, thus the core of its economic platform was 
very much influenced by Neoliberal ideology. It did not questioned Neoliberalism’s basic 
premises, at the same time it foresaw many incompatible policies with regulations from the 
European Union. Its economic platform, at least as presented to the Central Election 
Commission, was an amalgamation of points without further explanation. It started with 
the promise of radically increasing the Latvia’s population quality  of life by: supporting 
local industrial activity, increasing small and medium enterprises; the sale of Latvian 
products to the internal and external market; attracting foreign investment; directing the 
funds obtained with privatisation to support and increase the business sector; writing-off 
the debt of state companies; to improve the economic relations with Russia and the CIS; 
providing cheap long-term credit to agriculture firms; establishing cooperatives to process 
and sell agriculture products; renewing roads in the countryside.374
It supported the state monopoly of alcohol and tobacco. Also, higher import tariffs 
for alcohol beverages similar to those produced in Latvia, what is contradictory to the 
European Union’s norms. The party was against  the privatisation of natural monopolies, 
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including Latvenergo, Latvian Railways, Latvian Shipping, and ports. It  was in favour of 
the state regaining control of Lattelekom. Finally, capital transactions should be regulated 
and a progressive tax system should be established.375
The Latvian Unity  Party’s (Latvijas Vienibas partija) economic platform was one of 
the most left-wing of all political parties being analysed in this dissertation. It  was one of 
the most laconic too. The party foresaw the national economy as a socially oriented free 
market, with developed private initiative, and several forms of property, limiting the 
extreme liberal economic approach. The privatisation of strategic objects was to be 
interrupted. The exchange rate policy was to be used as instrument to help developing the 
industrial sector, stabilising the state finances. The state should keep the monopoly of 
alcohol, tobacco, currency  exchange, and others. The state should guarantee the purchase 
of agricultural products, at the same time reducing taxes to stimulate manufacturing, 
resulting in the Gross Domestic Product  reaching the same levels of 1990.376 Following the 
model of ideological convergence presented in this dissertation, it is not a surprise that the 
party was closed in 2001.
Equal Rights (Līdztiesība) was the Latvian Socialist Party’s (Latvijas Sociālitiskā 
partija) precursor, which had its roots in the last Supreme Soviet elected in 1990. Thus, it 
is no surprise that in 1995 it had the most left-wing economic platform of all. First, the 
party  was against the notion of free-market as regulator of the national economy. Instead, it 
was necessary  to regulate the economic process with programming methods and 
conjuncture policies. Privatisation was to be subjected to societal control, and the state 
should buy unused privatisation certificates from the population by  their face value. The 
state manufacturing companies were to start  producing again, and could be used to buy 
energy and heating. The Bank of Latvia’s independence and its monetary policy was 
considered to be wrong, because it artificially created shortage of means of payment. 
Finally, the party was against Latvia joining the European Union and NATO.377
In 2002, the Latvian Socialist Party  was part of the coalition For Human Rights in 
United Latvia (Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā). Since the party  is the only  truly left-
wing of all being analysed, it is interesting to identify that it followed the model of 
convergence proposed in this dissertation, changing to a much more Neoliberal ideological 
position in comparison to 1995. The party’s political program implemented during its 7th 
conference in April 12, 2003 stated that integrating in the European Union will foster the 
development of democracy. Thus, since the party was in favour of Latvia joining the 
European Union, it  is fair to conclude that it also supported the same Neoliberal model that 
comes attached to a European Union’s membership. This is clear in the section dedicated to 
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economic policy, in four main points. First, the base for revitalising the Latvian economic 
is the establishment of an intense internal market, increasing the population’s purchasing 
power. Second, the right to private property is one of the fundamental rights people have. 
Third, the role of the state in the economy should be minimal, the exception being fiscal 
policy in the form of lower taxes for business and investments. Fourth, the market for 
passengers’ services, medicine, education, and housing maintenance services should be 
free and face competition.378  As a result, Neoliberalism in Latvia turned to be the only 
alternative for macroeconomic policy.
4.1.3 Economic and Political Institutions and Structures 
Since the end of the USSR, the Latvian economy has passed through a strong and 
rapid process of transformation based on Neoliberal ideology. However, Neoliberal 
economic policy in Latvia has been dissociated by the political elite to something close to 
market anarchy. It follows that economic institutions and structures, such as the financial, 
industrial, educational, and social structure started to be shaped also by neoliberal 
principles. Latvia’s financial structure is based on three main Neoliberal principles. First, 
total capital mobility; second, the mandate of the Central Bank being purely to guarantee 
the stability of the exchange rate and, in a lesser extent, of prices even at the expense of the 
real sector and social interests; third, the Financial and Capital Market Commission’s 
mandate is solely to protect the interests of financial institutions and does not consider the 
interests of the general public.
The transformation of the industrial structure also followed the Neoliberal logic. 
First, by privatisation; second, by the reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers for imports; third, financing business was almost totally transferred to private 
banks. The labour market was reformed to have greater market flexibility, at  the same time 
most of the tax burden felt to the workforce. The result is a less-organised workforce, 
greater wage disparities, which at  the same time - at least in theory - is more adapted to 
business needs.
With an independent Central Bank, monetary policy  became independent of 
political interference. Its policy was also very  Neoliberal. First, the exchange rate was 
pegged first to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and second to the Euro, in an 
arrangement similar to a currency board. Second, because its main objective was to 
maintain the stability of the exchange rate, instead of regulating the endogenous creation of 
money by private banks and the influx of foreign financial investment.
The fiscal policy can also be characterised as Neoliberal. First, the income tax rate 
is flat, thus regressive. Second, the overall tax burden is much greater on the real sector 
and consumption, than on real estate and the financial sector. This means that the labour 
force pays most of taxes. Third, Latvia has being pursuing a policy  of fiscal equilibrium 
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since the year 2000. Before the 2008 crisis, the budget deficit/surplus as percentage of the 
GDP was reduced from -2.8% to + 0.1% in 2007.379
Indeed, political institutions and structures, the workforce and unions, business, and 
other interest groups such as the state bureaucracy, rarely answered negatively  to the 
Neoliberal reforms. Rather, they had considerable support. This is explained by the 
macroeconomic performance being considered acceptable, at least until 2008. In other 
words, the overall expectations were sufficient to maintain Neoliberal ideology as 
mainstream in Latvia. Also, social and political (neo)liberalism became associated with the 
idea that  the state and the politicians are not  responsible for what happens in the country, 
but the market. The result is a classic case of state capture, since many  Latvian politicians 
and civil servants use the state as instrument to realise their private interests.
4.1.4 Macroeconomic Performance
After joining the European Union, the complete openness of Latvia’s financial and 
capital accounts, together with the sentiment of low risk, changed the structure of the credit 
market. Therefore, during the period 2004–2008, there was a credit  boom following the 
strategy of the foreign banks operating in Latvia. In the last  quarter of 2008, the loans 
issued to residents have amounted to Ls 14,737.4 million or 90.1% of GDP. The chart 4.1 
shows the bank credit growth in Latvia.
Figure 4.1
Bank credit growth, 2000-2009
Source: Latvia’s Financial and Capital Market Commission, own calculations.
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As chart 4.2 below shows, while in 2003, the most privileged sectors were 
individual services (23.11%), wholesale (16.09%) financial intermediation (12.5%) and 
manufacture (11.73%), at the end of 2008, the situation had changed drastically. From 
2004, the banks started to lend relatively cheap  money to finance operations in the real 
estate sector and consumption of durable goods. Besides, because of the process of 
increasing financial needs, the availability of credit for financial intermediation also rose. 
In this way, the money lent to non-banks in the years before the crisis turned out to be 
mainly directed to finance operations with real estate activities (56.6%), consumption of 
durable goods (11.2%) and financial intermediation (7.2%), while all other sectors 
experienced a relative reduction. 
Figure 4.2
Structure of the loans classified by national economy sector in 31.12.2003 and in 
31.12.2007 – %
Source: Latvia’s Financial and Capital Market Commission, own calculations. Access in January 21, 2010.
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availability of credit, the consumption of these goods experienced a boom. However, when 
this demand was fulfilled, the sectors associated with it  tended to experience a strong 
reduction in their level of economic activity. Second, as economic history shows, 
artificially inflated prices of real estate always go down, in other words, bubbles always 
deflate. Third, and most relevant, because the capacity of people to borrow is directly 
related to the amount of money they can dispose to pay back the credit, which naturally 
limits the credit market 
The transport and storage sector depends on the production of goods, which in turn 
is dependent on their demand. With a crisis, both in the internal and the external side, this 
sector tends to suffer a reduction in its performance. Latvia’s manufacturing sector had 
been already  shrinking because of the crisis. Besides the inevitable decrease in the 
commerce of durable goods, the transport and storage sector also experienced a slow 
down. In this way, nearly a half of Latvian GDP has been remaining in an unsustainable 
basis, showing that a crisis would have occurred with or without the current financial 
crisis. Although the GDP was growing fast, in reality the structure of the Latvian economy 
was debasing and becoming increasingly dependent on four sectors that, by their own 
idiosyncrasy, are not sufficiently  dynamic to push the economy in the medium and long 
terms. In other words, the failure of the internal model was a natural consequence of its 
own structure. In other words, the failure of the internal model was a natural consequence 
of its own structure. 
Figure 4.3
Structure of Latvia’s GDP – 1995 and 2008, %
Source: Latvia’s Central Statistic Bureau, own calculations.Access in January 21, 2010.
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Besides the process of economic restructuring, another problem was infla- tion. As 
a result of the influx of foreign money from the banks from 2003 to 2007 the monetary 
base of Latvia increased by 181%.4 From May 2004 to June 2008, the increase was 163%. 
Besides M1, the biggest growth was in overnight deposits, leading to the conclusion that 
the issuance of money by  the Bank of Latvia was not the main cause of the increase of the 
monetary base. Rather, this was the result of the strategies of the private banks operating in 
Latvia. If on one side they can naturally create money, on the other the increase of their 
activities has been financed by external remittances of money. 
Usually inflation is seen as a bad indicator; it is also true that it may signal 
economic growth. What developing countries must take into consideration is that an annual 
rate of 13% of inflation is not so bad if there is economic growth and, more important, 
development. Inflation is a problem when it is 13% a month. A yearly inflation of about 
2-3% is the case of developing countries in recession or developed countries approaching 
stagnation and starting to face problems such as unemployment. Before achieving such an 
inflation, a country first must develop. On the contrary, such a low inflation rate is going to 
be at the expense of low economic growth/development.
The restructuring of the economy and the inflationary process was the result  of 
ineffective regulation of the market by the Minister of Finance, the Financial and Capital 
Market Commission, and the inability of the Bank of Latvia to deal firmly  with the 
increases of the monetary base. The Financial and Capital Market Commission assumed a 
position of not  intervening in the market, being rather an observer. It did not fully perform 
its basic function of regulating the financial system to guarantee its stability  or controlling 
the explosion of the credit market  and therefore protecting banks and non-banking 
institutions from overexposing to risk.
The Bank of Latvia’s case is different. Its institutional discourse relies on the 
impossibility  of performing monetary  policy due to the “impossible trinity,” as Latvia’s 
exchange rate is practically fixed against the euro and the capital and financial accounts of 
the Balance of Payments are open. Also, on the fact that more than 85% of the credit lent in 
Latvia is in euros, the Bank of Latvia cannot use the interest rate as an instrument to 
control inflation.
Although this may be a true, this rhetoric has been used to shield the institution 
from criticism, through the discourse of impotence in the face of the actions of the market. 
Much more important for the Bank of Latvia was to artificially maintain the exchange rate 
from going beyond the fluctuation band, and to maintain the long-term interest rate in 
accordance with the Maastricht criteria. These goals have been achieved administratively, 
without active interventions disciplining the market. Therefore, although aware of the 
growing inflation, it completely ignored the role of the monetary base as the main 
determinant of inflation in Latvia. It also ignored the fact that regulating the expansion of 
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the monetary base could have avoided the process of economic restructuring being so 
drastic.
A working paper of the Bank of Latvia even discussed changes in the expectations 
of economic agents as determining inflation, but the authors did not consider the monetary 
aggregates, which would have been a logical way of trying to explain why expectations 
were changing.380 Although most of the sectors of the Latvian economy were developing in 
a way based on unreal positive expectations, people were feeling that they  were getting 
richer and richer and that this was occurring in a sustainable way. The result was a 
distortion of the apprehension of reality by the majority of the economic agents.
Nevertheless, the Bank of Latvia was the only institution alerting several times the 
structural problems the Latvian economy was going to face, although it  did nothing to 
avoid them. The central government never took these alerts into consideration, often 
discrediting them, while the Financial and Capital Market Commission was ignoring the 
macroeconomic aspects of its chosen regulatory model. In this sense, the general 
institutional passiveness, together with the narrow attitude of politicians, is an important 
component of the formation of the structural crisis.
With regard to private banks, even when the signs that this process was 
unsustainable, they were still considering safe to lend, since the risk associate to mortgage 
is very low. Besides, there was a component of moral hazard. The answer of the head of 
the real estate division of one of the top three banks of Latvia to the question of why they 
were inflating the real estate market with credit was that it was known that “(...) it is 
unsustainable, but everyone’s annual bonus depends on making more money. We know it 
will crash, but we are all making too much money now to stop  it.”381 Although appetite for 
risk by large foreign banks was particularly  strong given the modest exposure of their 
portfolios to the Latvian market and the very high returns on equity invested there, 
international experience shows that perceptions of loan quality are notoriously procyclical-
positive during economic upswings, but deteriorate rapidly  when conditions turn less 
favourable.
The crisis had two main consequences. With regard to the banks: (a) the soundness 
of the loan portfolio experienced a reduction of its quality, in other words, the collateral of 
the issued loans was considerably less than the amount advanced implying losses; and (b) 
the assets of the banks suffered a reduction that might affect  the profitability of the banks. 
As foreign-owned institutions dominate most of the banking system of Latvia, this meant 
exporting losses to the parent institutions. This had been already suggested by the 
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International Monetary Fund in the “Request  for Standby Arrangement” no. 09/3.382 To the 
general population, the main problem was the psychological impact affecting consumption, 
thus credit and the general level of savings. As buying a real estate property  is seen as an 
investment and a form of saving, a decrease in the price of property  makes people consider 
they  have lost  part of their savings. This negatively affects the level of confidence in the 
national economy. The result is a fall in the consumption level, and in the expectations of 
economic agents. Therefore, the result  is a lower level of economic activity and 
employment. 
As at least in 2006 it was already clear that a crisis was possible to happen in the 
short term, some measures could have been taken to avoid it. In this case, the Bank of 
Latvia could have at least taken one significant measure. Although its possibilities of 
shaping a comprehensive monetary  policy are limited, in this specific case one instrument 
was available: the compulsory reserves. As the monetary base was increasing mainly as a 
consequence of the remittance of capital from foreign banks to their subsidiaries to be 
issued as credit, together with the endogenous creation of money  by banks operating 
locally, a stricter increase in compulsory reserves would have been sufficient to dry the 
liquidity  of M2. Combined with stricter regulations by the Financial and Capital Market 
Commission and a more prudent  tax policy  by  the Ministry  of Finance, the crisis would not 
have been so radical.
Thus, since the Latvia’s economic policy’s main goal was to develop the financial, 
transit, and real state sectors, high-tech services and manufacturing have been struggling 
for developing. In 2008, the most important industrial sectors are food and beverages 
(25%), wood and its products (23%), non-metallic mineral products (9%), metal products 
except machines and equipment (6%), and electrical equipment. The sectors classified as 
“other” are mostly  related to the cited before.383 In other words, they are not related to the 
Knowledge Society. This explains the low level of employment in high and medium-high-
technology manufacturing sectors.384
This means that Latvia’s insertion in the international economic system results in 
paths of dependence being strengthened instead of lightened. Latvia’s main exports are 
mainly primary products or products of the paradigm of the Second Industrial Revolution. 
Imports are constituted by machinery  and equipment for the fragile real sector of the 
economy, together with imports of combustible minerals and their derivatives. Latvia also 
imports a considerable share of prepared foodstuffs, showing that  its agriculture is not 
capable of meeting internal demand and that national agribusiness is not sufficiently 
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developed. On the other hand, the huge influx of financial capital resulted in real exchange 
rate appreciation, reducing the Latvian economy’s external competitiveness.385
As shown on chart 4.4. below, a natural consequence, the level of high-tech exports 
of Latvia is very low, just better than Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Spain, Lithuania, and 
Poland. It Is well below the level of the European Union (15,6%) and of the United States 
(18%). As the value of non-high-tech exports is usually lower than the imports of high-tech 
exports, naturally it  is impossible to a country to have a well-balanced trade balance. In the 
medium term, without socio-economic development and the reversion of this situation, the 
output is a contraction of the capacity of import and a consequent crisis.
Figure 4.4
High-tech Exports as % of total - 2012
Source: EUROSTAT. United States’ data is of the year 2011 from the Worldbank.
In Latvia’s case, this deficit was being financed by the remittances of foreign banks 
to their Latvian branches, resulting in an increasing national external debt as consequence. 
This money was used to finance the expansion of their activities, mainly in the credit 
market. With the natural exhaustion of the market for credit in Latvia, the main source of 
financing the external imbalances drained.386  Allied with the effects of the international 
financial crisis, which resulted in some investors to get money out from the country, the 
economy collapsed. As a consequence, the persistent deficit on the Current Account of the 
past is still a problem, mostly because of the difference of the terms of trade.
That’s the essence of what may be called the “Latvian disease”, a modern version 
of the “Dutch disease”, as the latter is a concept dealing with economic paradigms 
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surpassed by  the establishment of the abstract-capitalism. Accordingly to the Routledge 
Dictionary of Economics, the Dutch Disease is defined as:
The harmful consequences for a national economy of discovering natural 
resources, especially the decline in traditional industries brought about by the 
rapid growth and prosperity of a new industry. New dominant industries can 
afford to pay wages far in excess of other industries, so the latter raise their wage 
levels to unaffordable levels causing unemployment. The successful new 
industry has high exports, creating a foreign exchange surplus and raising the 
country’s exchange rate, with the consequence that other industries of the 
economy become internationally uncompetitive.  This was noticeable in the 
Netherlands after the discovery of North Sea gas. There rising prosperity brought 
about higher levels of welfare benefits which persisted after the downturn in the 
economy, causing immense difficulties for the financing of public expenditure.387
While the concept of Dutch disease deals with natural resources and the real sector, 
the concept of Latvian disease deals with the financial sphere and its relationship with the 
economy in its totality. It must be understood as the harmful consequences for a national 
economy of receiving huge amounts of financial capital. The result is the creation of a 
foreign exchange surplus, permitting or causing the real exchange rate to be overvalued. 
There was a dual process of economic transformation: at the same time manufacturing and 
services have been struggling through a lack of competitiveness resulting from the 
overvalued exchange rate, the economy experienced a process of reorganisation in favour 
of speculative and/or non-sustainable sectors, as for example, real estate and consumption 
of durable goods.
Since the independence, Latvian authorities and opinion makers have believed that 
a successful transition resulting in economic development was only possible through 
Neoliberalism. The promise of a smooth transition followed by sustainable economic 
development was seductive enough to politicians to accept the thesis that the neoliberal 
order was unavoidable. This confirms that  the model developed in this dissertation can be 
applied also to Latvia. At first, Neoliberalism was established as the economic ideology, 
since it was already  the established mainstream in the international system. Since it  already 
has its own macroeconomic policies pre-determined, there was a process of political 
convergence to Neoliberal economic policies as the only one acceptable for Latvia. This 
pattern is so strong, that  even in face of the last crisis, the chosen economic policy was 
rather a return to Neoliberalism, although other economic policies could be considered. 
While Neoliberalism will be considered the economic mainstream ideology, radical 
changes in the Latvian macroeconomic policy  will be limited to its ideological boundaries. 
As a result, the model developed in this dissertation can be applied to Latvia.
173
387 Rutherford, D. (2002). Routledge Dictionary of Economics (2nd edition). London: Routledge.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the research developed in this dissertation, it is possible to present the 
conclusions below. They confirm this dissertation’s hypothesis that “macroeconomic 
policy is determined at the political level, following ideological changes as the output of 
long-wave business cycles” in the cases of both Brazil and Latvia.
1. The concept of ‘ideology’ has myriad definitions. Some of them are positive, like 
Lenin’s “class consciousness”; some are negative, like Marx and the distortion of the 
reality  of social relations to conceal forms of social domination; some are neutral, like the 
notion that ideology is the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their 
world. Also, it has been used to describe different phenomena, like distorted 
communication and semiotic closure. Even, there were attempts by  the postmodernists to 
give the term an accessory character, substituting the term ‘ideology’ by ‘discourse.’
If ideology is a vehicle for dominance, a general definition for the term can be “the 
combined systemic ways in which social and political dominance is established and 
sustained through subliminal means”. This meet much the notion of ideology accordingly 
to Gramsci, the Frankfurt School and Foucault. However, Althusser was right when 
affirming that ideology  is manifested through material actions. Thus, it is necessary to 
complete the proposed definition to “the combined systemic ways in which social and 
political dominance is established and sustained through subliminal means, and which is 
manifested through material actions.” These material actions are also the set  of economic 
policies considered to be acceptable during determined historical period, and which are 
determined at the political level, thus dependent of ideology.
2. Economics can be a vehicle for ideology. Economic analysis, when discussing, 
for example, the monetary system or the principles of foreign trade, always provide 
precepts of political conduct. This can be explained by social scientists, including 
economists, having the ambition of seeing their work recognised as true science. However, 
the individual moral values of each social scientist is the result  of his/her own personal 
experiences. Therefore, even if these values can be suppressed in the beginning, they may 
appear when making policy recommendations. As a result, as policy  recommendations 
presuppose an ideal model of social organisation, it also presupposes some form of 
political control. As a result, “economics” as discipline is ideological by itself.
3. Much of the research on short-term political business cycles following Kitchin 
and Juglar cycles has lost its sense after the 1980’s. First, because of the process of 
ideological change followed by party convergence that constrains internal choices by 
external means. Second, because economic policy  is increasingly being determined by 
independent institutions, i.e., independent Central Banks, where policy-makers deal with 
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long-term goals. Third, because of the reducing electoral turnout in Western democracies 
observed in the last years. This results in Milton Friedman’s hypothesis that under 
Neoliberalism people would be free to choose being wrong. Instead, it is the contrary: there 
is no choice. As a result, it  is possible to affirm that short-term political business cycles are 
determined and/or restricted by  long-term ideological business cycles. At this moment, the 
current ideological business cycle made short-term political business cycles irrelevant. 
However, as history  is inexorable, after some time the prevalent economic ideology will 
change. Than, the economic and political paradigms will also change.
4. Because of this determinism, the set of economic policies available to the parties 
and coalitions to deal with crises is limited to the boundaries of the economic ideology 
established in the time of the last big crisis. The result is the process of party convergence 
identified by several authors, where there was a general turn to the left until the 1980’s, 
when centre-right and right parties abandoned traditional ideologies seeking for a broader 
electoral support. After the 1980’s, there has been a process of convergence to right-wing 
policies due to the effects of economic globalisation on national economic policies.
5. Ideological transformation occurs when, in times of crisis, voters expect the 
government to find a set of economic policies to deal with it, making the economy to 
experience the same activity level than before. Accordingly to the magnitude of the crisis, a 
more or less radical set of policies is chosen. In the case of a very  serious crisis like the 
Great Slump or the stagflation of the 1960’s, the economic policies in force looses its 
scientific validity. It is substituted by another ideology and the group connected to the 
previous ideology looses its academic prestige and respect. What was mainstream turn to 
be marginal, at the same time that what was marginal turns to be the new mainstream. 
Nowadays, the mainstream is financial neoliberalism.
6. The process of ideological convergence of the last years is different  from the one 
resulting in the Bretton Woods System. Rather, it is the result of major parties abandoning 
their role in linking citizens to the political system. As a result, the political system has 
been increasingly ceasing to be a medium that represents, articulates, redresses, and refines 
citizen concerns. Therefore, the determination of economic policy becomes conditioned by 
the particular interests and views of specific social groups, and not of the society  as whole. 
The only chance people have to they disapprove economic policy is during elections.
7. Politicians shift from using one set of economic policies to another, following 
economic crisis. Because of the process of economic voting, bad macroeconomic 
performance will influence voting accordingly to its impact on voters’ wealth, making 
politicians to look for alternatives to keep their popularity.
8. There are two variables determining how far economic policies will change 
following crises. First, how serious a crisis is. Second, its geographic extent. Regional or 
country-specific crisis will not result in dramatic economic policy changes. As the 
economic system passes through structural crisis, sometimes the established economic 
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ideology is not able to make the system to go back to the previous level of accumulation, 
what makes the incumbents’ popularity to fall. Then, with the involvement of the media, of 
private interests, and contending political parties, a societal debate starts. This process soon 
becomes tied up with electoral competition. As a consequence, each party’s and/or 
coalition’s offered economic policies become under a process of social scrutiny  leaded by 
the media and its pundits.
9. The transformation of the established economic ideology occurs when, in times 
of crisis, the population expects the government to find a set of economic policies that will 
make the economy to experience growth and development. Accordingly to the magnitude 
of the economic crisis, a more or less radical set of policies might be chosen. In the case of 
a very serious crisis like the Great Slump or the stagflation of the 1960 - 1970’s, the 
economic ideology in force looses its scientific validity. It is substituted by another 
economic ideology  and the group connected to the previous ideology looses its academic 
prestige and respect. What was mainstream turns to be marginal; what was marginal turns 
to be the new mainstream. The result is the process of political convergence identified by 
several authors, where there was a general turn to the left between the 1930s and 1980s, 
when centre-right and right parties pended to the left seeking a broader electoral support. 
However, since the 1980’s there is a process of convergence to right-wing economic 
policies called Neoliberalism.
10. The acceptable economic policies are determined by a supra-ideological process 
of convergence to a specific ideology which has its own macroeconomic policies 
determined ex-ante. Therefore, it leads to the impossibility  of establishing and conducting 
economic policy independently of ideological constraints. In other words, what is 
acceptable as economic policy is already  pre-determined, although adapting to particular 
circumstances.
11. Neoliberalism is not the same than completely free economics as apposite 
during the period of classic Liberalism. Rather, it is a specific form of socio-economic 
regulation aiming to artificially  reproduce the conditions of perfect competition. As a 
result, there is a established institutional and legal framework shaping how economic 
relations occur, which is not determined economically  but rather at the political level by 
politicians and political institutions.
12. Although in the USA the ideology  determining the interconnection between 
economics and politics had started changing already  in the ending of the 1960’s, in Brazil it 
started only almost thirty  years later, with Collor’s election. The acceptance of the 
relationship  among the ideas of “interventionist state,” “development,” “inflation,” and 
“economic stability” started to change the ideological paradigm defining what is and what 
is not acceptable in terms of economic policy, thus conditioning the understanding about 
economics to a specific view. Therefore, the change occurs first in the central countries, 
spreading later to the periphery.
176
13. The economic problems during Sarney’s government had a fundamental role to 
explaining Collor’s victory and the ideological change that took place in the 1990’s Brazil. 
The idea that the state is structurally ineffective and corrupt  in contrast to an idealised 
perfect liberalism guided by market forces started to determine Brazilian macroeconomic 
and development policy. The role of the state in promoting development completely 
changed from active to passive. In ten years after Collor’s impeachment, most of the state-
owned companies had been privatised, the programs of credit for development, including 
to agriculture, had been terminated or reduced, the control of foreign financial capitals 
ended, as many  other mechanisms of internal economic protection. The national-
developmentalism from the 1950’s, which had determined the economic policies until 
Collor’s election, ended.
14. Twelve years after Collor being elected, the Workers’ Party  (PT) won the 
Brazilian presidential elections and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became the 35th President of 
Brazil in 2002. Without the intention to oversimplify the political process that resulted in 
Lula’s victory, Lula’s rhetoric experienced a deep change in relation to 1989, from a 
considerably radical left-wing political program to a moderate one.
15. During the 1989 elections, Collor’s main argument against Lula da Silva was 
that a left-wing government would destabilise the economy even more, since his economic 
policy would be based on old-fashioned developmentalist economic theories. In 1994, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso argued that with Lula da Silva inflation would come back as a 
result of non-mainstream/heterodox economic policies. In the 1998 and 2002’s elections, 
the argument changed to include the poor performance of the stock market, the volatile 
exchange rate, and foreign capital outflow. In the last case, since Lula da Silva’s popularity 
was very  high, the rationale was that foreign investors were concerned with his left-wing/
heterodox economic policies. Lula argued in his “Carta para o Povo Brasileiro” he would 
maintain the basic premises of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s economic policies. He also 
invited José de Alencar, a well known businessman from the right-wing Liberal Party (PL), 
to be his vice-president. Lula da Silva’s convergence to right-wing/orthodox economic 
policies is the result of the process of ideological convergence initiated with Fernando 
Collor and discussed in chapter 3 using data from CESOP and from the PLIO.
16. In 1989 the preference for total state intervention was much stronger among 
centre-right and right-wing individuals than among left-wing individuals, although the 
latter also preferred the state controlling the economy. The preference for the state 
controlling only  basic services, thus leaving the rest under private control, was stronger 
among centre-left and centrist  individuals, and the second choice for left-wing. At the same 
time, the strongest support for private control of the economy was also among right-wing 
individuals. Although this denies the logic of left-wing preferring more state intervention 
in the economy and right-wing less, in the Brazilian case the explanation relies on 20 years 
of military dictatorship between 1964 and 1984.
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17. Although politically the Brazilian military regime was very conservative and 
nationalist, the economic policy was clearly based on national-developmentalim, which are 
considered to be left-wing or Keynesian. Thus, state intervention was associated with the 
militaries and with right-wing conservative policies. In 1993, strong state economic 
intervention was still the first choice among right-wing and centre-right individuals. It is 
not a surprise that the same applies to left-wing and centre-left individuals. The lowest 
support for state economic intervention was among centrist individuals. Nevertheless, with 
the exception of the latter, more than half preferred strong state economic intervention; at 
the same time, the second choice for all, with the exception of centre-right individuals, was 
total private economic control of the economy.
18. One of the presuppositions in this work is that the left-right scale moves 
through time. This means that economic policies considered to be right-wing, for example, 
50 years ago, turn to be considered centre or even left-centre policies nowadays. As a 
result, there is a general movement changing the definitions of left and right, changing the 
set of economic policies the political parties identify themselves. Thus, the change is dual: 
first there is an ideological change in the outside moving the entire left-right scale; second, 
an internal movement of adaptation follows the new ideological configuration in force, 
making economic policy to move to the left  or to the right to reflect the economic ideology 
in force.
19. Latvia became independent in 1991. At this time, Neoliberalism was already the 
mainstream economic ideology. Therefore, neoliberal ideology based on the Washington 
Consensus’ conclusions became the guide for economic reforms. More specifically, the 
process of transition from a centralised administrated economic system towards a market 
economy in Latvia followed what became known as Shock Therapy.
20. Since Neoliberal ideology already have its own macroeconomic policies pre-
determined, it is possible to affirm that all major Latvia’s parties are Neoliberal. 
21. It  followed that economic institutions and structures, such as the financial, 
industrial, educational, and social structure started to be shaped also by neoliberal 
principles. The political institutions and structures such as business, parties, workers and 
other interest groups as the state bureaucracy, many times answered negatively to some 
reforms.
22. With the exception of the Latvian Socialist  Party, the economic platform of all 
parties elected to the 5th - 8th Saeima shared the same Neoliberal principles: opening the 
trade and financial account, flat tax system, privatisation, fiscal equilibrium, currency 
board as exchange rate model, no or minimal state role in the economy, free competition in 
markets traditionally regulated by the government such as passengers’ services, medicine, 
education, and housing maintenance services. Thus, it is no surprise that Latvia pursued 
Neoliberal economic policies from the very beginning. 
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23. The Latvian Socialist Party  followed the model of convergence proposed in this 
dissertation, changing its economic platform to a much more Neoliberal ideological 
position in comparison to 1995. The party’s political program implemented during its 7th 
conference in April 12, 2003 stated that the base for revitalising the Latvian economic is 
the establishment of an intense internal market, increasing the population’s purchasing 
power. Second, the right to private property is one of the fundamental rights people have. 
Third, the role of the state in the economy should be minimal, the exception being fiscal 
policy in the form of lower taxes for business and investments. Fourth, the market for 
passengers’ services, medicine, education, and housing maintenance services should be 
free and face competition.
24. Monetary policy in Latvia has been very Neoliberal. First, the exchange rate 
was pegged first to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and second to the Euro, in an 
arrangement similar to a currency board. Second, because its main objective was to 
maintain the stability of the exchange rate, instead of regulating the endogenous creation of 
money by private banks and the influx of foreign financial investment.
25. Latvia’s Fiscal policy can also be characterised as Neoliberal. First, the income 
tax rate is flat, thus regressive. Second, the overall tax burden is much greater on the real 
sector and consumption, than on real estate and the financial sector. This means that the 
labour force pays most  of taxes. Third, Latvia has being pursuing a policy of fiscal 
equilibrium since the year 2000. Before the 2008 crisis, the budget deficit/surplus as 
percentage of the GDP was reduced from -2.8% to + 0.1% in 2007.
26. Latvia’s financial structure is based on three main Neoliberal principles. First, 
total capital mobility; second, the mandate of the Central Bank being purely to guarantee 
the stability of the exchange rate and, in a lesser extent, of prices even at the expense of the 
real sector and social interests; third, the Financial and Capital Market Commission’s 
mandate is solely to protect the interests of financial institutions and does not consider the 
interests of the general public.
27. The transformation of the industrial structure also followed the Neoliberal logic. 
First, by privatisation; second, by the reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers for imports; third, financing business was almost totally transferred to private 
banks. The labour market was reformed to have greater market flexibility, at  the same time 
most of the tax burden felt to the workforce. The result is a less-organised workforce, 
greater wage disparities, which at  the same time - at least in theory - is more adapted to 
business needs.
28. After joining the European Union, the complete openness of Latvia’s financial 
and capital accounts, together with the sentiment of low risk, changed the structure of the 
credit market. Therefore, during the period 2004–2008, there was a credit boom following 
the strategy of the foreign banks operating in Latvia. This created a bubble in the real state 
market and increased the consumption of imported durable goods. Because if these 
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sectors’ own structure, Latvia’s GDP would substantially contract with or without the 
international crisis.
29. The model developed in this dissertation is able to explain why in Latvia the 
choice of macroeconomic policy does not take in consideration economic structural 
conditions and requirements for promoting economic development. As it is empirically 
verifiable that, if Latvia is not an economic disaster it is not a success story  either, what can 
explain the adoption of concrete macroeconomic policies that resulted in the current 
situation is the lack of alternatives.
30. The model developed in this dissertation can be applied also to Latvia. At first, 
Neoliberalism was established as the economic ideology, since it  was already the 
established mainstream in the international system. Since it already has its own 
macroeconomic policies pre-determined, there was a process of political convergence to 
Neoliberal economic policies as the only  one acceptable for Latvia. This pattern is so 
strong, that even in face of the last crisis, the chosen economic policy was rather a return to 
Neoliberalism, although other economic policies could be considered. While Neoliberalism 
will be considered the economic mainstream ideology, radical changes in the Latvian 
macroeconomic policy will be limited to its ideological boundaries.
Finally, the observation of the following suggestions and recommendations are 
necessary:
1. There is a general agreement that multi-disciplinarity is necessary  for the social 
sciences to cope with today’ challenges in research. Thus, the first recommendation is 
directed at the Latvian academic community: to increase multidisciplinary research.
2. In Latvia’s case, the model developed in this dissertation is able to explain why 
the choice of macroeconomic policy does not take the economic structural conditions and 
requirements for promoting economic development into consideration. Thus, the second 
recommendation is about development of research on macroeconomic policy and Latvia’s 
growth and development, combining the interaction between the macro and micro level.
3. To research the strategies of development employed by  other countries and their 
results, making a comparison with Latvia.
4. In accordance with the model developed by  the author, Macroeconomic policy  is 
developed at the political level. However, politicians and most civil servants lack 
knowledge in economics. At the same time, the best knowledge about economics, both at 
the micro and macro level, is at the universities. Therefore, the government should rely 
more on the academic sector for economic expertise.
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Table A.1.
Brazilian Political Parties in 1989
Party Glossary
PCB Brazilian Communist Party. Follows the Soviet line.
PC do B Communist Party of Brazil. It’s an Albanian oriented party.
PDC
Christian democratic Party. Contrasting to Christian 
Democracy parties in many countries, the Brazilian 
party is on the right end of the political spectrum.
PDS
Social Democratic Party. In spite of its name, it is a 
conservative party. It provided the partisan support for 
the military dictatorship (1964-1984). It was known as 
ARENA before.
PDT Democratic Labour Party. Predominantly social democrat.
PFL Party of the Liberal Front. Created in 1984 by dissidents of the PDS. Very conservative.
PL The Liberal Party. Conservative party with strong antistatist discourse.
PMDB
Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement. Its 
precursos, the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) 
was created in 1966 as the official party of opposition 
to the military regime. It was renamed the PMDB in 
1978. Since its inception, the PMDB has been a very 
heterogenous party, nut its hegemonic group is centrist. 
Many conservatives have left the party since the 
military dictatorship end. 
PRN
Party of the National Reconstruction. A right party 
created in 1989 to enable Fernando Collor de Mello to 
run for president.
PSB Brazilian Socialist Party. An independent leftist party.
PSDB
Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy. Created in 
1988 by a dissident group of the PMDB, it follows the 
line of social democracy.
PT The Workers’ Party. A heterogenous leftist party, ranging from revolutionary groups to social democrats. 
PTB Brazilian Labour Party. Predominantly a center-right party.
Source: Author, adapted from Mainwaring, S. (1992). “Brazilian Party  Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective”. 
Political Science Quaterly, vol. 107, no. 4, pp. 677-707 , p. 680
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Table A.2.
Ordinal Regression Results of Preference for State Intervention in the Economy and 
Personal Positioning in the Left- Right Scale in 1989 - Electors
Model Fitting Information -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept Only 147,942
Final 109,504 38,439 4 0,000
Goodness-of-Fit Chi-Square df Sig.
Pearson 54,048 4 0,000
Deviance 53,631 4 0,000
Pseudo R-Square
Nagelkerke 0,032
Test of Parallel Lines -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Null Hypothesis 109,504
General 55,872 53,631 4 0,000
Table A.3.
Ordinal Regression Results of Preference for State Intervention in the Economy and 
Personal Positioning in the Left- Right Scale in 1993 - Electors
Model Fitting Information -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept Only 149,87
Final 93,847 56,023 4 0,000
Goodness-of-Fit Chi-Square df Sig.
Pearson 11,084 8 0,197
Deviance 10,714 8 0,218
Pseudo R-Square
Nagelkerke 0,028
Test of Parallel Lines -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Null Hypothesis 93,847
General 83,133 10,714 8 0,218
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Table A.4.
Ordinal Regression Results of Preference for State Intervention in the Economy and 
Personal Positioning in the Left - Right Scale in 1990 - Politicians
Model Fitting Information -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept Only 88,717
Final 31,834 56,883 4 0,000
Goodness-of-Fit Chi-Square df Sig.
Pearson 3,079 8 0,929
Deviance 4,383 8 0,821
Pseudo R-Square
Nagelkerke 0,379
Test of Parallel Lines -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Null Hypothesis 31,834
General 27,450 4,383 8 0,821
Table A.5.
Ordinal Regression Results of Preference for State Intervention in the Economy and 
Personal Positioning in the Left - Right Scale in 1997 - Politicians
Model Fitting Information -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept Only 75,374
Final 25,831 49,543 4 0,000
Goodness-of-Fit Chi-Square df Sig.
Pearson 2,514 8 0,961
Deviance 3,942 8 0,862
Pseudo R-Square
Nagelkerke 0,375
Test of Parallel Lines -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Null Hypothesis 25,831
General 21,889 3,942 8 0,862
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Table A.6.
Ordinal Regression Results of Preference for State Intervention in the Economy and 
Personal Positioning in the Left - Right Scale in 2001 - Politicians
Model Fitting Information -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept Only 53,330
Final 29,703 23,627 3 0,000
Goodness-of-Fit Chi-Square df Sig.
Pearson 5,967 6 0,427
Deviance 6,374 6 0,383
Pseudo R-Square
Nagelkerke 0,243
Test of Parallel Lines -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Null Hypothesis 29,703
General 23,329 6,374 6 0,383
Table A.7.
Ordinal Regression Results of Preference for State Intervention in the Economy and 
Personal Positioning in the Left - Right Scale in 2005 - Politicians
Model Fitting Information -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept Only 49,289
Final 28,879 20,409 4 0,000
Goodness-of-Fit Chi-Square df Sig.
Pearson 7,773 4 0,100
Deviance 9,433 4 0,051
Pseudo R-Square
Nagelkerke 0,229
Test of Parallel Lines -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Null Hypothesis 28,879
General 9,425 19,455 4 0,001
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Table A.8.
Ordinal Regression Results of Preference for State Intervention in the Economy and 
Personal Positioning in the Left - Right Scale in 2009 - Politicians
Model Fitting Information -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept Only 50,367
Final 24,001 26,355 4 0,000
Goodness-of-Fit Chi-Square df Sig.
Pearson 1,621 8 0,991
Deviance 2,532 8 0,960
Pseudo R-Square
Nagelkerke 0,256
Test of Parallel Lines -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Null Hypothesis 24,011
General 0,000 24,011 8 0,002
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